In the First Essay of the Genealogy of Morals, Nietzsche lays out his ideal of the ‘noble’, the ‘strong’ man, and explains his reasons for exemplifying the strong over his idea of ‘weak’. Nietzsche attempts to prove to the reader that the notions of ‘good’ and ‘evil’ are really the weak man’s attempts at making the strong man incapable of exercising his strength over the weak, and are ideals that the strong must disregard in order to be truly strong. Nietzsche exemplifies the aristocratic ideal, that there are a few strong men who should rule over the many because they alone can, and that any attempt by the many, by those being ruled, to overthrow or otherwise make a society more ‘fair’ is only the attempt by the weak to force the strong to feel ashamed of being so strong.
And yet, Nietzsche falls into the all-too-common trap of proposing an ideal and then not following through with an explanation of how the world would look if people stuck to the ideal. He never explains how to go about achieving ‘strength’, he even goes so far as to suggest that it is not something that can be ‘achieved’; either one has strength or one has weakness and there is no changing what one has. But it is not only this that Nietzsche fails to do; he also fails to actually definitively propose anything. He fails to take a side.
Sure, he talks and writes with anger and rancor and malice, especially when talking directly about the weak and the usurping of the strong by the weak. But he also talks about how boring humanity would be if the weak had not attempted, and succeeded, at instilling morals into humanity. “Human history would be altogether too stupid a thing without the spirit that the impotent have introduced to it”. He talks as if humanity, were it not for the introduction of morals and the invention of the idea of ‘evil’, would be nothing more than base creatures no better than the rest of the animals of the earth. “...only here did the human soul in a higher sense acquire depth and become evil – and these are two basic respects in which man has hitherto been superior to other beasts!”
So the question becomes this; was Nietzsche ever proclaiming an ideal at all? Does Nietzsche ever really think that it is possible for humanity to truly go back to the ‘strong’ vs. ‘weak’ dialectic now that ‘good’ and ‘evil’ has replaced it? And regardless of what Nietzsche thinks, what are the results of such a base and, in the truest sense of the word, immoral system? It is not possible, to Nietzsche, for everyone to be strong; it seems that one is only ‘strong’ if one cares not for the ‘weak’. But is it possible for everyone to be weak? Is it preferable for some to be ‘strong’ and have the ‘strong’ constantly exploit and cause pain on the ‘weak’? Or is it preferable for all to be ‘weak’ and for exploitation to end entirely? Is this even possible?
To even begin to answer these questions, Nietzsche’s definition of the ‘strong’ man must be clearly defined and laid out with respect to the rest of society; in other words, clearly define the relationships between the ‘strong’ and the ‘weak’. It must be explained how the ‘strong’ function in society, how society would look like if the ‘good’ vs. ‘evil’ dialectic had never existed. A clear picture must be created that shows how society would function, how the relationships between people would play out, in a time when the ‘strong’ vs. ‘weak’ dialectic was untainted by the impotent. This is clearly expressed in Nietzsche’s First Essay of “On the Genealogy of Morals”.
Nietzsche asserts, in this First Essay, that the judgment ‘good’ did not come from those to whom the supposed ‘good’ was done, that instead the judgment of an action as ‘good’ came from the ‘good’ person doing the action. It was the person himself that was defined as ‘good’, and any action that that ‘good’ person took was defined as ‘good’, due to the ‘goodness’ of the person doing the action. It can be inferred from this that the judgment ‘bad’ came about in the same way; a ‘bad’ person did ‘bad’ things, it was not the ‘bad’ things done by a person that made that person ‘bad’.
A good analogy would be that of a simple dog; a dog is a dog regardless of what a dog does. If the dog, say, tears up furniture, it is still a dog that happens to be tearing up furniture. If the dog does tricks, it is still a dog. In one case, the adjective ‘good’ would be ascribed to the dog, and in the other case, the adjective ‘bad’. However, according to Nietzsche, it is not the actions themselves that make the dog either good or bad.
