"For the moment, the U.S. Navy enjoys a level of global hegemony that surpasses that of the Royal Navy during its heyday. While the ability to project naval power ashore is, as it has always been, an important subsidiary mission for the Navy, it may not remain the service’s primary focus through the coming decades. Over the longer term –
but, given the service life of ships, well within the approaching planning horizons of the U.S. Navy – the Navy’s focus may return again to keeping command of the open oceans and sea lines of communi- cation. Absent a rigorous program of experimentation to investigate the nature of the revolution in military affairs as it applies to war at sea, the Navy might face a future Pearl Harbor – as unprepared for war in the post-carrier era as it was unprepared for war at the dawn of the carrier age."
[...]
Further, the process of transformation, even if it brings revolutionary change, is likely to be a long one, absent some catastrophic and catalyzing event – like a new Pearl Harbor. Domestic politics and industrial policy will shape the pace and content of transformation as much as the requirements of current missions.
[…]Wise management of this process will consist in large measure of figuring out the right moments to halt production of current-paradigm weapons and shift to radically new designs.[…]Thus, this report advocates a two-stage process of change – transition and transformation – over the coming decades.[…]
Really??? You clearly expected that I haven't read this document beyond the actual quotes... it's ok though, let's correct this for everyone here just to show
So you took the quote from 67, then added a "[...]" to show that it was a continuation of the thought that led to the second section. Well, that [...] must have meant a continuation to the end of the book and all the way through to page 51. You're attempt to confuse is noted, at least you made more proper usage of the [...] afterward....
So, let's go to what the document ACTUALLY says :
To preserve American military preeminence in the coming decades, the Department of Defense must move more aggressively to experiment with new technologies and operational concepts, and seek to exploit the emerging revolution in
military affairs. Information technologies, in particular, are becoming more prevalent and significant components of modern military systems. These information technologies
are having the same kind of transforming effects on military affairs as they are having in the larger world. The effects of this military transformation will have profound implications for how wars are fought, what kinds of weapons will dominate the battlefield and, inevitably, which nations enjoy military preeminence.
So, this section is detailing how to "preserve military preeminence" to find out what is meant, let's go back to the preface : Key findings, the findings of what was needed to 'preserve military preeminence'.
These are :
- Defend the American Homeland (re : Homeland security)
- fight and decisively win two simultaneous large scale wars (Afghanistan and Iraq, from hindsight)
- perform constabulary duties in critical regions (Policing these critical regions, it can be argued that we are now the police in parts of Iraq, I imagine what was sent to Haiti might also count in this)
- Transform US forces to exploit the "revolution in military affairs" (re: implementation of new technologies, kinda like how there's been exponential increase in drone aircraft)
So, this is what was necessary to preserve military preeminence... carrying on, there is brief discussion about how America has the benefit of its current position to take charge, but the Pentagon is constrained by its budget and must reduce how much it spends on research and development to put the money towards implementation.
Any serious effort at transformation must occur within the larger framework of
U.S. national security strategy, military missions and defense budgets. The United States cannot simply declare a “strategic pause” while experimenting with new technologies and operational concepts. Nor can it choose to pursue a transformation
strategy that would decouple American and allied interests.
A transformation strategy that solely pursued capabilities for projecting force
from the United States, for example, and sacrificed forward basing and presence,
would be at odds with larger American policy goals and would trouble American
allies.
So, if there's a serious effort to transform the military in ways that will "guarantee preeminence", it must be done in ways that are congruent with its current operations. Or else it might alienate America's allies.
Further, the process of transformation, even if it brings revolutionary change, is likely to be a long one, absent some catastrophic and catalyzing event – like a
new Pearl Harbor. Domestic politics and industrial policy will shape the pace and
content of transformation as much as the requirements of current missions.
So, now that we put the quote into it's proper context, it has a different meaning.
I really didn't mean to digress so long into this.... it could make for a thread in itself.
---------------------------------------------
Now, to tie this back into the original point here :
What do YOU think that Obama will have to do to combat this credibility crisis and bring people back to the man that was sold as the messianic leader of 'hope and change'????
Do you think that what this Shapiro character said was accurate, that Obama needs his own catastrophic and catalyzing event???
I mean, the facts are there, Obama's about as popular as the guy who passes gas in church, and dropping daily, how would YOU propose he fix this problem?
What does that say about him that he's even losing his core support? What does that say about the american people that everything he does is almost instantly unpopular?
What about the calls for Obama to "act like a dictator"???
