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duh!... The article, in Rolling Stone, said McChrystal's staff frequently derided top civilian leaders, including special envoy Richard C. Holbrooke and U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan Karl Eikenberry. ... McChrystal is reported as visibly exasperated by e-mails he receives from Holbrooke, appointed by President Obama to oversee developments in Afghanistan and Pakistan. "Oh, not another e-mail from Holbrooke," the article quotes McChrystal as saying after receiving one message. "I don't even want to open it." ... Late Monday, McChrystal issued an apology for the Rolling Stone article. "It was a mistake reflecting poor judgment and should never have happened," he said in a statement.
my guess is yes, after the current rolling stone article
he has literally been called on the carpet to be in person in the situation room, not in video, on the monthly afghanistan assessment tomorrow
this is smart guy. he knew the outcome of his insubordination when he made those quoted comments to rolling stone
apparently there is a huge chasm between some military brass and the white house about the strategy for conducting the war(s)
U.S. general lets down his guard in Rolling Stone interview - latimes.com
duh!
If he is fired, his public comments shouldn't be the issue. A legitimate issue concerns the strategy that he largely designed, as what is currently happening in Afghanistan risks becoming a case study in bad planning despite heroic efforts of execution by the troops.
my guess is yes, after the current rolling stone article
he has literally been called on the carpet to be in person in the situation room, not in video, on the monthly afghanistan assessment tomorrow
this is smart guy. he knew the outcome of his insubordination when he made those quoted comments to rolling stone
apparently there is a huge chasm between some military brass and the white house about the strategy for conducting the war(s)
U.S. general lets down his guard in Rolling Stone interview - latimes.com
duh!
If he is fired, his public comments shouldn't be the issue. A legitimate issue concerns the strategy that he largely designed, as what is currently happening in Afghanistan risks becoming a case study in bad planning despite heroic efforts of execution by the troops.
On June 10, 2009, The Washington Post reported:
The top U.S. commander in Afghanistan said Thursday that major parts of the military operation to secure Kandahar, the birthplace of the Taliban movement, would be pushed back because it was taking longer than expected to win local support...
But McChrystal said it was taking longer than anticipated to gain the blessing of local tribal leaders -- and Kandaharis in general -- for the operation. He also said commanders needed more time to ensure that Afghan government could step in after the fighting stops and provide effective public services, something that has been lacking in Kandahar for years.
The underlined part is key. It again reflects Kabul-centric thinking that is a problem. The widely unpopular Karzai regime's legitimacy is suspect it has cronyism-related issues to deal with in Kandahar. Family ties have visibly benefited Karzai's half-brother there. Carl Forsberg, an analyst at the Institute for the Study of War described prevailing perceptions there as follows, "In Kabul, as in Kandahar, state-building and family interests have become confused, such that they are equated with one another, in ways that sometimes parallel the monarchical political order of the old regime, in which the strength of the state relied on the strength of the Shah [king], his family and its personal allies." In that atmosphere, the lack of support from local tribal leaders is reasonable. They are not about to run risks presented by the Taliban largely to benefit the Karzai family.
That the Kabul-centric strategy has yielded suboptimal results was expected, particularly by those who are knowledgeable about Afghan affairs. Ambassador Eikenberry and General Petraeus had concerns about partnering with the Karzai regime during the time the current strategy was being developed. From the December 6, 2009 edition of The New York Times:
That very afternoon, someone leaked word of a cable sent by Ambassador Eikenberry from Kabul expressing reservations about a large buildup of forces as long as the Karzai government remained unreformed. At one of their meetings, General Petraeus had told Mr. Obama to think of elements of the Karzai government like "a crime syndicate." Ambassador Eikenberry was suggesting, in effect, that America could not get in bed with the mob.
Sadly, as had been the case before the new strategy was devised, the architects of the strategy are the ones who yet again have fallen behind the proverbial curve. Worse, in this case they should never have fallen behind the curve. The evolution of events was readily foreseeable (and foreseen by some such as Amb. Eikenberry) and very likely avoidable (had the strategy not been Kabul-centric in nature).
If the article is accurate, he should be fired for conduct unbecoming an Officer. You don't air dirty laundry about the Chain of Command... some of that stuff reads like high school level drama llama crap.
However, I think it also says a lot about Obama's Admin and the failures of proper leadership going on there. If half of what they said is true, the WH is seriously dysfunctional.
If he is fired, his public comments shouldn't be the issue. A legitimate issue concerns the strategy that he largely designed, as what is currently happening in Afghanistan risks becoming a case study in bad planning despite heroic efforts of execution by the troops.
On June 10, 2009, The Washington Post reported:
The top U.S. commander in Afghanistan said Thursday that major parts of the military operation to secure Kandahar, the birthplace of the Taliban movement, would be pushed back because it was taking longer than expected to win local support...
But McChrystal said it was taking longer than anticipated to gain the blessing of local tribal leaders -- and Kandaharis in general -- for the operation. He also said commanders needed more time to ensure that Afghan government could step in after the fighting stops and provide effective public services, something that has been lacking in Kandahar for years.
