And whether the order happened or not, it wasn't carried out.
With respect to the potential of Trump committing the crime of obstruction, it doesn't matter that it wasn't carried out. The statutes related to obstruction also forbid attempted but failed attempts at obstruction. The same logic can also apply to abuse of office more generally.
We do know that President Obama ordered the assassinations of American citizens abroad.
We also know there was considerable legal debate whether Obama had the authority to do so.
Did President Obama issue an unlawful order? What if had ordered it, the relevant officials refused to carry it out, and Obama let the matter drop.
Did Obama still commit a crime? Its the same issue. Nothing would have happened.
RESPONSE - PART 1
This particular legal issue remains unresolved to a great extent, but let's assume, for the sake of discussion, that it's a criminal act for a President to assassinate a U.S. citizen without respect to that citizen's participation in a terrorist organization's ongoing violence against the U.S. If a statute outlaws attempts at an action the statute is defining, then attempts at the action represent a criminal act. With respect to things like obstruction and conspiracy, our laws forbid attempts to obstruct and attempts to engage in conspiracy. If attempts at killing U.S. citizens within this context are illegal, it would be illegal for the President to attempt to do so. There is nothing in our laws, our Constitution, or in our case history that shields a President from criminal liability for issuing an illegal order that is subsequently ignored. In fact, the weight of our case law and historical precedent points towards the opposing view. Now, if you have some case you can cite, show me the case. If you have some Supreme Court ruling in mind. Show me the ruling. Furthermore, such an action,
By your logic, a person occupying the office of the President has not engaged in any action until a subordinate carries out an order. Unitary Executive Theory does not extend this far as to view the Presidency through this artificial lens. The Supreme Court and lower court rulings do not view the office of the Presidency in this way. Within the context of our case law, the office of the Presidency is not some sort of hermetically-sealed bubble that the judicial and legislative branches cannot penetrate. The internal deliberations of the Presidency can be subject to scrutiny by the other two branches. There is no legal or historical precedent that entities outside the executive branch must pretend that the actions of individuals within the executive branch are not real, and the only official actions of the executive branch are real.
And to support my argument, I refer to the following court rulings that deal with executive privilege. In all of these cases involving executive privilege, you will find the Court not agreeing with your view that everyone else outside the executive branch must pretend an action has not happened until the executive branch takes official action. The overwhelming weight of case law points towards at least some actions of the Presidency being subject to scrutiny by the judicial and legislative branches, especially those involving obstruction and abuses of office.
1. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974)
2. Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S. 425 (1977)
3. Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700 (D.C. Cir. 1973)
4. Senate Select Committee v. Nixon, 498 F.2d 725 (D.C. Cir 1974)
5. United States v. AT&T, 551 F.2d 384 (D.C. Cir. 1976), appeal after remand, 567 F.2d 121 (D.C. Cir. 1977)
6. United States v. House of Representatives, 556 F. Supp. 150 (D.D.C. 1983)
7. In re Sealed Case (Espy), 121 F. 3d 729 (D.C. Cir. 1997)
8. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 5 F. Supp. 2d 21 (D.D.C. 1998)
9. Judicial Watch v. Department of Justice, 365 F. 3d 1108 (D.C. Cir. 2004)
10. Loving v. Department of Defense, 550 F. 3d 32 (D.C. Cir. 2008)
11. House Committee on the Judiciary v. Miers, 558 F. Supp. 2d 53 (D.D.C. 2008).