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Libyan rebels fighting Muammar Gaddafi said on Friday they would agree to a ceasefire based on conditions including that the Libyan leader's forces quit cities in the west and give the people freedom to speak out.
Today, The Jerusalem Post reported:
Libya rebels set conditions for any ceasefire
Just so it is clear, I strongly support free speech and poltical liberalization in Libya. But as enlightened as those principles are, the problem associated with the demand actually has nothing to do with those principles.
The problem is that the anti-Gadhafi forces are actually raising demands in a position of weakness. Their political performance and battlefield setbacks (even with Coalition air cover) has put them in a weaker position than they were even a few days ago for making such demands. Demands have credibility when a party has, in theory, the possibility of imposing those conditions if the demands are not met. In this case, the on-the-ground situation suggests that the anti-Gadhafi forces lack such a capability. Hence, they are not in a position to be making such demands and it is highly likely that the demands associated with troop withdrawals will be ignored by the Gadhafi regime. Those demands might connect with outsiders, but the anti-Gadhafi forces already enjoy outside support. Instead, they need to build popular support in Libya.
Why would the dictatorship do something that its foes have little chance to accomplish on their own, even with the generous air support that has been furnished? If such a realistic capability existed or appeared likely to develop, then the regime's calculations might have a better chance of shifting toward a managed exit. Of course, being that it is a truly revolutionary regime, such an exit is not the most likely course it would pursue. Nonetheless, that outcome would be far more likely if the anti-Gadhafi forces had a possible capability to force the outcome. Right now, they don't. In fact, they've been on the retreat in recent days. Therefore, the Gadhafi dictatorship is not likely to give them what they cannot hope to achieve on their own. Power and concrete battlefield achievements matter, but the anti-Gadhafi elements don't understand that.
The larger and more disturbing aspect of this fundamental lack of understanding of the fit between power, policy, and diplomacy is that if the anti-Gadhafi elements cannot get those basic principles right, how can one reasonably expect that they would suddenly be able to handle the far more complex responsibilities of governance, uniting Libya's peoples and tribes, and restoring stability, all of which would be needed to avoid the significant dangers associated with a post-Gadhafi power vacuum. Yet, those are precisely the tasks that would be required once the Gadhafi regime collapsed or was driven from power.
I think this is being done to lend credibility in the world of public opinion. They are openly demanding freedom of speech to help garner support from outside Libya. They know that Khadafi wouldn't willingly give it to them even if they were strong. The man is a tyrrant.
The Pentagon is about to pull its attack planes out of the international air campaign in Libya, hoping NATO partners can take up the slack.
The announcement Thursday drew incredulous reactions from some in Congress who wondered aloud why the Obama administration would bow out of a key element of the strategy for protecting Libyan civilians and crippling Moammar Gadhafi's army.
"Odd," ''troubling" and "unnerving" were among critical comments by senators pressing for an explanation of the announcement by Defense Secretary Robert Gates and Joint Chiefs chairman Adm. Mike Mullen that American combat missions will end Saturday.
"Your timing is exquisite," Sen. John McCain, R-Ariz., said sarcastically, alluding to Gadhafi's military advances this week and the planned halt to U.S. airstrikes. "I believe this would be a profound mistake with potentially disastrous consequences."
Gates said no one should be surprised by the U.S. combat air pullback, but he called the timing "unfortunate" in light of Gadhafi's battlefield gains. He noted that the air attacks are a central feature of the overall military strategy; over time they could degrade Gadhafi's firepower to a point that he would be unable to put down a renewed uprising by opposition forces, he said.
"The idea that the AC-130s and the A-10s and American air power is grounded unless the place goes to hell is just so unnerving that I can't express it adequately," Graham said.
Asked by Sen. Jeanne Shaheen, D-N.H., whether he was confident that NATO could sustain airstrikes alone, Gates replied, "They certainly have made that commitment, and we will see."
The nascent rebel effort in eastern Libya, sustained for weeks by revolutionary passion and zeal, has begun to fray in the face of chaotic battlefield collapses and ineffective leadership.