The underlined part is key. It again reflects Kabul-centric thinking that is a problem. The widely unpopular Karzai regime's legitimacy is suspect it has cronyism-related issues to deal with in Kandahar. Family ties have visibly benefited Karzai's half-brother there. Carl Forsberg, an analyst at the Institute for the Study of War described prevailing perceptions there as follows, "In Kabul, as in Kandahar, state-building and family interests have become confused, such that they are equated with one another, in ways that sometimes parallel the monarchical political order of the old regime, in which the strength of the state relied on the strength of the Shah [king], his family and its personal allies." In that atmosphere, the lack of support from local tribal leaders is reasonable. They are not about to run risks presented by the Taliban largely to benefit the Karzai family.
That the Kabul-centric strategy has yielded suboptimal results was expected, particularly by those who are knowledgeable about Afghan affairs. Ambassador Eikenberry and General Petraeus had concerns about partnering with the Karzai regime during the time the current strategy was being developed. From the December 6, 2009 edition of The New York Times:
That very afternoon, someone leaked word of a cable sent by Ambassador Eikenberry from Kabul expressing reservations about a large buildup of forces as long as the Karzai government remained unreformed. At one of their meetings, General Petraeus had told Mr. Obama to think of elements of the Karzai government like "a crime syndicate." Ambassador Eikenberry was suggesting, in effect, that America could not get in bed with the mob.
Sadly, as had been the case before the new strategy was devised, the architects of the strategy are the ones who yet again have fallen behind the proverbial curve. Worse, in this case they should never have fallen behind the curve. The evolution of events was readily foreseeable (and foreseen by some such as Amb. Eikenberry) and very likely avoidable (had the strategy not been Kabul-centric in nature).
Article 88—Contempt toward officials
“Any commissioned officer who uses contemptuous words against the President, the Vice President, Congress, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of a military department, the Secretary of Transportation, or the Governor or legislature of any State, Territory, Commonwealth, or possession in which he is on duty or present shall be punished as a court-martial may direct.”
Link
Actually, he should, and rightfully so.
Technically his remarks could lead to his dismissal. IMO, the growing problems associated with the strategy largely of his design is a more important reason, if the change is made. It would be one thing if the strategy were leading to progress along the agreed timelines. But it isn't. Moreover, there are increasing stories about even elementary matters having not been given attention.
On June 8, 1993, the Washington Post reported that Major General Harold N. Campbell was being "investigated on charges that he ridiculed President Clinton as a 'gay-loving,' 'pot-smoking,' 'draft-dodging' and 'womanizing' commander in chief at a [May 24, 1993] banquet for U.S. Air Force personnel in the Netherlands."
According to a July 8, 1993, Associated Press article, Campbell "retired after he was reprimanded and fined about $7,000 ... for his comments about Clinton." The Air Force investigation's report, according to the AP, also concluded that Campbell had "planned the remarks."
Link
Technically his remarks could lead to his dismissal. IMO, the growing problems associated with the strategy largely of his design is a more important reason, if the change is made. It would be one thing if the strategy were leading to progress along the agreed timelines. But it isn't. Moreover, there are increasing stories about even elementary matters having not been given attention.
General officers have been relieved in the past because of disparaging remarks they've made regarding the civilian leadership. It's obvious he's been recalled to DC because of the comments he made, and not because of any strategy issues.
The admin is going to have a real hard time pinning the lack of success in the ATO on McChrystal. They would be perfectly in the right to relieve McChrystal, however, they will make themselves look like complete assholes if they scapegoat him.
for my edification; what are the mission objectives and major goals to be accomplished in afghanistan before we can remove our troops?If he is replaced, and that is not yet certain, it will be done as diplomatically as possible. There will be no scapegoating.
Nonetheless, the Administration still has a need to modify the current strategy. Failure to do so will reduce prospects for a clear-cut U.S. success in achieving its mission and major goals in Afghanistan.
If he is fired, his public comments shouldn't be the issue. A legitimate issue concerns the strategy that he largely designed, as what is currently happening in Afghanistan risks becoming a case study in bad planning despite heroic efforts of execution by the troops.
If the article is accurate, he should be fired for conduct unbecoming an Officer. You don't air dirty laundry about the Chain of Command... some of that stuff reads like high school level drama llama crap.
However, I think it also says a lot about Obama's Admin and the failures of proper leadership going on there. If half of what they said is true, the WH is seriously dysfunctional.
He knew the consequences of such statements, what this should lead us to believe is that there is some ****ed up **** coming down so much so that he felt he needed to say it.
I also believe the General must be relieved of duty.
It is interesting, however, to compare how quickly this White House can react when it's interests are assailed and compare the reaction time to that when the interests of the "small people" are under attacked. Ain't no moss a growin' on this rolling stone, huh?
The admin is going to have a real hard time pinning the lack of success in the ATO on McChrystal. They would be perfectly in the right to relieve McChrystal, however, they will make themselves look like complete assholes if they scapegoat him.
Just a couple of points to ponder...
1 McChrystal is a warrior's warrior
2 McChrystal swore an oath to the Constitution and to no one else. He simply is fighting at that level for what he thinks is right.
3 Who wants to be known as the general that lost Afghanistan ? **** that
Even though McChrystal is wrong for speaking out against his Chain of Command, what about the validity of what he is saying? Sometimes the most rude and unwelcomed comments speak the most truth. Is the war being run by politicians who simply are trying to cover themselves while claiming to fight the war?
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