On the contrary, I believe Israel's role as a strategic ally was even more important than it might seem for at least three reasons.
First, because the relationship had grown so visible, it became a barometer of American reliability. If the U.S. were to abandon Israel, other U.S. allies might have discounted American reliability with respect to their bilateral relationship with the U.S. This might have tempted them to seek their own accommodation with the Soviet Union as "insurance" against a lack of American reliability. In turn, the Soviet Union might well have exploited the opening to seek such accommodations so as to undermine the foundations of NATO and other American relationships.
Second, the Soviets supported Arab radicals and revolutionary movements. This put pressure on moderates within the Arab world. Had the U.S. abandoned Israel, Arab moderates might well have grown demoralized as there would be no reliable counterweight to Soviet influence in the region. As a result, Arab radicalism might well have spread throughout the region and relatively moderate governments in Jordan and Saudi Arabia might have been toppled.
Third, if the U.S. were to abandon Israel, that would not have assured better relations with Egypt under President Nasser, etc. Such governments were dabbling with anti-Western policies and American disengagement from the scene, especially if Israel fell, could well have led to triumphs that locked in those anti-Western policies. Under such a scenario, the Middle East would be a far worse place than it is today with regard to American interests. A Soviet sphere of influence might well have given the Soviets a lock on that region's oil resources and one can imagine the economic consequences, particularly for Europe and Japan if the region's oil sales were harmonized with Soviet interests. The Soviets would have gained a powerful tool with which to pry Western Europe and Japan away from the U.S.
Keeping in mind the above considerations, when it came to the 1973 Yom Kippur War, the U.S. airlift of arms to Isarel to counter the Soviets' assistance to Egypt and Syria made powerful sense. If the Soviets position were to have been enhanced by an Arab victory on account of their assistance to the Arab states, that would have had vast repercussions well beyond the Middle East. If, on the other hand, Israel prevailed with American assistance, the U.S. position would be strengthened vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. In his memoirs, former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger highlighted the dangers and opportunities involved with the U.S. choice concerning assistance to Israel. He wrote:
If the Arabs won with Soviet support, Moscow would emerge as the dominant power; the radical course—the military option—would appear vindicated, and moderate Arabs would be in an even weaker position. Then the United States would lose influence no matter how restrained we had been during the war. If our arms aid blocked an Arab victory, then our central role would be confirmed.
Cold calculations of national interest--as much as affinity based on shared values--made it possible for the U.S. and Israel to forge an intense and lasting relationship.
Today, that relationship is just as vital. In the face of Islamic fundamentalism, Israel is a dependable strategic ally. Israel has intimate familiarity with the region's actors. Its assessments add depth to American understanding of that area, and improved understanding mitigates risks associated with uncertainty. Its strength helps deter the spread of such fundamentalism. Its example, even as many Arabs criticize it, demonstrates the power of a free society in terms of producing improved living standards and wellbeing. Its economic model shows states such as Jordan who lack oil wealth, that they too can become relatively affluent if the liberalize their economies. A gradual economic liberalization is underway in the region, and even if they won't mention it, Israel's ability to create a modern and prosperous economy has not gone unnoticed by its neighbors. Down the road, if economic liberalization can begin to give rise to an Arab middle class, that development might well offer another underpinning for a trend toward moderation, as volatile and radical policies tend to suppress economic growth and wealth creation.
