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What If Iran Had Invaded Mexico?

Is this a fair and accurate analogy?

  • Yes

    Votes: 5 31.3%
  • No

    Votes: 3 18.8%
  • Maybe (if other conditions were present)

    Votes: 5 31.3%
  • Not even close!

    Votes: 3 18.8%

  • Total voters
    16
CIA's Track I aimed at bringing about conditions in which the Frei gambit could take place. To do this, the CIA, at the direction of the 40 Committee, mobilized on interlocking political action, economic, and propaganda campaign. As part of its political action program, the CIA attempted indirectly to induce President Frei at least to consent to the gambit or, better yet assist in its implementation. The Agency felt that pressures from those whose opinion and views he valued -in combination with certain propaganda activities- represented the only hope of converting Frei. In Europe and Latin America, influential members of the Christian Democratic movement and the Catholic Church were prompted either to visit or contact Frei. In spite of these efforts, Frei refused to interfere with the constitutional process, and the re-election gambit died.

As previously noted, U.S. efforts to prevent Aliende's assumption of office operated on two tracks between September 4 and October 24. Track II was initiated by President Nixon on September 15 when he instructed the CIA to play a direct role in organizing a military coup d'etat in Chile. The Agency was to take this action without coordination with the Departments of State or Defense and without informing the U.S. Ambassador. While coup possibilities in general and other means of seeking to prevent Allende's accession to power were explored by the 40 Committee throughout this period, the 40 Committee never discussed this direct CIA role. In practice, the Agency was to report, both for informational and approval purposes, to the White House.

Between October 5 and October 20 1970, the CIA made 21 contacts with key military and Carabinero (police) officials in Chile. Those Chileans who were inclined to stage a coup were given assurances of strong support at the highest levels of the U.S. Government both before and after a coup.

After the failure of Track II, the CIA rebuilt its network of contacts and remained close to Chilean military officers in order to monitor developments within the armed forces. For their part, Chilean officers who were aware that the United States once had sought a coup to prevent Allende from becoming president must have been sensitive to indications of continuing U.S. support for a coup.

By September 1971 a new network of agents was in place and the Station was receiving almost daily reports of new coup plotting. The Station and Headquarters began to explore ways to use this network. At the same time, and in parallel, the Station and Headquarters discussed a "deception operation" designed to alert Chilean officers to real or purported Cuban involvement in the Chilean army. Throughout the fall of 1971 the Station and Headquarters carried on a dialogue about both the general question of what to do with the intelligence network and the objectives of the specific operation.

TABLE III.-MILITARY ASSISTANCE (1)
Fiscal Year Programed Delivered
1966 $8,806,000 $8,366,000
1967 4,143,000 4,766,000
1968 1,801,000 7,507,000
1969 734,000 2,662,000
1970 852,000 1,966,000
1971 698,000 1,033,000
1972 870,000 2,227,000
1973 941,000 918,000
1974 912,000 619,000

(1) Figures are from a Department of Defense response to a Senate Select Committee document request and are unclassified.

TABLE IV.-MILITARY SALES (1)
Fiscal Year Orders Delivered
1966 $1,057,000 $1,490,000
1967 2,559,000 1,690,000
1968 4,077,000 2,100,000
1969 1,676,000 2,147,000
1970 7,503,000 9,145,000
1971 2,886,000 2,958,000
1972 6.238,000 4,583,000
1973 14,972,000 2,242,000
1974 76,120,000 4,860,000

(1) Figures are from a Department of Defense response to a Senate Select Committee document request and are unclassified.

TABLE V.- TRAINING IN PANAMA (1)
Fiscal Year Number of people
1966 68
1967 57
1968 169
1969 107
1970 181
1971 146
1972 197
1973 257
1974 268

(1) Figures are from a Department of Defense response to a Senate Select Committee document request and are unclassified.

The Station proposed, in September, to provide information -some of it fabricated by the CIA- which would convince senior Chilean Army officers that the Carabineros' Investigations unit, with the approval of Allende was acting in concert with Cuban intelligence (DGI) to gather intelligence prejudicial to the Army high command. It was hoped that the ettort would arouse the military against Allende's involvement with the Cubans, inducing the armed services to press the government to alter its orientation and to move against it if necessary. A month later CIA Headquarters suggested that the deception operation be shelved, in favor of passing "verifiable" information to the leader of the coup group which Headquarters and the Station perceived as having the highest probability of success.

After a further Station request, Headquarters agreed to the operation with the objective of educating senior Chilean officers and keeping them on alert. In December 1971 a packet of material, including a fabricated letter, was passed to a Chilean officer outside Chile. The CIA did not receive any subsequent reports on the effect if any, this "information" had on the Chilean military. While the initial conception of the operation had included a series of such passages, no further packets were passed.

The Station/Headquarters dialogue over the use of the intelligence network paralleled the discussion of the deception operation. In November the Station suggested that the ultimate objective of the military penetration program was a military coup. Headquarters responded by rejecting that formulation of the objective, cautioning that the CIA did not have 40 Committee approval to become involved in a coup. However, Headquarters acknowledged the difficulty of drawing a firm line between monitoring coup plotting and becoming involved in it. It also realized that the U.S. government's desire to be in clandestine contract with military plotters, for whatever purpose, might well imply to them U.S. support for their future plans.

