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Ah I get the jist of what you're trying to say, but I'd like to make an adaption to it.
What you are saying is that Khrushchev wanted a level playing field. This could be achieved by with a status quo of missiles in Turkey and Cuba or with a absence of both. However the United States couldn't stand-by with Missiles a stone's throw away from Miami. So the only real end result would be mutual "demisslizing" of those areas.
If this is the case though would you say the Cuban missile crisis was actually no real crisis at all?
Actually if I'm not mistaken didn't we never actually take our missiles out of Turkey?
The "Cuban Missile Crises" was real, we came extremely close to war.
JFK ordered the NATO missiles in Turkey to be removed, They were.
This caused a problem in NATO, JFK was not the commander of NATO and had no authority of issuing the order without involving the other NATO members.
>" On Saturday evening, after a day of tense discussions within the "ExComm" or Executive Committee of senior advisers, President Kennedy decided on a dual strategy—a formal letter to Khrushchev accepting the implicit terms of his October 26 letter (a U.S. non-invasion pledge in exchange for the verifiable departure of Soviet nuclear missiles), coupled with private assurances to Khrushchev that the United States would speedily take out its missiles from Turkey, but only on the basis of a secret understanding, not as an open agreement that would appear to the public, and to NATO allies, as a concession to blackmail. The U.S. president elected to transmit this sensitive message through his brother, Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy, who met in his office at the Justice Department with Soviet ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin... "<
The Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962: Anatomy of a Controversey