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Again, credit to Kyle Bass on this.
Zero Interest Rate Policy.
Have we already entered the ZIRP trap? (Or the slightly higher rendition). Yes.
Once interest rates have been low long enough, we depend on them to keep debt payments down.
It enables the govt to borrow much more money until and unless someone notices.
But if we (or the market) raises them to higher rates, the payments become onerous.
Japan is the biggest Debtor nation in the World, almost twice as indebted as Greece relative to GDP.
But they have true ZIRP.
Japan Government Bonds Yield & Interest Rates - Bloomberg
and if rates went up by 2% from basically zero, they'd be broke.
The zero interest rate policy trap (Magazine Version)
Kyle Bass
March 2, 2011
http://www.institutionalinvestor.co...-trap-Magazine-Version.html?ArticleId=2776006
Zero Interest Rate Policy.
Have we already entered the ZIRP trap? (Or the slightly higher rendition). Yes.
Once interest rates have been low long enough, we depend on them to keep debt payments down.
It enables the govt to borrow much more money until and unless someone notices.
But if we (or the market) raises them to higher rates, the payments become onerous.
Japan is the biggest Debtor nation in the World, almost twice as indebted as Greece relative to GDP.
But they have true ZIRP.
Japan Government Bonds Yield & Interest Rates - Bloomberg
and if rates went up by 2% from basically zero, they'd be broke.
The zero interest rate policy trap (Magazine Version)
Kyle Bass
March 2, 2011
http://www.institutionalinvestor.co...-trap-Magazine-Version.html?ArticleId=2776006
As interest rates in developed Western economies bounce along the zero lower bound, few participants realize or acknowledge that a zero interest rate policy is an inescapable trap. The problem of overindebtedness that is ameliorated by zero interest rate policy is only made worse the longer a sovereign stays at the zero lower bound—with ever-greater consequences when short rates eventually (and inevitably) return to a normalized level.
Consider the U.S. balance sheet. The U.S. is rapidly approaching the congressionally mandated debt ceiling, which was most recently raised in February 2010 to $14.2 trillion dollars (including $4.6 trillion held by Social Security and other government trust funds). Every one percentage point move in the weighted-average cost of capital will end up costing $142 billion annually in interest alone. Assuming anything but an inverted curve, a move back to 5% short-term rates would increase U.S. interest expense by almost $700 billion annually against current U.S. government revenues of $2.228 trillion.
[............]
The study focuses on 12 major developed economies and predicts that “debt/GDP ratios rise rapidly in the next decade, exceeding 300% of GDP in Japan; 200% in the United Kingdom; and 150% in Belgium, France, Ireland, Greece, Italy and the United States.” Additionally, the authors find that government interest expense as a percentage of GDP will rise “from around 5% [on average] today . . . to over 10% in all cases, and as high as 27% in the United Kingdom.” When central bankers engage in “nonstandard” policies in an attempt to grow revenues, the resulting increase in interest expense may be many multiples of the change in central government revenue. For instance, Japan maintains central government debt approaching ¥1 quadrillion against revenues of roughly ¥48 trillion—a fatal 20 times debt to revenue. Minute increases in the weighted-average cost of capital for these governments will force them into what we have termed “the Keynesian endpoint”—where debt service alone exceeds revenue.
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