During I970-73, the Station collected operational intelligence necessary in the event of a coup -arrest lists, key civilian installations and personnel that needed protection, key government installations which need to be taken over, and government contingency plans which would be used in case of a military uprising. According to the CIA the data was collected only against the contingency of future Headquarters requests and was never passed to the Chilean military.

The intelligence network continued to report throughout 1972 and 1973 on coup plotting activities. During 1972 the Station continued to monitor the group which might mount a successful coup, and it spent a significantly greater amount of time and effort penetrating this group than it had on previous groups. This group had originally come to the Station's attention in October 1971. By January 1972 the Station had successfully penetrated it and was in contact through an intermediary with its leader.

During late 1971 and early 1972, the CIA adopted a more active stance vis a vis its military penetration program, including a short-lived effort to subsidize a small anti-government news pamphlet directed at the armed services, its compilation of arrest lists and other operational data, and its deception operation.

Intelligence reporting on coup plotting reached two peak periods, one in the last week of June 1973 and the other during the end of August and the first two weeks in September. It is clear the CIA received intelligence reports on the coup planning of the group which carried out the successful September 11 coup throughout the months of July, August, and September 1973.

The CIA's information-gathering efforts with regard to the Chilean military included activity which went beyond the mere collection of information. More generally, those efforts must be viewed in the context of United States opposition, overt and covert, to the Allende government. They put the United States Government in contact with those Chileans who sought a military alternative to the Allende presidency.

http://foia.state.gov/Reports/ChurchReport.asp Dot Gov. QED.

And there you have it. So, Amercica had zip, zero, nada to do with that coup, did they? Are you sure?


Duke
 
Many thanks Duke.

I'll field the Iranian example for you.

This issue of Mossadeq as some kind of strong man needs to be dealt with. The issue of justified interference comes down I think to how much of a democrat Mossadeq was, although just because he may not be much of a democrat is not of course an excuse for foreign intervention.

Its clear from ToT that although Mossadeq and his party were the most honestly elected people in the Parliament/ Majlis there is some doubt over his democratic credentials due to the fact that the referendum on the dissolution of the Majlis was held with separete boxes for the simple YES or NO option and that the referendum was not held simultaneously across the country.
I tend to give this man the benefit of the doubt in this circumstance for these reasons;

i/ His government was subject to continual subterfuge and sabotage by the forces outside Iran while the country suffered under a British imposed blockade.
ii/ Iran was not long used to proper conduct of ballots, especially snap referendums.
iii/ Mossadeq previous record in public life is immpecable. In fact he had avoided leadership of the country until he was challenged by a right wing member of the Majlis to take a positive step. He called the man's bluff and was put in power on a wave of enthusiasm.
iv/
Although the referedum was crudely handled the popular support of the National Front is clear for very good historical reasons, making it likely that he would have won the referendum by some margin even if it had been done simultaneously with one voting booth.
v/ During his time in office he won support in the Majlis for tinkering with the system of representation - changing the Senate tenure from 6 to 2 years for example. This can be looked at as some attempt to subvert democracy however, you can also see it as his moves to reform an antiquated system. It should also be noted that Shah not long before had extended his powers over the country without any support.
 
Next we should be also mentioning Venezuela. But I'll let ToT try to defend US actions there first.
 
"The United States sought in 1970 to foment a military coup in Chile; after 1970 it adopted a policy both overt and covert, of opposition to Allende; and it remained in intelligence contact with the Chilean military, including officers who were participating in coup plotting.

The CIA gave support in 1970 to one group whose tacticts became more violent over time. Through 1971 that group received American money through third parties for specific purpose. And it is possible that money was passed to these groups on the extreme right from CIA-supported opposition political parties.

After Frei's decisive majority victory, in which he received 57 percent of the vote, he began to implement what he called a "revolution in liberty". That included ñagrarian, tax, and housing reform. To deal with the American copper companies, Frei proposed "Chileanization", by which the state would purchase majority ownership in order to exercise control and stimulate output.


In the clandestine collection of intelligence, the purpose of the relationship is the gathering of information. A CIA officer establishes a relationship with a foreign "asset" -paid or unpaid- in a party or government institution in order to find out what is going on inside that party or institution. There is typically no attempt made by the CIA officer to influence the actions of the "asset". Yet even that kind of covert relationship may have political significance. Witness the maintenance of CIA's and military attaches' contacts with the Chilean military after the inauguration of Salvador Allende: although the purpose was information-gathering, the United States maintained links to the group most likely to overthrow the new president. To do so was to walk a tightrope; the distinction between collecting information and exercising influence was inherently hard to maintain. Since the Chilean military perceived its actions to be contingent to some degree on the attitude of the U.S. government, those possibilities for exercising influence scarcely would have had to be consciously manipulated."


Duke

Yep just as I suspected you have absolutely 0 evidence that we supported the 1973 coup plotters. Thanx for playing been real fun. ;)
 
Many thanks Duke.

I'll field the Iranian example for you.

