What facts/research do you have to support your disagreement?
I believe we already hashed this out, but I'll post from the other thread.
1. Certainly Iran has 'rational' reasons for seeking a nuclear weapon, that doesn't mean they should have them. I think an absolutely massive facet of this many overlook is the way in which nuclear weapons would shift the strategic calculus in the region, particularly from Iran's perspective. My point, and the point that many have made, is that a nuclear Iran obviates Iranian fears of regime change and significantly reduces their concern over a conventional strike on their territory.
As a result of this new-found security Iran would be able to more aggressively pursue its regional objectives, which revolve around regional hegemony. It's ability to project proxy forces would aggressively increase on critical fronts including Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria, Yemen, Lebanon, and the Palestinian territories. Furthermore its ability to use its nuclear capability as a buffer would significantly increase their propensity for launching limited conventional attacks at Gulf targets, or along its periphery in reaction to geopolitical tensions. The underground battle for Iraq being waged by Iranian and Gulf (primarily Saudi) agents, donors, and proxies could become overt. So many things could happen, and we can pretty clearly see many of the ones that would happen, it would be a terrible thing to allow to occur.
2. In what way is it not reflective of historical evidence or contemporary political behavior on the part of the Islamic Republic? In terms of nuclear weapons providing strategic invulnerability which leads to more aggressive proxy behavior, as well as skirting the conventional edge one need only look to the US and USSR, and in the modern day Pakistan and North Korea. While Iran today has made it a clear point of its foreign policy to extend its influence as aggressively as possible, and Iranian commentators and policy analysts consistently reflect upon the need for Iran to regain its place in the sun and to lead the anti-US anti-Saudi axis in the region which would eventually be in the ascendancy in their vision.
Plainly speaking, of course they desire regional hegemony but have been limited and relatively restrained in their ability to act. Why? Because they fear both conventional and asymmetric counter stroke. Why aren't they, and why didn't they pump guns and agents to the Houthi in Yemen? Why have they been so placid with regards to the Shia demonstrations and clashes in the Eastern Province and in Bahrain? Why have they been so keen to keep a tamp on Hezbollah and to limit their arms flow to Hamas? It goes on, and on. Because they fear tipping the scales too far and incurring an American or Gulf led counter stroke. Either conventionally, or through the arming of paramilitaries in Iran, or direct action against Iranian proxies.
With that fear obviated by nuclear security Iran would be much more aggressive, and much more capable and unconstrained to use its 'deadly swam of mosquito forces' in all forms. They could surge weapons to Hezbollah and see them used on Israel or the Lebanese government with impunity, knowing retaliation against them will be tremendously limited. They can send military formations to Iraq without fear of the spillover crossing back into Iran. They can arm the Shia in the Eastern Province with explosives, and send weapons and IRGC agents to Yemen, why? Because the ability to act against them has been more or less taken off the table.
3. I'm not sure how you think nations with nuclear weapons behave, but the prevailing doctrine in both academic and strategic literature and policy analysis is a litany of references to the strategic implications of a nuclear weapon state and how such capability augments the capacity of a country to behave assertively and forcefully within its periphery and abroad. The most highly cited example in history is that of the US and USSR for obvious reasons. Moreover there are plenty of contemporary or near past examples to examine. I'm not sure what you are getting at. This is not a discussion of MAD, that is a separate issue and a valid one.
Furthermore you have missed my point. I'm not saying Iran would pass along chemical weapons to Hezbollah, that probably would cross a redline even if the state had nuclear weapons and would incite a like minded retaliation. The issue is that Iran has consistently, since the 1979 revolution, sought regional hegemony with a religious-nationalist tint. In pursuit of this it has incited and attempted to foment rebellions in Saudi Arabia and along the Gulf littoral, it has battled for control over the future of Iraq in the hopes of winning another firm ally, extended ties to the Houthi rebels of Northern Yemen as a possible conduit for Iranian power to upset Saudi power in Yemen and Najran and Asir, it has pursued the creation of strong proxies in Lebanon to balance against Israel and to assist in the cementing of power with Syria, and of course it has funneled weapons and aid to Hamas as a means to counterbalance the GCC backed Palestinian Authority, etc etc.
A nuclear weapon would significantly reduce Iran's reasons for limited its assistance to these groups and in restraining its activities abroad. Why? Because a nuclear option no matter how weak massively reduces the prospect that a Western or Gulf coalition will strike back at you. It adds a tremendous layer of doubt to every possible conventional or unconventional encounter.
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From our prior discussion.