Many of the idealistic young men who looted army depots of gun trucks and weapons six weeks ago believed the tyrannical 41-year reign of Col. Moammar Kadafi would quickly collapse under the weight of a mass rebellion.
Now those same volunteer fighters, most of whom had never before fired a gun, have fled a determined onslaught by Kadafi's forces, which have shown resilience after being bombarded and routed by allied airstrikes a week ago.
Some exhausted rebels capped a 200-plus mile retreat up the Libyan coast by fleeing all the way to Benghazi, the rebels' de facto capital, to rest and regroup. Others remained at thinly manned positions at the strategic crossroads city of Ajdabiya on Thursday.
Small groups of rebels stood their ground and fought Kadafi militiamen who seemed on the verge late Thursday of recapturing the oil city of Port Brega.
For many rebel fighters, the absence of competent military leadership and a tendency to flee at the first shot have contributed to sagging morale. Despite perfunctory V-for-victory signs and cries of "Allahu akbar!," the eager volunteers acknowledge that they are in for a long, uphill fight.
"Kadafi is too strong for us, with too many heavy weapons. What can we do except fall back to protect ourselves?" said Salah Chaiky, 41, a businessman, who said he fired his assault rifle while fleeing Port Brega even though he was too far away to possibly hit the enemy.
Thousands of protesters took to the streets in cities around Syria on Friday to chants of “We want freedom” and security forces responded with tear gas, electrified batons, clubs and bullets, killing at least seven people, according to activists, residents and a Syrian human rights group.
First of all...who are these rebels????
What we are seeing is mostly is a ****ed up, ineffective and disorganized mob *rebels* and is rapidly becoming into a messy stalemate. The mob's goal seems to be, the overthrow of Ghadaffi, but no coherent plan for democracy, i.e. parties, elections, etc....nada
Now, the US is involved in someone else's civil war, with little hope for a happy ending
Notice how Obama and, the Libyan thuggery describe near anarchy and open revolution as Democracy. That is sheer madness.
Today, The Jerusalem Post reported:
Libya rebels set conditions for any ceasefire
Just so it is clear, I strongly support free speech and poltical liberalization in Libya. But as enlightened as those principles are, the problem associated with the demand actually has nothing to do with those principles.
The problem is that the anti-Gadhafi forces are actually raising demands in a position of weakness. Their political performance and battlefield setbacks (even with Coalition air cover) has put them in a weaker position than they were even a few days ago for making such demands. Demands have credibility when a party has, in theory, the possibility of imposing those conditions if the demands are not met. In this case, the on-the-ground situation suggests that the anti-Gadhafi forces lack such a capability. Hence, they are not in a position to be making such demands and it is highly likely that the demands associated with troop withdrawals will be ignored by the Gadhafi regime. Those demands might connect with outsiders, but the anti-Gadhafi forces already enjoy outside support. Instead, they need to build popular support in Libya.
Why would the dictatorship do something that its foes have little chance to accomplish on their own, even with the generous air support that has been furnished? If such a realistic capability existed or appeared likely to develop, then the regime's calculations might have a better chance of shifting toward a managed exit. Of course, being that it is a truly revolutionary regime, such an exit is not the most likely course it would pursue. Nonetheless, that outcome would be far more likely if the anti-Gadhafi forces had a possible capability to force the outcome. Right now, they don't. In fact, they've been on the retreat in recent days. Therefore, the Gadhafi dictatorship is not likely to give them what they cannot hope to achieve on their own. Power and concrete battlefield achievements matter, but the anti-Gadhafi elements don't understand that.
The larger and more disturbing aspect of this fundamental lack of understanding of the fit between power, policy, and diplomacy is that if the anti-Gadhafi elements cannot get those basic principles right, how can one reasonably expect that they would suddenly be able to handle the far more complex responsibilities of governance, uniting Libya's peoples and tribes, and restoring stability, all of which would be needed to avoid the significant dangers associated with a post-Gadhafi power vacuum. Yet, those are precisely the tasks that would be required once the Gadhafi regime collapsed or was driven from power.