This issue of Mossadeq as some kind of strong man needs to be dealt with. The issue of justified interference comes down I think to how much of a democrat Mossadeq was, although just because he may not be much of a democrat is not of course an excuse for foreign intervention.

Its clear from ToT that although Mossadeq and his party were the most honestly elected people in the Parliament/ Majlis there is some doubt over his democratic credentials due to the fact that the referendum on the dissolution of the Majlis was held with separete boxes for the simple YES or NO option and that the referendum was not held simultaneously across the country.
I tend to give this man the benefit of the doubt in this circumstance for these reasons;

i/ His government was subject to continual subterfuge and sabotage by the forces outside Iran while the country suffered under a British imposed blockade.
ii/ Iran was not long used to proper conduct of ballots, especially snap referendums.
iii/ Mossadeq previous record in public life is immpecable. In fact he had avoided leadership of the country until he was challenged by a right wing member of the Majlis to take a positive step. He called the man's bluff and was put in power on a wave of enthusiasm.
iv/
Although the referedum was crudely handled the popular support of the National Front is clear for very good historical reasons, making it likely that he would have won the referendum by some margin even if it had been done simultaneously with one voting booth.
v/ During his time in office he won support in the Majlis for tinkering with the system of representation - changing the Senate tenure from 6 to 2 years for example. This can be looked at as some attempt to subvert democracy however, you can also see it as his moves to reform an antiquated system. It should also be noted that Shah not long before had extended his powers over the country without any support.

The only thing one needs to know about Mossadegh's "referendum" is that he recieved 99.9% of the vote and with these obviously fraudulent results he dissolved parliament and granted himself dictatorial control over Iran. The Shah afterall was the head of state according to the Iranian constitution, not Mossadegh, and his re-insertion into power was not a coup it was a counter coup.
 
Yep just as I suspected you have absolutely 0 evidence that we supported the 1973 coup plotters. Thanx for playing been real fun. ;)

OK...lemme get this straight.

You willingly accept low level evidence that supports your opinion in this case, or rather toss the weak information aside for lack of clarity. But use a similarly vague argument to support your own opinion when its all you have?

http://www.debatepolitics.com/polls/19548-what-if-iran-had-invaded-mexico.html#post528968


Interesting debate tactics
 
OK...lemme get this straight.

You willingly accept low level evidence that supports your opinion in this case, or rather toss the weak information aside for lack of clarity. But use a similarly vague argument to support your own opinion when its all you have?

http://www.debatepolitics.com/polls/19548-what-if-iran-had-invaded-mexico.html#post528968


Interesting debate tactics

Not exactly sure what you're trying to say, but the fact of the matter is that there is 0 evidence that we supported the 1973 coup plotters.
 
I'm afraid you are totally wrong.

U.S. Dept. of State FOIA - Church Report (Covert Action in Chile 1963-1973)

I've got it all worked out for you in the next posts.

No you don't because there is no evidence to support your assertion.


Yes we know that brutal genocidal sandinista regime the created the Nicaraguan equivalent to Castro's CDR secret police force was Democratic in nature. :roll: And again when was the Sandinista regime overthrown.


So you bought Allende's opposition propaganda campaign as God-given fact? That's just pathetic. What's more, you don't even provide a link.


lmfao, ya umm the Chilean Deputy of Chambers is the equivalent to our House of Representatives, the Chilean Supreme Court also passed a similar resolution on May 26, 1973.


See above. You are so certain you are right, but you are so, so wrong. It's comically tragic.


Duke

I'm not wrong, you have yet to post one scrap of evidence that the U.S. either directly or indirectly supported the 1973 coup plotters.
 
Not exactly sure what you're trying to say, but the fact of the matter is that there is 0 evidence that we supported the 1973 coup plotters.

My mistake, I linked the wrong thread. I was refering to your acceptance of this as fact..

http://www.debatepolitics.com/break...link-same-day-pentagon-denial.html#post528426

"Ya I've read that to regardless of whether Saddam was involved in the plot or not the undisputable fact of the matter is that he gave him sanctuary and a salary after the bombing IE he was harboring terrorists:"


While disregarding the information found in the current thread as having 0 evidence. By your own criteria, neither can be accepted as truth.
 
Yep just as I suspected you have absolutely 0 evidence that we supported the 1973 coup plotters. Thanx for playing been real fun. ;)

Oh? Oh really? Is that so? Then why did the CIA admit it?

http://www.cnn.com/2000/WORLD/americas/09/19/us.cia.chile.ap/

WASHINGTON (AP) -- The CIA is acknowledging for the first time the extent of its deep involvement in Chile, where it dealt with coup-plotters, false propagandists and assassins.

http://archives.cnn.com/2000/WORLD/americas/11/13/cia.chile.02/

WASHINGTON -- U.S. officials released documents on Monday acknowledging the CIA had provided covert aid 30 years ago to undermine Chile's government, but analysts say some of the most important documents have not yet been made public.

"The documents that would be revealing ... are still missing and still need to be declassified," Peter Kornbluh, Chile Documentation Project director at the National Security Archive, told CNN. The National Security Archive is a nonprofit organization that has campaigned for release of the documents.

