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Some, including UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon have suggested that Israel should lift its blockade of the Gaza Strip. The maritime blockade of the Gaza Strip was put in place to avoid the smuggling of weapons, weapon components, and other materials that could be used for military applications to the Hamas-run Gaza Strip. Like any other state, Israel has an inherent right of self-defense and the blockade represents a passive means of self-defense. At the same time, Israel continues to permit humanitarian aid to flow into the Gaza Strip.
If the blockade is to be lifted, advocates of doing so have the burden of offering a mechanism that would serve Israel’s security needs. Therefore, they would need to develop or offer an alternative mechanism that would be at least as effective in preventing weapons, weapon components, and materials that could be used for military applications from flowing into the Gaza Strip.
Moreover, the mechanism would need to be credible. Mere promises without robust and detailed enforcement mechanisms would not suffice. After all, following the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah fighting, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1701 that called for, among other things, “full implementation of the relevant provisions of the Taif Accords, and of resolutions 1559 (2004) and 1680 (2006), that require the disarmament of all armed groups in Lebanon…” It also required:
…that all States shall take the necessary measures to prevent, by their nationals or from their territories or using their flag vessels or aircraft: (a) The sale or supply to any entity or individual in Lebanon of arms and related materiel of all types, including weapons and ammunition, military vehicles and equipment, paramilitary equipment, and spare parts for the aforementioned, whether or not originating in their territories…
In other words, that resolution prohibited the transfer of weapons to Hezbollah and required its being disarmed. Some four years later, Hezbollah has replenished its arsenal and is arguably in a stronger armed position vis-à-vis Lebanon’s military forces than in 2006. In other words, the resolution lacked enforcement machinery and its implementation proved hollow. Given its security needs, words alone are not acceptable. Israel should not accept any framework that lacks an adequate enforcement mechanism to fulfill the purpose served by the maritime blockade of the Gaza Strip.
Furthermore, in the recent past, the UN Security Council took no substantive measures to rein in Hamas’ rocket attacks on Israel. As a result, Israel was left alone to defend the lives and wellbeing of its citizens. That past lack of responsiveness by the UN adds to the need for any framework aimed at lifting the Gaza maritime blockade to contain strong and credible enforcement mechanisms.
On a separate matter, Turkey’s foreign minister suggested that his country would “normalize” its ties with Israel were Israel to end the Gaza blockade. Even as such a proposition might sound attractive, it is not.
Relationships rest on interests. What Turkey is proposing, in effect, is to restore a relationship it had ended, but only if Israel pays a price. Any partner that breaks a relationship and then insists on payment to restore the status quo ante is an unreliable partner. If Israel meets Turkey’s condition, there is no assurance that Turkey might not repeat the cycle down the road, downgrading relations and then asking for new payment for a restoration of those relations. Instead, if the relationship is to be restored to its earlier standing, interests alone should drive that development.
If the blockade is to be lifted, advocates of doing so have the burden of offering a mechanism that would serve Israel’s security needs. Therefore, they would need to develop or offer an alternative mechanism that would be at least as effective in preventing weapons, weapon components, and materials that could be used for military applications from flowing into the Gaza Strip.
Moreover, the mechanism would need to be credible. Mere promises without robust and detailed enforcement mechanisms would not suffice. After all, following the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah fighting, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1701 that called for, among other things, “full implementation of the relevant provisions of the Taif Accords, and of resolutions 1559 (2004) and 1680 (2006), that require the disarmament of all armed groups in Lebanon…” It also required:
…that all States shall take the necessary measures to prevent, by their nationals or from their territories or using their flag vessels or aircraft: (a) The sale or supply to any entity or individual in Lebanon of arms and related materiel of all types, including weapons and ammunition, military vehicles and equipment, paramilitary equipment, and spare parts for the aforementioned, whether or not originating in their territories…
In other words, that resolution prohibited the transfer of weapons to Hezbollah and required its being disarmed. Some four years later, Hezbollah has replenished its arsenal and is arguably in a stronger armed position vis-à-vis Lebanon’s military forces than in 2006. In other words, the resolution lacked enforcement machinery and its implementation proved hollow. Given its security needs, words alone are not acceptable. Israel should not accept any framework that lacks an adequate enforcement mechanism to fulfill the purpose served by the maritime blockade of the Gaza Strip.
Furthermore, in the recent past, the UN Security Council took no substantive measures to rein in Hamas’ rocket attacks on Israel. As a result, Israel was left alone to defend the lives and wellbeing of its citizens. That past lack of responsiveness by the UN adds to the need for any framework aimed at lifting the Gaza maritime blockade to contain strong and credible enforcement mechanisms.
On a separate matter, Turkey’s foreign minister suggested that his country would “normalize” its ties with Israel were Israel to end the Gaza blockade. Even as such a proposition might sound attractive, it is not.
Relationships rest on interests. What Turkey is proposing, in effect, is to restore a relationship it had ended, but only if Israel pays a price. Any partner that breaks a relationship and then insists on payment to restore the status quo ante is an unreliable partner. If Israel meets Turkey’s condition, there is no assurance that Turkey might not repeat the cycle down the road, downgrading relations and then asking for new payment for a restoration of those relations. Instead, if the relationship is to be restored to its earlier standing, interests alone should drive that development.
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