- Joined
- Jan 28, 2013
- Messages
- 94,823
- Reaction score
- 28,343
- Location
- Williamsburg, Virginia
- Gender
- Male
- Political Leaning
- Independent
It's a usage that carries the "states' rights" message.
I wouldn't say that's southern sympathizer usage as I grew up in Southern PA (Mason Dixon line and called it War Between the States because in the "border" region that's exactly what it was. Reality is in 1860/1861 people had more loyalty to their states and not the "nation" on both sides. Union regiments and Brigades such as the Irish Brigade, Philadelphia Brigade, Michigan Brigade, or even the Maryland Line in the CSA or the 1st Maryland Battalion (of which many of people I grew up with along the Mason Dixon line with had ancestors who served in that unit.
Dude.. Northern States had slaves during the Civil War. Kentucky, Delaware, Maryland and DC were slave holding regions and the Emancipation Proclamation didn't apply to anybody in Kentucky, Maryland, Delaware or DC either.
Not sure how you can say that when eight of the states that ratified to make the required three-fourths were reconstituted southern states. Obviously it took time to set those up.
Four of the Southern states that voted had voted to ratify by April.
And four had not.
That's what makes Mississippi the special place it is.
Only 50%. Not, "the South". Your spin failed.
Not sure what "spin" you're talking about. The four were needed to make three-fourths of the states, and it took time to reconstitute the state governments.
Except it wasn't. The North's history of burning of Atlanta is this that only targeted destruction is actually incorrect. The Union burned that city to ground, just as they did Rome, GA and other towns along the way.
While Sherman never ordered the wholesale burning of Atlanta, he did little to stop many of his increasingly undisciplined soldiers from escalating targeted destruction into arson and rioting. It is difficult to avoid concluding that he arranged matters so that he could deny responsibility if Atlanta’s destruction became morally condemned, but accept credit if it was celebrated.
Nor did it apply to anybody in West Virginia. Nor, the following people as individuals:
- Members of pro union indian factions
- Slaves in unoccupied CSA states that were owned by absentee union officers
- Slaves in occupied portions of the CSA that were owned by people willing to take even a token union loyalty oath.
Obviously, the union war effort was one big emancipation crusade- yeah right.
LOL, the North was on the run just a little over a month before after Chancellorsville. So much so.. Lincoln fired Hooker for Meade. That was big punches thrown but it was in 1864 at the Battle of Monocacy and the march on DC by General Early (CSA) when the war was done. The delaying action by Maj Gen. Lew Wallace just out side Fredrick saved the Union.
There were for loyal states that could have met that thtee-fourths, but didn't.
First of all people have the wrong impression in their heads. This wasn't Columbia where the city was literally consumed by a massive fire. Instead this was the targeted destruction of all the remaining military and industrial infrastructure left in the city in order to free Sherman of the need to devote a significant number of troops to occupy and guard these facilities. The city still existed after the razing was complete.
Was it the right move? Duh. Of course it was.
Yes, the 13th Amendment was just an example of skillful propaganda.
Even after Chancellorsville the resources of the United States were too extraordinary to surmount. Every defeat bled the Confederacy more severely than it bled the Union who could, and did, replace losses. While the Confederacy was scraping the bottom of the manpower pool with fierce conscription efforts the Union had millions of men untapped. As for Monocacy it didn't 'save the Union' even in the most favorable analysis (as it is by no means clear that Early would have been successful in seizing the city) it just saved Washington D.C. from being raided. The loss of the city would not have ended the war, it would have delayed it before converging columns recaptured the city from the skeleton Confederate force.
Would you be bothered about what happened in Lawrence, Kansas? CSA guerillas plan a massive retaliation for plundering raids conducted by pro union jayhawkers and "red leg" militias. The town is to be burned and looted. Quantrill then distributes a "hit list" to the various guerilla bands oeprating under his command. Only known Jay Hawker leaders are to be killed. But... things quickly spiral out of control.PS: Even if he did let the city burn I still wouldn't be overly bothered.
The House (at the time consisting of only union states), initially refused to pass the 13 amendment. After arm twisting by Lincoln, it passed 119-56. Even after disruption from the war had de facto freed mllions of slaves in both the CSA and border states, and slavery was de facto finished socially and economically, there were still substantial numbers in the north who voted against emancipation.
The CSA was facing the exact same war situation as the WWII Germany: Neither the superior tactical skills of their generals, nor the fact that their units delivered "more bang for the buck" on average could alter the strategic reality.
And even more bad news for the CSA and Germany.... the enemy's tactical skills were only getting better. Though the skills of the union and the allies never equalled German and CSA skills, their steadily growing tactical competence leveraged their numerical and material advantage that much more.
Would you be bothered about what happened in Lawrence, Kansas? CSA guerillas plan a massive retaliation for plundering raids conducted by pro union jayhawkers and "red leg" militias. The town is to be burned and looted. Quantrill then distributes a "hit list" to the various guerilla bands oeprating under his command. Only known Jay Hawker leaders are to be killed. But... things quickly spiral out of control.
In the end, those who were reluctant to emancipate feared the idea of black citizenship. As for generalship, the two finest commanders of the war, Grant and Sherman, were with the North.