One document, Kornbluh said, indicates that in 1991 the CIA destroyed a file on Manuel Contreras, the former head of Chile's secret police now serving a sentence for the 1976 car bombing in Washington that killed Orlando Letelier, a prominent Chilean opposition leader. Letelier's American assistant Ronni Moffitt also died in the blast.

You can deny it all you want, but the facts aren't going anywhere.


Duke
 
Yes we know that brutal genocidal sandinista regime the created the Nicaraguan equivalent to Castro's CDR secret police force was Democratic in nature. :roll: And again when was the Sandinista regime overthrown.

Cuba was a pure dictatorship; the Sandinistas were instituting democratic reforms. But don't get me wrong, I don't like them much. They were too socialist for me. But this isn't the point: The point is that our actions in Nicuragua, Chile, Panama, and Guatemala were decidedly undemocratic. Your post that started this showed your belief that America is always pro-democracy overseas: That if we were them, we would establish a democracy. But I'm here to pull the wool off your eyes; it just isn't so. America has found herself on the opposite side of democracy since the Monroe Doctrine. The high moral ground isn't ours either.


Duke
 
"All we are is the air that we breathe" - the Hollies

The purpose of this thread, is to prove beyond a reasonable doubt, the gullability of some American's and the failure of the mainstream (corporate) media in disseminating the truth of our foreign policy, which has resulted in the suppression of the Marketplace of Ideas.

The proof of this can be illustrated in this basic premise...It should be noted, in discussing the following scenario, is the concept of American propaganda. Many on this board echo this behavior like Pavlov's Dog. This is the formula...If we are to put things in perspective with Iran and the seizure of British sailors, we must look at the shoe on the other foot.

Now the scenario for the thread...Is this a fair and accurate analogy?

Is this the air that you breathe?

I am going to ignore what ever pro-terrorist sympathizer rhetoric you may be spewing and answer the following question.
"What If Iran Had Invaded Mexico?"

What if Iran had invade Mexico?,the retards in the pro-illegals camp would still spew open border's nonsense and Iran wouldn't have to use for to invade us.Iran would just do what Mexico and other countries are already doing which is walk across our borders,steal our jobs,get traitors within to accommodate them with bilingual garbage and benefits.
 
My mistake, I linked the wrong thread. I was refering to your acceptance of this as fact..

http://www.debatepolitics.com/break...link-same-day-pentagon-denial.html#post528426

"Ya I've read that to regardless of whether Saddam was involved in the plot or not the undisputable fact of the matter is that he gave him sanctuary and a salary after the bombing IE he was harboring terrorists:"


While disregarding the information found in the current thread as having 0 evidence. By your own criteria, neither can be accepted as truth.

How do you figure it is beyond dispute that Saddam gave Yasin safe haven thus being guilty of harboring terrorists? It is not beyond repute that the U.S. supported the 1973 coup plotters because there is no evidence to that effect.
 
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Cuba was a pure dictatorship; the Sandinistas were instituting democratic reforms. But don't get me wrong, I don't like them much. They were too socialist for me. But this isn't the point: The point is that our actions in Nicuragua, Chile, Panama, and Guatemala were decidedly undemocratic. Your post that started this showed your belief that America is always pro-democracy overseas: That if we were them, we would establish a democracy. But I'm here to pull the wool off your eyes; it just isn't so. America has found herself on the opposite side of democracy since the Monroe Doctrine. The high moral ground isn't ours either.


Duke


Sorry Communist regimes do not evolve into Democracies unless they adobt capitalism they devolve into totalitarian governments as is the case for every Communist society in the history of the world. Furthermore; through our support of capitalist regimes in those nations we were able to hold communism at bay and all of those nations are free today. And when it comes to us and Iran you better believe that we hold the moral high ground on every level.
 
Oh? Oh really? Is that so? Then why did the CIA admit it?

CNN.com - CIA acknowledges involvement in Allende's overthrow, Pinochet's rise - September 19, 2000



CNN.com - Documents reveal U.S. funding for Chile coup - November 13, 2000



You can deny it all you want, but the facts aren't going anywhere.


Duke

Which coup plotters were they referring to? Oh ya it was the 1970 coup plotters not the ones of 1973, infact the CIA has stated the exact opposite in regards to the coup:

Regarding Pinochet's rise to power, the CIA undertook a comprehensive analysis of its records and individual memoirs as well as conducting interviews with former agents, and concluded in a report issued in 2000 that the CIA "did not assist Pinochet to assume the Presidency." [13]

Again I'm right you're wrong thanx for playing. ;)
 
Which coup plotters were they referring to? Oh ya it was the 1970 coup plotters not the ones of 1973, infact the CIA has stated the exact opposite in regards to the coup:


CIA acknowledges involvement in Allende's overthrow, Pinochet's rise


LET ME SEE! THE CIA WAS INVOLVED WITH THE RISE OF PINOCHET! HE CAME TO POWER IN THE 1973 COUP! WHAT DOES THAT TELL US? IF THE CIA WAS INVOLVED WHEN PINOCHET CAME TO POWER, THIS MEANS THAT THE CIA HAD SOMETHING TO DO WITH PINOCHET'S RISE TO POWER, THE COUP! DO YOU THINK THIS COULD POSSIBLY MEAN THAT THE CIA WAS INVOLVED WITH ALLENDE'S OVERTHROW, TOO, AND PINOCHET'S RISE TO POWER? WOW, I NEVER THOUGHT OF IT THAT WAY!

http://archives.cnn.com/2000/WORLD/americas/11/13/cia.chile.02/

U.S. officials released 16,000 government documents on Monday, including a CIA memorandum indicating $1 million in covert aid had been given to Chilean opposition parties in an effort to undermine then-Chilean President Salvador Allende socialist government.

