Actually your interpretation of the ruling is incorrect. The issue was raised specifically because the State of Texas forbid all abortions unless the mother's life was in danger.
The court actually held that the right to personal privacy includes the abortion decision, but the right is not unqualified and must be considered against important state interests in regulation.
After going through an analysis of the history behind abortions the court determined that at each trimester stage of development there are limits to what a State can proscribe by law. They then held"
1. For the stage prior to the approximate end of the first trimester, the abortion decision must be left to the medical judgment of the pregnant woman’s attending physician, and may not be criminalized by statute.
2. For the stage subsequent to the approximate end of the first trimester, the State may regulate abortion in ways reasonably related to maternal health based upon the State’s interest in promoting the health of the mother.
3. For the stage subsequent to viability, the State may regulate and even proscribe abortion, except where necessary for the preservation of the mother’s life, based upon the State’s interest in the potential of the potential life of the unborn child.
Most of the rest of your argument is a patchwork of personal opinion on what the decision meant, and in the main, completely incorrect.
You are making a claim “everyone knew” which is factually incorrect since one of the key arguments between factions is “when is “life” (.i.e. viability, the “soul,” etc.) actually in play. The Court used the term "viability" in reference only to the period on or just before the beginning of the THIRD trimester.
My interpretation of the ruling is completely correct, while you have shown significant incorrectness here. Here's why I think so.
1. Your (1) above implies that the medical judgment of the attending physician is the only factor in the abortion decision in the first trimester, as if a doctor could perform an abortion even the woman did not agree! Actually, in the Roe v Wade decision summary, the point you cite is subpoint (a) of point (3), which clearly refers to "a woman's qualified right to terminate her pregnancy," thereby establishing beforehand that the physician's medical judgment as a factor comes into play only if she already wishes to assert this right.
2. In your (3) above, you have omitted a very crucial point: the exception must be made where necessary to preserve the
health as well as the life of the mother. Why so crucial? Because in the 1990s, abortion opponents went to court to try to get rid of that point.
3. Though you use the expression "the potential life of the unborn child," the fetus is not referred to as "child" anywhere in the decision or the full text of Blackmun's opinion. There are expressions such as the state's interest in "potential life" and protection of "fetal life."
4. The usage of "viability" is in reference to the period just before or during the third trimester, not "the period on or just before the beginning of the third trimester."
You are dead wrong on my interpretation of the use of the term "life." Blackmun implies a distinction between human biological life and the life of a person as a matter of course. As a physician, he had to know, as all the women of my acquaintance knew in 1973, the difference between biologically live and dead fetuses. If a fetus dies inside a woman and does not get expelled in a short time, it has to be removed so as not to impair her health. The whole section on the history of abortion and different views of when "life" begins involves an array of different views of life that do not clearly distinguish the two, but see, for example:
With respect to the State's important and legitimate interest in
potential life, the "compelling" point is at viability. This is so because the fetus then presumably has the capability of
meaningful life outside the mother's womb. State regulation
protective of fetal life after viability thus has both logical and biological justifications. If the State is interested in
protecting fetal life after viability, it may go so far as to proscribe abortion [410 U.S. 113, 164] during that period, except when it is necessary to preserve the life or health of the mother. [my underline]
and
". . . the law has been reluctant to endorse any theory that
life, as we recognize it, begins before live birth." [my underline]
FindLaw | Cases and Codes
"Fetal life" obviously is meant to refer to a biological quality that distinguishes a live fetus from a dead one. It is actual biological life, but not, here, "meaningful life" or "life, as we recognize it." The state can protect "fetal life" (actual biological life) in the third trimester because its interest in "potential life" becomes compelling at the point of viability. Blackmun does not say the state has a compelling interest in "fetal life," but that it can protect "fetal life" to serve the interest in "potential life." After all, the Constitution gives protection to the life of a live person, not necessarily the biological life of a live organism that is not a person. But the fetus has the potential for life as person later, after birth.
Again, your statement shown underlined is factually incorrect. That was not the SCOTUS holding, since it held that States could only impose such a restriction on the third trimester of the pregnancy. The rest of your statement is founded on an incorrect premise and is therefore also incorrect.
The statement that you underlined is completely correct. Of course the ruling is that the states could only impose a restriction in the third trimester. My point was that, even if they did so, they had to make exceptions to the restriction if necessary to preserve the life
and health of the woman. A health exception was mandatory. Now, nobody in the US with any sanity would argue that one could kill a born person to protect someone else's health, so this mandatory health exception to abortion bans clearly implies that fetal life after viability/in the third trimester is not equal to the life of a person.
This part…completely irrelevant.
In conclusion I reiterate that the law allows unrestricted access to abortion in the first trimester, then in the second trimester States may regulate, but not proscribe, abortions in the State’s interest in promoting the health of the mother. It is only during the third trimester where a State “may regulate and even proscribe abortion, except where necessary for the preservation of the mother’s life.”
I'm not sure why you think the last comment from me that you cited was irrelevant, but in your final citation of the ruling, ". . . . a State 'may regulate and even proscribe abortion, except where necessary for the preservation of the mother's life,'" you forgot two crucial words at the end: 'and health.'