Originally posted by galenrox:
The reason why we shouldn't leave YET is because we cannot afford the costs of leaving under the current domestic environment.
The points you've raised, that the war's cost billions of dollars, we're proliferating new enemies, yadda yadda yadda, these are problems, both on principle and strategically. Most of the issues of principle are canceled out by similar issues of principal that lie in all of the alternatives (i.e. collateral damage from the war is a problem on principle, but it is not significant to decision making, as all the alternatives that don't bare the cost of collateral damage will likewise lead to similar levels of problems on principle, as evidenced by how Afghanistan was after the USSR's withdrawl). Because of this, we'll operate in terms of strategic costs, based on the assumption that victory, cetaris paribus, is preferable to defeat. I define strategic costs and benefits in terms of success (or lack thereof) against nations and groups with divergent interests, whose efforts towards these interests involve harming US citizens, and our allies (namely Israel). This is what I refer to when I refer to "The Greater War on Terror".
My basic position is that, although there are significant costs in staying in Iraq, the marginal costs are substantially less significant, in that there aren't that many people to piss off that we haven't already pissed off beyond the point at which them being pissed off is strategically relevant, which is to say that, more or less, the battle lines have already been drawn. There are other costs in which the marginal costs are remaining at similar levels, such as our inability to defend our interests elsewhere as a product of our resources being so heavily focused in Iraq.
And when we withdraw from Iraq, those costs will be the strategic reason to leave Iraq, which is to say that the reason that we really want to get out of Iraq is so we can have the power to defend our interests elsewhere, such as Iran understanding that we have the capability to realisticly invade (not to say that we should invade Iran, we absolutely should not if it's at all avoidable, but it is more avoidable if they know that we can, cause the reason they've been taking such a confrontational approach towards us recently is because they believe they can afford to, as we can't do **** about it. This is evidenced by the change in Iran's dealings with us, and its correlation with our success in Iraq (they were willing to bend over backwards for us right after we walluped Iraq, but once **** started getting worse in Iraq, their approach to us has become increasingly confrontational).
And thus if we are to leave Iraq, we must leave Iraq in a way that would generate domestic conditions in which we would be able to pursue our interests elsewhere. If we withdraw under any other circumstances, it will inevitably be an irrational decision from a strategic perspective, as we are able to pursue our interests in Iraq and places under the radar now (evidenced by how little attention's been paid to our involvement in the Ethiopian/Somali conflict), while if we withdrew under conditions that would not allow us to pursue our interests elsewhere, not only would we only be able to pursue our interests in Iraq, but we would lose Iraq as a distraction, and thus there would be fewer conflicts that would fall underneath our collective radar, and thus even fewer instances in which we are able to pursue our interests elsewhere.
There are other realms of strategic analysis that I've explored, such as what would happen in Iraq were we to pull out, but those don't matter nearly as much to me as this, to the point that I would be supportive of withdrawl IF it would not empower the dovish and isolationist movements domestically to the point that it would render the US incapable of defending itself, which it would under the current circumstances (thus meaning you, and people like you, are the reason why I don't support withdrawl. If you would be content with a withdrawl, that'd be fine, but that's not the case, as as soon as we get the troops out of Iraq, the anti-war movement will immidiately turn its focus towards cutting us off at the knees strategically in our dealings with Iran, which would make it FAR more likely that we'd have to actually have to go to war with Iran, which is an alternative that I am not willing to accept).
And I believe a measure of victory is possible in Iraq, and thus is where the discussion of Nash Equilibriums and strategic cooperation enabled by indefinately repeating games comes into play, which you wrote off as "too classroom" (which isn't an argument in and of itself). Victory, now, is in the form of a stalemate between the various tribal elements vying for power in Iraq. I think of it as similar to setups between prison gangs. If you observe prison gangs, they get a lot of leeway, and get away with a lot of **** that would be preferable to prevent, but there are certain things the will not do, which means that the guards and warden are able to achieve certain interests as a product of allowing the gangs to likewise achieve certain interests. Basically, a measure of victory is possible if we collectively lower our standards of what victory entails. We need to define certain interests in Iraq that are more important than anything else, and then start developing the stalemate in which we allow them to pursue their interests in so far as the actions they take in pursuit of those interests do not undermine our attempts to achieve our interests (which should be VERY limited, basically down to not providing safe havens for our enemies as the Taliban did).
I'd also be much more comfortable with putting off withdrawl until after a new President takes office. If we achieve modest successes in Iraq, and we withdraw in a way that allows us to have a President who still has the political capital neccesary to fufilling his/her constitutional role as commander in chief of the armed services, then absolutely we should withdraw, but the time is not right now. If President Bush does not have the political capital available in order to fufill his role as commander in chief of the armed services, then we don't have a commander in chief of the armed services. The armed services are very hierarchical and centralized, and thus if the top of the ladder is in effect vacant, then we, in effect, don't have armed services. And if President Bush withdraws, he most certainly won't have the political capital to send them anywhere else if neccesary, while if we stay in Iraq, the amount of political capital neccesary is much less, to the point that he can afford to be our commander in chief.