THIS LINK SAYS THAT WE GAVE ONE MILLION DOLLARS TO THE COUP PLOTTERS! COULD THIS MEAN THAT THE CIA WAS INVOLVED IN THE COUP? NO, THAT'S IMPOSSIBLE! TRAJAN TOLD ME THAT THE CIA HAD ZIP, ZERO, NOTHING TO DO WITH IT!!!


Duke
 
Sorry Communist regimes do not evolve into Democracies unless they adobt capitalism they devolve into totalitarian governments as is the case for every Communist society in the history of the world. Furthermore; through our support of capitalist regimes in those nations we were able to hold communism at bay and all of those nations are free today. And when it comes to us and Iran you better believe that we hold the moral high ground on every level.

Right. I mean, a country is never more moral than when they overthrow another country's functioning democracy and establish a fascist, totalitarian dictatorship in its place. I cannot imagine one single thing we could do for another country that could be better than overthrow the leader that their people elected and put in a genocidal tyrant. That just speaks volumes of democratic compassion. And what's more, we did it for our American companies, ITT and United Fruit Co. See? Our motives were as pure as spring water too. Incidents like these remove all doubt that, throughout history, America has always held the high moral ground. I mean, it's abundantly apparent, especially when we do such lovely things such as installing tyrants.


Duke
 
CIA acknowledges involvement in Allende's overthrow, Pinochet's rise


LET ME SEE! THE CIA WAS INVOLVED WITH THE RISE OF PINOCHET! HE CAME TO POWER IN THE 1973 COUP! WHAT DOES THAT TELL US? IF THE CIA WAS INVOLVED WHEN PINOCHET CAME TO POWER, THIS MEANS THAT THE CIA HAD SOMETHING TO DO WITH PINOCHET'S RISE TO POWER, THE COUP! DO YOU THINK THIS COULD POSSIBLY MEAN THAT THE CIA WAS INVOLVED WITH ALLENDE'S OVERTHROW, TOO, AND PINOCHET'S RISE TO POWER? WOW, I NEVER THOUGHT OF IT THAT WAY!

CNN.com - Documents reveal U.S. funding for Chile coup - November 13, 2000



THIS LINK SAYS THAT WE GAVE ONE MILLION DOLLARS TO THE COUP PLOTTERS! COULD THIS MEAN THAT THE CIA WAS INVOLVED IN THE COUP? NO, THAT'S IMPOSSIBLE! TRAJAN TOLD ME THAT THE CIA HAD ZIP, ZERO, NOTHING TO DO WITH IT!!!


Duke

No it doesn't, it says that we gave money to "opposition parties," not the "1973 coup plotters," again there is 0 evidence that we supported the coup plotters, save yourself the trouble of looking because it doesn't exist.
 
Right. I mean, a country is never more moral than when they overthrow another country's functioning democracy and establish a fascist, totalitarian dictatorship in its place.

Chile and Nicaragua were not functioning democracies.

I cannot imagine one single thing we could do for another country that could be better than overthrow the leader that their people elected and put in a genocidal tyrant.

Pinochet was not genocidal and we didn't put him into power in the first place, if any of the regimes you mentioned was gencoidal it was the sandinista regime.

That just speaks volumes of democratic compassion. And what's more, we did it for our American companies, ITT and United Fruit Co. See? Our motives were as pure as spring water too. Incidents like these remove all doubt that, throughout history, America has always held the high moral ground. I mean, it's abundantly apparent, especially when we do such lovely things such as installing tyrants.


Duke

We didn't install Pinochet, the closest example you have is the removal of Arbenz, but Arbenz was instituting communist reforms at the time. These "land reforms," were the first step in Castro's Cuba and Hugo Chavez's Venezuela as well and we all know how that turned out. Funny that Arbenz moved to Moscow following his ousting.
 
Originally posted by TOT:
Pinochet was not genocidal and we didn't put him into power in the first place, if any of the regimes you mentioned was gencoidal it was the sandinista regime.

We didn't install Pinochet, the closest example you have is the removal of Arbenz, but Arbenz was instituting communist reforms at the time. These "land reforms," were the first step in Castro's Cuba and Hugo Chavez's Venezuela as well and we all know how that turned out. Funny that Arbenz moved to Moscow following his ousting.
Do you realize with each post, you are proving more and more the premise for this thread? The scenario was just the analogy (or vehicle) to prove the point...
The purpose of this thread, is to prove beyond a reasonable doubt, the gullability of some American's and the failure of the mainstream (corporate) media in disseminating the truth of our foreign policy, which has resulted in the suppression of the Marketplace of Ideas.