Grammatically, we consider the dog ‘good’ because it does actions that a ‘good dog’ would do, and the dog ‘bad’ because it does actions that a ‘bad dog’ would do. These ‘good dogs’ and ‘bad dogs’ are universals, they exist outside of reality only as ideas, only as stereotypes. However, these abstract notions of ‘good dogs’ and ‘bad dogs’ allow us to, in English, define certain actions as either ‘good’ actions or ‘bad’ actions for a dog to take. The purely ‘good’ dog would do no ‘bad’ because any action taken by the ‘good dog’ is defined as a ‘good’ action.
Yet this is merely a function of the way the English language works; it does not actually describe the dog. Saying that, in reality, a dog doing tricks is a ‘good dog’ is merely saying that the dog is doing actions that the stereotypical ‘good dog’ would do, not that the dog itself is ‘good’ or that the actions it is taking are ‘good’; it is likewise with the ‘bad’. The grammar is non-consequential to Nietzsche; a ‘good dog’ cannot do ‘bad’ things, no more than a ‘bad dog’ could do ‘good’ things.
But how, then, does one come to be defined as either ‘good’ or as ‘bad’? If it is not the actions of the person that decides the definition of a person, then what is it that defines the person?
Nietzsche claims that the judgments ‘good’ and ‘bad’ were created by “the noble, powerful, high-stationed, and high-minded…”, who created the idea of ‘good’ to apply to themselves. It was, the “total feeling on the part of a higher ruling order in relation to a lower order, to a “below””. It was not that the ‘good’ had qualities that were better or nicer or more charitable than the ‘bad’, it was simply that those who had power, who had control, defined ‘good’ as their own actions, as their preferred actions. The ‘good’ dog was a dog that did what those with power over it desired, what the owners, the superiors, the rulers, desired. And it was when those with power decided that an action was against their wishes, against their desires; they defined it as ‘bad’. Rebellion was ‘bad’, revolution was ‘bad’, equality was ‘bad’, anything that threatened their power or their status was ‘bad’. Hence, when the dog tore up the furniture, the owners viewed this action as a direct threat to their control over the dog, and thus tearing up the furniture was defined as a ‘bad’ action for a dog to take. A ‘bad dog’ would be one who took this ‘bad’ action.
And yet, Nietzsche falls into the all-too-common trap of proposing an ideal and then not following through with an explanation of how the world would look if people stuck to the ideal. He never explains how to go about achieving ‘strength’, he even goes so far as to suggest that it is not something that can be ‘achieved’; either one has strength or one has weakness and there is no changing what one has. But it is not only this that Nietzsche fails to do; he also fails to actually definitively propose anything. He fails to take a side.
Sure, he talks and writes with anger and rancor and malice, especially when talking directly about the weak and the usurping of the strong by the weak. But he also talks about how boring humanity would be if the weak had not attempted, and succeeded, at instilling morals into humanity. “Human history would be altogether too stupid a thing without the spirit that the impotent have introduced to it”. He talks as if humanity, were it not for the introduction of morals and the invention of the idea of ‘evil’, would be nothing more than base creatures no better than the rest of the animals of the earth. “...only here did the human soul in a higher sense acquire depth and become evil – and these are two basic respects in which man has hitherto been superior to other beasts!”
So the question becomes this; was Nietzsche ever proclaiming an ideal at all? Does Nietzsche ever really think that it is possible for humanity to truly go back to the ‘strong’ vs. ‘weak’ dialectic now that ‘good’ and ‘evil’ has replaced it? And regardless of what Nietzsche thinks, what are the results of such a base and, in the truest sense of the word, immoral system? It is not possible, to Nietzsche, for everyone to be strong; it seems that one is only ‘strong’ if one cares not for the ‘weak’. But is it possible for everyone to be weak? Is it preferable for some to be ‘strong’ and have the ‘strong’ constantly exploit and cause pain on the ‘weak’? Or is it preferable for all to be ‘weak’ and for exploitation to end entirely? Is this even possible?
