My point is that people in the field of economics, finance, and business need exposure to material and instruction that goes beyond narrow course requirements. At the university level, a PhD is essential for higher-level teaching. One need not have a PhD in let's say crises, but exposure to the material, understanding of crises, or a thesis among some is helpful. Economic outcomes are, in part, a function of human behavior. Such behavior is complex and still not well understood. Not surprisingly, economic forecasts can be far off the mark. The consensus March employment forecast called for more than double the number of jobs that were actually created. The standard deviation on year-ahead GDP forecast is around +/- 1.9 points. Better insight could reduce the uncertainty behind those forecasts. In turn, reduced uncertainty could allow companies to better plan, better allocate resources, etc.
Bernanke's PhD work was an exception, not the norm. Instead, much of the focus was on aggressively expanding the case of market efficiency and rationality to wildly optimistic proportions. Not surprisingly, when symptoms of problems began manifesting themselves, many during the early and middle 2000s felt that what had been abnormally low inflation rates in place despite near full employment was a "mystery." If increasing capital flows and other elements of an economy approaching capacity weren't adversely impacting consumer prices, perhaps the growing level of demand relative to supply had to be occurring elsewhere. In fact, it was and inflation was raging in the housing sector. Likewise, they believed that bubbles couldn't be identified (literature on crises, including the fresh experience with the 1980s Japan stock/housing market crash and 1990s Asian financial crisis, show a sustained and rapidly accelerating decoupling of asset prices from macroeconomic fundamentals is a clear sign of a swelling bubble. The IMF, which is not beholden to any single economic sector, correctly drew upon the literature and its firsthand experience with the Japanese, Scandanavian, and Asian financial crises and correctly warned about unsustainability problems in the U.S. housing sector. Others, including Paul Krugman, Robert Shiller, and Nouriel Roubini took similar views. The blowback from industry-related economists was harsh. The attitude among U.S. policy makers was "thou shalt not speak badly about housing." Already, with calls to relax lending standards to the housing sector, the lessons of the recent housing bust are being forgotten.
The lack of intellectual rigor, which more attention to history and tbe sciences could provide, leads to a larger share of management and policy decisions becoming little more than exercises in satisficing (the proverbial course of least resistance that seems to address an issue) rather than those closer to optimization.
My overall point is that even seemingly "useless" fields have some utility. One might not need many graduates in those fields, but possession of at least some knowledge is better than none. Some fields might have little direct utility in industry, but they might have indirect utility in providing graduates will knowledge, skill sets, and critical reasoning ability that is important to one's professions.