The proof of this can be illustrated in this basic premise...

...the Party Line...becomes beyond question, beyond thought itself, like the air we breathe.
...and no one demonstates this better than you!

One more thing, Duke kicked your a.s.s!
 
Do you realize with each post, you are proving more and more the premise for this thread? The scenario was just the analogy (or vehicle) to prove the point......and no one demonstates this better than you!

One more thing, Duke kicked your a.s.s!

"Party line"??? If that's what you call the truth then WTF ever. Bottom line Duke has failed to present one scrap of evidence that we supported the 1973 coup plotters, end of story, case closed, next.
 
No it doesn't, it says that we gave money to "opposition parties," not the "1973 coup plotters," again there is 0 evidence that we supported the coup plotters, save yourself the trouble of looking because it doesn't exist.

You are denying historical fact, much like David Irving or David Duke. It's disheartening and pitiful.

The reaction in Washington to Allende's plurality victory was immediate. The 40 Committee met on September 8 and 14 to discuss what action should be taken prior to the October 24 congressional vote. On September 15, President Nixon informed CIA Director Richard Helms that an Allende regime in Chile would not be acceptable to the United States and instructed the CIA to ploy a direct role in organizing a military coup d'etat in Chile to prevent Allende's accession to the Presidency.

After the failure of Track II, the CIA rebuilt its network of contacts and remained close to Chilean military officers in order to monitor developments within the armed forces. For their part, Chilean officers who were aware that the United States once had sought a coup to prevent Allende from becoming president must have been sensitive to indications of continuing U.S. support for a coup.

By September 1971 a new network of agents was in place and the Station was receiving almost daily reports of new coup plotting. The Station and Headquarters began to explore ways to use this network. At the same time, and in parallel, the Station and Headquarters discussed a "deception operation" designed to alert Chilean officers to real or purported Cuban involvement in the Chilean army. Throughout the fall of 1971 the Station and Headquarters carried on a dialogue about both the general question of what to do with the intelligence network and the objectives of the specific operation.

TABLE III.-MILITARY ASSISTANCE (1)
Fiscal Year Programed Delivered
1966 $8,806,000 $8,366,000
1967 4,143,000 4,766,000
1968 1,801,000 7,507,000
1969 734,000 2,662,000
1970 852,000 1,966,000
1971 698,000 1,033,000
1972 870,000 2,227,000
1973 941,000 918,000
1974 912,000 619,000

The military. Yes, the military that overthrew the government. The guys who did the coup. We gave them money before, during, and after the coup. What does that tell you?

Following the September 11, 1973, coup, the military Junta, led by General Augusto Pinochet, moved quickly to consolidate its newly acquired power. Political parties were banned, Congress was put in indefinite recess, press censorship was instituted, supporters of Allende and others deemed opponents of the new regime were jailed, and elections were put off indefinitely.

The prospects for the revival of democracy in Chile have improved little over the last two years. A 1975 National Intelligence Estimate stated that the Chilean armed forces were determined to oversee a prolonged political moratorium and to revamp the Chilean political system. The NIE stated that the Junta had established tight, authoritarian controls over political life in Chile which generally continued in effect. It had outlawed Marxist parties in Chile as well as other parties which had comprised Allende's coalition. In addition, the Christian Democratic and National parties had been placed in involuntary recess. These two parties were forbidden from engaging in political activity and restricted to purely housekeeping functions.

In addition, charges concerning the violation of human rights in Chile continue to be directed at the Junta. Most recently, a United Nations report on Chile charged that "torture centers" are being operated in Santiago and other parts of the country. The lengthy docu ment, issued October 14, 1975, listed 11 centers where it says prisoners are being questioned "by metbods amounting to torture." The Pinochet government had originally offered full cooperation to the U.N. group, including complete freedom of movement in Chile. However, six days before the group's arrival in Santiago the government reversed itself and notified the group that the visit was cancelled.

2. CIA Post-coup Activities in Chile

The covert action budget for Chile was cut back sharply after the coup and all the anti-Allende projects except for one, a major propaganda project, were terminated. Covert activities in Chile following the coup were either continuations or adaptations of earlier projects, rather than major new initiatives.

The goal of covert action immediately following the coup was to assist the Junta in gaining a more positive image, both at home and abroad, and to maintain access to the command levels of the Chilean government. Another goal, achieved in part through work done at the opposition research organization before the coup, was to help the new government organize and implement new policies. Project files record that. CIA collaborators were involved in preparing an initial overall economic plan which has served as the basis for the Junta's most important economic decisions.

With regard to the continuing propaganda project, a number of activities, including the production of books, a mailing effort, a military collection program, and the media coordination effort were terminated. However, access to certain Chilean media outlets was retained in order to enable the CIA Station in Santiago to help build Chilean public support for the new government as well as to influence the direction of the government, through pressures exerted by the mass media. These media outlets attempted to present the Junta in the most positive light for the Chilean public and to assist foreign journalists in Chile to obtain facts about the local situation. Further, two CIA collaborators assisted the Junta in preparing a White Book of the Change of Government in Chile. The White Book published by the Junta shortly after the coup, was written to justify the overthrow of Allende. It was distributed widely both in Washington and in other foreign capitals.

