CDSs didn't really take all of the risk out of them in the end, did they?
Quite true. When the business backing the CDS, AIG I believe it was, went bust when all the CDSs triggered, they were one of the entities that got TARP bail out money to keep them solvent.
As was pointed out before, this was financed by savings. And private sector buyers were willing to buy it because those instruments were rated higher than they should have been. There is always demand for a low-risk, high-return instrument, and that is what MBSs were falsely sold as. F&F bought some, but they certainly weren't the driving force. Their hand in this is far overstated by your team.
Also correct. The rating agencies rated these toxic mortgages as A1 securities, which was clearly wrong, and also weren't familiar with the mathemagical formula the banksters applied, which I believe they claimed somehow magically reduced the inherent risk of those bundled and traunched mortgages.
From what I gathered, the bubble was financed by people continually re-mortgaging their houses and getting cash from the savings they had put into their houses, i.e. mortgage payments. The worst story that I heard was someone who had re-mortgaged their house 6 times in a single year, and always for their increased market value. Others would buy a house on credit, fix a few things or nothing at all, and weeks later re-sell it at a profit. Both of these are symptoms of 'get rich quick' mentality which came to bite them in their asses. A 'get rich quick' mentality the mortgage originators, mortgage buyers, banksters and yes, even F&F, all supported / enabled, all which fed the market prices increasing faster and faster. It was a feed back loop.
People want to buy homes. There was demand, the only thing that is different is that companies made billions of dollars selling mis-rated mortgage securities.
True the rating agencies lied / didn't understand what they were rating, and the banksters kept gambling in ever greater dollar amounts with ever greater risk.
Reduced ROI in fixed income markets created the demand for higher returns. The problem is, when you have to resort to fraud in order to create this demand, or in this case, rate BBB rated securities AAA, it creates tremendous amounts of systemic risk.
Yup. A feedback loop. One that injected ever increasing risk to the system.
BTW: Which part of 'systemic' is any one single individual? Any one single law? Any one single regulation? Any one single action?
I do believe that this is a case of a conflagration of actions and conditions coming together in a rather unforeseen way, which caused great harm. This is by no means any excuse to any of those in leadership positions for not taking action when it was already blatantly obvious what was coming down the tracks. This is their failure, and this is the blame they must shoulder.
Unfortunately, yes, Fannie and Freddy were also buying into, and exposing themselves to, the subprime mortgage risk. Or is it your position that Fannie and Freddy never bought any subprime mortgages? Never exposed themselves to the subprime mortgage risks?