I'm hearing, we are pulling all aircraft out of the Libyan airspace.
After the U.S. standdown takes effect on Sunday, Navy ships and submarines armed with Tomahawks will remain in the Mediterranean in position to resume firing if requested by NATO and approved by the Pentagon, the officials said. U.S. attack aircraft at land bases in Italy and aboard a Navy amphibious ship will also be at the ready, the officials said.
Loyalty in that region has a very short life, being paid off tend to make so called loyalty have longevity. In the M.E. the U.S. really has only one true ally and friend even if we didn't send them arms, the reason would be commonality.It doesn't matter what government precipitates out of the Libyan rebels, as long as they are loyal to us. :shrug:
It doesn't matter what government precipitates out of the Libyan rebels, as long as they are loyal to us. :shrug:
That could potentially be a big if.
I don't necessarily disagree. However, they already enjoy a good part of the world's sympathies. What's at question is how much support do they actually enjoy within Libya.
I would suggest that actually trying to build the movement into one with broad-based popular support among Libya's peoples/tribes and especially improving battlefield performance should take priority. Tying political demands to ceasefire terms are a sure way of blocking a possible ceasefire when one lacks the power to lend credibility to such demands.
Now, if the anti-Gadhafi forces actually had the power to possibly impose their terms, it might be a shrewd political move to offer ceasefire terms that were unacceptable to the other side. Then, the terms would likely be rejected and the stronger party could then use that rejection to continue to pursue its larger objectives beyond what might be possible were a ceasefire agreed. The anti-Gadhafi forces are not in any such position.
Their military and political tactics to date have been abysmal. Their political leaders have yet to outline a coherent sketch of what a post-Gadhafi transitional government would look like, much less stand for. No guarantees of amnesty and safety for civilians who might have supported Gadhafi's regime and/or reside in Gadhafi strongholds have been made. Few could have designed a more ineffective approach to trying to gain the support of a majority of Libya's people. Providing meaningful incentives for people to turn against the dictatorship is as close to a "no-brainer" as it gets.
The anti-Gadhafi movement has even squandered the gains made possible by the Coalition's close-air support (military efforts that went beyond the NFZ, and support that might be ending once the U.S. AC130 gunships and A-10 Warthogs are withdrawn from active use in Libya). IMO, their setbacks have much more to do with inept (and that's probably an understatement) political and military leadership coupled with an absence of broad-based popular support, than the advantages of Gadhafi's military forces, which have now been substantially degraded.
Actually that is not exactly what is happening:
Source: The Enterprise
Basically this is just part of the official handover to NATO. The U.S. military will not be acting at its sole discretion, but instead act as requested by NATO.
For all of Daffy's reputation and past deeds, what suggests that Libyan's lives have been miserable enough to endure a civil war? Remember, most of us just want to live our lives - we are not freedom fighters. We want to go to sleep safe in our beds. Not fear for our lives from bombing raids. What is the size of the rebel coalition? How many men are actually fighting in this rag-tag band? Do they even have popular support? I don't presume to know the answers; but we should have known them before we interfered.
While I do think that Obama had popular support for acting, and was criticized that he didn't act sooner, had the answers to those questions indicated otherwise, the American people would have understood our reluctance to get involved.
I think you put too much value in the use of military power so you miss more important political aspects. What the rebels demanded was not bold or decisive. All they demanded is basically a ceasefire that includes a withdrawal from the cities and allowing people their freedom of expression. This is mainly a political demand. By making a very limited demand the rebels create a win-win situation. If the government accedes to the demand of allowing freedom of expression it will mean an outburst of dissent in the West providing potential avenues for the rebels to pressure the government. At the same time refusing the offer creates the impression that the government will not stop fighting even when it only means allowing people basic rights. This reinforces the impression that the rebels are fighting for peace and freedom while the government is fighting for war and oppression.
All they demanded is basically a ceasefire that includes a withdrawal from the cities and allowing people their freedom of expression. This is mainly a political demand.
Just the threat of a protracted war gives the rebels leverage.
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