Afer the coup, the CIA renewed liaison relations with the Chilean government's security and intelligence forces, relations which had been disrupted during the Allende period. Concern was expressed within the CIA that liaison with such organizations would lay the Agency open to charges of aiding political repression; officials acknowledged that, while most of CIA's support to the various Chilean forces would be designed to assist them in controlling subversion from abroad, the support could be adaptable to the control of internal subversion as well. However, the CIA made it clear to the Chileans at the outset that no CIA support would be provided for use in internal political repression. Furthermore, the CIA attempted to influence the Junta to maintain the norms the Junta had set in its "Instructious for Handling of Detainees" which closely followed the standards on human rights set by the 1949 Geneva Convention.

We assisted and helped those who executed the coup in the days following. What does that tell you?

The CIA is in a large responsible for the destruction of a democratic government, and it supported the fascistic and genocidal regime that followed thereafter. This is historical fact.


Duke
 
Timeline:

The 40 Committee is the CIA group on the Chile situation.

1970

March 25 40 Committee approves $125,000 for a "spoiling operation" against Allende's Popular Unity coalition (UP).

June The possibility of an Allende victory in Chile is raised at an ITT Board of Directors meeting. John McCone, former CIA Director, and, at the time, a consultant to the Agency and a Director of ITT, subsequently holds a number of conversations regarding Chile with Richard Helms, the current CIA Director.

June 27 40 Committee approves $300,000 for additional anti- Allende propaganda operations.

July 16 John McCone arranges for William Broe (CIA) to talk with Harold Geneen (ITT). Broe tells Geneen that CIA cannot disburse ITT funds but promises to advise ITT on how to channel its own funds. ITT later passes $350,000 to the Alessandri campaign through an intermediary.

August 18 National Security Study Memorandum (NSSM) 97 is reviewed by the Interdepartmental Group; the Group considers options ranging from efforts to forge amicable relations with Allende to opposition to him.

September 4 Salvador Allende wins 36.3 percent of the vote in the Presidential election. Final outcome is dependent on October 24 vote in Congress between Allende and the runner-up, Jorge Alessandri, who received 35.3 percent of the vote. Allende's margin of victory was 39,000 votes out of a total of 3,000,000 votes cast in the election.

September 8, 14 40 Committee discusses Chilean situation. The Committee approves $250,000 for the use of Ambassador Korry to influence the October 24 Congressional vote.

September 9 Harold Geneen, ITT's Chief Executive Officer, tells John McCone at an ITT Board of Directors meeting in New York that he is prepared to put up as much as $1 million for the purpose of assisting any government plan designed to form a coalition in the Chilean Congress to stop Allende. McCone agrees to communicate this proposal to high Washington officials and meets several days later with Henry Kissinger and Richard Helms. McCone does not receive a response from either man.

September 15 President Nixon instructs CIA Director Helms to prevent Allende's accession to office. The CIA is to play a direct role in organizing a military coup d'etat. This involvement comes to be known as Track II.

September 16 At on off-the-record White House press briefing, Henry Kissinger warns that the election of Allende would be irreversible, might affect neighboring nations, and would pose "massive problems" for the U.S. and Latin America.

September 29 A CIA official, at the instruction of Richard Helms, meets with a representative of ITT. The CIA officer proposes a plan to accelerate economic disorder in Chile. ITT rejects the proposal.

1970--Continued

October CIA contacts Chilean military conspirators; following a White House meeting, CIA attempts to defuse plot by retired General Viaux, but still to generate maximum pressure to overthrow Allende by coup; CIA provides tear gas grenades and three submachine guns to conspirators.

October 14 40 Committee approves $60,000 for Ambassdor Korry's proposal to purchase a radio station. The money is never spent.

October 22 After two unsuccessful abduction attempts on October 19 and 20, a third attempt to kidnap Chilean Army General Rene Schneider results in his being fatally shot.

October 24 The Chilean Congress votes 153 to 35 in favor of Allende over Alessandri.

November 3 Allende is formally inaugurated President of Chile.

November 13 40 Committee approves $25,000 for support of Christian Democratic candidates.

November 19 40 Committee approves $725,000 for a covert action program in Chile. Approval is later superseded by January 28, 1971, authorization.

December 21 President Allende proposes a constitutional amendment establishing state control of the large mines and authorizing expropriation of all foreign firms working them.

1971

January 28 40 Committee approves $1,240,000 for the purchase of radio stations and newspapers and to support municipal candidates and other political activities of anti- Allende parties.

February 25 In his annual State of the World message, President Nixon states, "We are prepared to have the kind of relationship with the Chilean government that it is prepared to have with us".

March 22 40 Committee approves $185,000 additional support for the Christian Democratic Party (PDC).

April 4 Allende's Popular Unity (UP) coalition garners 49.7 percent of the vote in 280 municipal elections.

May 10 40 Committee approves $77,000 for purchase of a press for the Christian Democratic Party newspaper. The press is not obtained and the funds are used to support the paper.