Even after Chancellorsville the resources of the United States were too extraordinary to surmount. Every defeat bled the Confederacy more severely than it bled the Union who could, and did, replace losses. While the Confederacy was scraping the bottom of the manpower pool with fierce conscription efforts the Union had millions of men untapped. As for Monocacy it didn't 'save the Union' even in the most favorable analysis (as it is by no means clear that Early would have been successful in seizing the city) it just saved Washington D.C. from being raided. The loss of the city would not have ended the war, it would have delayed it before converging columns recaptured the city from the skeleton Confederate force.
Very good summary of the entire war. The union could afford defeats and stalemates. The CSA could not. Their superior tactical skills were not going to save them from strategic realities.
A reluctance to emncipate is still a reluctance to emancipate and demonstrates that the union did not view the war as an emancipation crusade.
As for point 2, Sherman was a highly skilled, modern strategic thinking general. Though Grant had above average skills, he used vastly superior numbers and material advantages to grind his enemy down. Even with these advantages, he still could not beat CSA "A Team" commanders tactically.
The ability to grind down an outnumbered and out supplied enemy does not show that Grant had markedly superior skills. His men knew this, thus his nickname "The Butcher".
The nickname "the Butcher" was a product of Confederate propaganda and Grant's (and Lincoln's) political enemies. Grant was in fact enormously popular among his men. His Vicksburg campaign was the unsurpassed masterpiece of the war. His famous right turn to Spotsylvania after the Wilderness was the single most consequential military decision of the war.
Good points. In the military sense, the union could afford stalemates. In the political sense, they could not afford stalemates followed by inactivity that prolonged the strategic war. Once Grant's grind them down campaign started, even stalemates on CSA territory (the Wilderness) contributed towards a union victory because the Confederate flagship army was slowly breaking down after each one, and Grant relentlessly initiated another battle where win, or draw, the union still won in the strategic sense.The Union couldn't afford stalemates either. Politically it was a nightmare for Lincoln. You had the rise of the Copperheads and a serious chance of losing the 1864 election which was there such a massive push under Lincoln orders in July 1864. Riots in NYC over the draft.
1) South had resources what it lacked was effective railroad system. 2) I never buy the line because they have more blood to spill so they automatically win. It's a notion that has proven false century after century. 3) The North in 1863 was dealing with draft riots and the rise of the copperheads. So it's not like the North was free of issues that could have derailed their ability to fight.
It was in 1864 it really changed.
Monocacy saved the Union.. Few key things to remember. There was only 4,000 home guardsmen and militiamen left to defend DC. Grant removed almost all of the artillery and regular army troops in support (and then usage) chasing after Lee and ended up getting bogged down at Petersburg. Early would have arrived destroyed the Naval Yard, moved massive amounts of supplies (food, weapons and money) back west. That we agree on.. where we disagree is what happens next.
Early could have:
1) burned DC down to the ground and marched on Baltimore.
Burning DC down would have caused massive problems politically for Lincoln (who was in DC at the time) and he probably would have lost the election in 1864. It also would lead to no effective Government.
2) Hold DC due to it's already built fortifications for as long as possible requiring Grant to move more troops North, freeing up Lee to move out of Petersburg.
It's because of Monocacy that Early didn't get to DC a day earlier. He walks into DC facing untrained forces against one of the best trained Divisions in the Confederate Army.
Please note that I never said Grant was incompetent- just that he was not one the two best generals in the war. Grants Vicksburg campaign was not against the CSA all star army, nor was it against the CSA all star commander. Likewise, Grant's "right turn" had nothing to do with any superior sense of tactics. Rather, the right turn signified that Grant, unlike previous union commanders, was not going to retreat in the face of a set back. Rather, Grant was fully committed to grinding down the confederacy in the strategic sense and thus winning the war . He then ordered the right turn to continue grinding them down. Grant never beat the Army of Northern Virginia tactically. As for the "Butcher title": Grant's actions like Cold Harbor (three human wave attacks) earned him that nickname by discontented Union troops, The popularity Grant enjoyed among his troops came from the fact that his strategic "grind them down" campaign was working and the end of the CSA was coming into view.
Good points. In the military sense, the union could afford stalemates. In the political sense, they could not afford stalemates followed by inactivity that prolonged the strategic war. Once Grant's grind them down campaign started, even stalemates on CSA territory (the Wilderness) contributed towards a union victory because the Confederate flagship army was slowly breaking down after each one, and Grant relentlessly initiated another battle where win, or draw, the union still won in the strategic sense.
The nickname "the Butcher" was a product of Confederate propaganda and Grant's (and Lincoln's) political enemies. Grant was in fact enormously popular among his men. His Vicksburg campaign was the unsurpassed masterpiece of the war. His famous right turn to Spotsylvania after the Wilderness was the single most consequential military decision of the war.
The Union was divided on slavery throughout the war but there is no doubt that anti-slavery sentiment grew, and Lincoln modulated his policies to both encourage and capitalize on that trend. In the end, Union sentiment to destroy slavery is a topic separate from Confederate determination to defend it, which was the cause of the war.
We use cookies and similar technologies for the following purposes:
Do you accept cookies and these technologies?
We use cookies and similar technologies for the following purposes:
Do you accept cookies and these technologies?