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From Reuters:
Gunmen attack NATO trucks near Pakistan capital | Reuters
In business, one of the important lessons concerning suppliers/logistics is to avoid one's becoming disproportionately or even solely dependent on a single source. Such an outcome leads to one's lacking market leverage and becoming highly vulnerable to supply disruptions.
Unfortunately, it appears that NATO planners are unfamiliar with such basic business principles. Given how basic the concept of supply/logistics diversification is, such lack of familiarity is disturbing, as it raises fundamental questions about the expertise and competencies of the senior military planners.
Unless the supply routes are secured, and this attack suggests that they are not, the Taliban and its allies will be in a position to deny NATO forces operating in Afghanistan a share of supplies. Such a development would further undermine successes that would otherwise be possible from the troop surge there.
IMO, suboptimal outcomes in Iraq and Afghanistan are not just a consequence of unforeseeable events. The rise of a low-level civil war and Al Qaeda in Iraq insurgency were highly likely outcomes given that country's past experience and other historical cases in which strong central authorities were replaced by weak ones. Afghanistan's history highlights the inherent risks of that entity's fragmented power and the vital importance of working through local tribal leaders. Past Soviet and British experience vividly illustrate the nature of that country's risks. In Iraq, the U.S. went in with too little manpower and no contingency plan for an insurgency. In Afghanistan, the U.S. placed too much emphasis on a Kabul-centric approach, particularly in a leader who is deeply unpopular and highly impulsive. Apparently, as supply route statistics and growing Taliban attacks on supply convoys this spring illustrate, the U.S. also failed to diversify its supply routes and, worse, with disproportionate reliance on routes through Pakistan, failed to secure those routes. All said, the suboptimal outcomes in both theaters are much more an outcome of poor planning than the unexpected.
Suspected Taliban gunmen in Pakistan set fire to more than 50 trucks carrying supplies for Western forces in Afghanistan, killing at least seven people in the first such attack near the capital, police said on Wednesday...
The U.S. military sends 75 percent of its supplies for the Afghan war through or over Pakistan, including 40 percent of the fuel for its troops.
Gunmen attack NATO trucks near Pakistan capital | Reuters
In business, one of the important lessons concerning suppliers/logistics is to avoid one's becoming disproportionately or even solely dependent on a single source. Such an outcome leads to one's lacking market leverage and becoming highly vulnerable to supply disruptions.
Unfortunately, it appears that NATO planners are unfamiliar with such basic business principles. Given how basic the concept of supply/logistics diversification is, such lack of familiarity is disturbing, as it raises fundamental questions about the expertise and competencies of the senior military planners.
Unless the supply routes are secured, and this attack suggests that they are not, the Taliban and its allies will be in a position to deny NATO forces operating in Afghanistan a share of supplies. Such a development would further undermine successes that would otherwise be possible from the troop surge there.
IMO, suboptimal outcomes in Iraq and Afghanistan are not just a consequence of unforeseeable events. The rise of a low-level civil war and Al Qaeda in Iraq insurgency were highly likely outcomes given that country's past experience and other historical cases in which strong central authorities were replaced by weak ones. Afghanistan's history highlights the inherent risks of that entity's fragmented power and the vital importance of working through local tribal leaders. Past Soviet and British experience vividly illustrate the nature of that country's risks. In Iraq, the U.S. went in with too little manpower and no contingency plan for an insurgency. In Afghanistan, the U.S. placed too much emphasis on a Kabul-centric approach, particularly in a leader who is deeply unpopular and highly impulsive. Apparently, as supply route statistics and growing Taliban attacks on supply convoys this spring illustrate, the U.S. also failed to diversify its supply routes and, worse, with disproportionate reliance on routes through Pakistan, failed to secure those routes. All said, the suboptimal outcomes in both theaters are much more an outcome of poor planning than the unexpected.