May 20 40 Committee approves $100,000 for emergency aid to the Christian Democratic Party to meet short-term debts.

May 26 40 Committee approves $150,000 for additional aid to Christian Democratic Party to meet debts.

July 6 40 Committee approves $150,000 for support of opposition candidates in a Chilean by-election.

July 11 In a joint session of the Chilean Congress, a constitutional amendment is unanimously approved permitting the nationalization of the copper industry. The amendment provides for compensation to copper companies within 30 years at not less than 3 percent interest.

August 11 The Export-Import Bank denies a Chilean request for $21 million in loans and loan guarantees needed to purchase three jets for the national LAN-Chile airline.

September 9 40 Committee approves $700,000 for support to the major Santiago newspaper, El Mercurio.

September 28 President Allende announces that "excess profits" will be deducted from compensation to be paid to nationalized copper companies.

1971-Continued

September 29 The Chilean government assumes operation of the Chilean telephone company (CHITELCO). ITT had owned 70 percent interest in the company since 1930.

September 29 Nathaniel Davis replaces Edward Korry as U.S. Ambassador to Chile.

October ITT submits to White House an 18-points plan designed to assure that Allende "does not get through the crucial next six months". The ITT proposal is rejected.

November 5 40 Committee approves $815,000 support to opposition parties and to induce a split in the Popular Unity coalition.

December 1 The Christian Democratic and National Parties organize the "March of the Empty Pots" by women to protest food shortages.

December 15 40 Committee approves $160,000 to support two opposition candidates in January 1972 by-elections.

1972

January 19 President Nixon issues a statement to clarify U.S. policy toward foreign expropriation of American interests. The President states that the United States expects compensation to be "prompt, adequate, and effective". The President warns that should compensation not be reasonable, new bilateral economic aid to the expropriating country might be terminated and the U.S. would withhold its support from loans under consideration in multilateral development banks.

April 11 40 Committee approves $965,000 for additional support to El Mercurio.

April 24 40 Committee approves $50,000 for an effort to splinter the Popular Unity coalition.

May 12 President Allende submits a constitutional amendment to the Chilean Congress for the expropriation of ITT's holdings in the Chilean telephone company.

June 16 40 Committee approves $46,500 to support a candidate in a Chilean by-election.

August 21 Allende declares a state of emergency in Santiago province after violence grows out of a one-day strike by most of the capital's shopkeepers.

September 21 40 Committee approves $24,000 to support an anti- Allende businessmen's organization.

October 10 The Confederation of Truck Owners calls a nation- wide strike.

October 26 40 Committee approves $1,427,666 to support opposition political parties and private sector organizations in anticipation of March 1973 Congressional elections.

December 4 Speaking before the General Assembly of the United Nations, President Allende charges that Chile has been the "victim of serious aggression" and adds, "we have felt the effects of a large-scale external pressure against us".

1973

February 12 40 Committee approves $200,000 to support opposition political parties in the Congressional elections.

March 4 In the Congressional elections, Allende's Popular Unity coalition wins 43.4 percent of the vote.

March 22 Talks between the U.S. and Chile on political and financial problems end in an impasse.

1973--Continued

June 5 Chile suspends its foreign shipments of copper as miners' strikes continue.

June 20 Thousands physicians, teachers, and students go on strike to protest Allende's handling of the 63-day copper workers' strike.

June 21 Gunfire, bombings, and fighting erupt as government opponents and supporters carry out a massive strike. The opposition newspaper, EL MERCURIO, is closed by court order for six days following a government charge that it had incited subversion. The following day an appeals court invalidates the closure order.

June 29 Rebel forces seize control of the downtown area of Santiago and attack the Defense Ministry and the Presidential Palace before troops loyal to the government surround them and force them to surrender. This is the first military attempt to overthrow an elected Chilean government in 42 years.

July 26 Truck owners throughout Chile go on strike.

August 2 The owners of more than 110,000 buses and taxis go on strike.

August 20 40 Committee approves $1 million to support opposition political parties and private sector organizations. This money is not spent.

August 23 General Carlos Prats Gonzalez resigns as Allende's Defense Minister and Army Commander. General Pinochet Ugarte is named Army Commander on August 24. Prats' resignation is interpreted as a severe blow to Allende.

August 27 Chile's shop owners call another anti-government strike.

September 4 An estimated 100,000 supporters of Allende's government march in the streets of Santiago to celebrate the third anniversary of his election. The Confederation of Professional Employees begins an indefinite works stopagge.

September 11 The Chilean military ovethrows the government of Salvador Allende. Allende dies during the takeover, reportedly by suicide.

September 13 The new military government names Army Commander Pinochet President and dissolves Congress.

September- October The Junta declares all Marxist political parties October illegal and places all other parties in indefinite recess. Press censorship is established, as are detention facilities for opponents of the new regime. Thousands of casualties are reported, including summary executions.

October 15 40 Committee approves $34,000 for an anti-Allende radio station and travel costs of pro-Junta spokesmen.

1974

June 24 40 Committee approves $50,000 for political commitments made to the Christian Democratic Party before the coup.

September 16 President Ford acknowledges covert operations in Chile.


Duke
 
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