To even begin to answer these questions, Nietzsche’s definition of the ‘strong’ man must be clearly defined and laid out with respect to the rest of society; in other words, clearly define the relationships between the ‘strong’ and the ‘weak’. It must be explained how the ‘strong’ function in society, how society would look like if the ‘good’ vs. ‘evil’ dialectic had never existed. A clear picture must be created that shows how society would function, how the relationships between people would play out, in a time when the ‘strong’ vs. ‘weak’ dialectic was untainted by the impotent. This is clearly expressed in Nietzsche’s First Essay of “On the Genealogy of Morals”.
Nietzsche asserts, in this First Essay, that the judgment ‘good’ did not come from those to whom the supposed ‘good’ was done, that instead the judgment of an action as ‘good’ came from the ‘good’ person doing the action. It was the person himself that was defined as ‘good’, and any action that that ‘good’ person took was defined as ‘good’, due to the ‘goodness’ of the person doing the action. It can be inferred from this that the judgment ‘bad’ came about in the same way; a ‘bad’ person did ‘bad’ things, it was not the ‘bad’ things done by a person that made that person ‘bad’.
A good analogy would be that of a simple dog; a dog is a dog regardless of what a dog does. If the dog, say, tears up furniture, it is still a dog that happens to be tearing up furniture. If the dog does tricks, it is still a dog. In one case, the adjective ‘good’ would be ascribed to the dog, and in the other case, the adjective ‘bad’. However, according to Nietzsche, it is not the actions themselves that make the dog either good or bad.
Grammatically, we consider the dog ‘good’ because it does actions that a ‘good dog’ would do, and the dog ‘bad’ because it does actions that a ‘bad dog’ would do. These ‘good dogs’ and ‘bad dogs’ are universals, they exist outside of reality only as ideas, only as stereotypes. However, these abstract notions of ‘good dogs’ and ‘bad dogs’ allow us to, in English, define certain actions as either ‘good’ actions or ‘bad’ actions for a dog to take. The purely ‘good’ dog would do no ‘bad’ because any action taken by the ‘good dog’ is defined as a ‘good’ action.
Yet this is merely a function of the way the English language works; it does not actually describe the dog. Saying that, in reality, a dog doing tricks is a ‘good dog’ is merely saying that the dog is doing actions that the stereotypical ‘good dog’ would do, not that the dog itself is ‘good’ or that the actions it is taking are ‘good’; it is likewise with the ‘bad’. The grammar is non-consequential to Nietzsche; a ‘good dog’ cannot do ‘bad’ things, no more than a ‘bad dog’ could do ‘good’ things.
But how, then, does one come to be defined as either ‘good’ or as ‘bad’? If it is not the actions of the person that decides the definition of a person, then what is it that defines the person?
Nietzsche claims that the judgments ‘good’ and ‘bad’ were created by “the noble, powerful, high-stationed, and high-minded…”, who created the idea of ‘good’ to apply to themselves. It was, the “total feeling on the part of a higher ruling order in relation to a lower order, to a “below””. It was not that the ‘good’ had qualities that were better or nicer or more charitable than the ‘bad’, it was simply that those who had power, who had control, defined ‘good’ as their own actions, as their preferred actions. The ‘good’ dog was a dog that did what those with power over it desired, what the owners, the superiors, the rulers, desired. And it was when those with power decided that an action was against their wishes, against their desires; they defined it as ‘bad’. Rebellion was ‘bad’, revolution was ‘bad’, equality was ‘bad’, anything that threatened their power or their status was ‘bad’. Hence, when the dog tore up the furniture, the owners viewed this action as a direct threat to their control over the dog, and thus tearing up the furniture was defined as a ‘bad’ action for a dog to take. A ‘bad dog’ would be one who took this ‘bad’ action.