I understand that completely; the part you don't seem to grasp is that you don't is that there is no requirement to adjust the plan. War is not a game where automatic functions occur in decision making.
Since the liberation of Kharkov Russias only major conquests have been Bahkmut and Avdiivka, which took over a year. Apologies if I don't see this as a sign of a decisive impending victory.
I have never dismissed the idea that Avdiivka was fortified, I merely pointed out it was not some fortress of solitude.
And in your defense, you offer painfully underwhelming analysis.
Iraqi forces were some of the most incompetent of the 20th century. They were lacking in initiative, skill at arms, leadership, discipline, and basic operational flexibility. They struggled mightily against an embargoed Iran then were Curbstomped by the Coalition in 1991. Iraqi forces would perform just as bad in 2003 and 2014 as they did in 1991 and 1980.
But in 1988 Iraq was able to drive the Iranians out of Iraq; not because the Iraqis had gotten good at war, but because they outnumbered the Iranians 5:1 in tanks and artillery and were pouring posion gas over Iranian lines. The fact that they drove Iran from Iraqi soil is not proof that Iraqi were suddenly experts in combined arms and mechanized maneuver warfare.
Russian forces likewise have not demonstrated excellence in combined arms or tactical execution. At both Bahkmut and Avdiivka, the Russian victory was achieves by throwing thousands of men into the meat grinder backed up by mass fires until finally the Ukrainians could take no more and were compelled to withdraw. The fact that the Russians are poor at executing complex mechanized maneuvers does not mean their artillery is not dangerous, and likewise, the fact that Russian artillery can do a lot of damage does not mean Russian mechanized forces are good. If you don't understand that, then you don't know much about this war.
