Part I of II
When a state goes for dismissal, they don't demand the defendant turn over his bond.
If the state thought they couldn't win the case, they drop the charges and the bond is returned to the defendant.
This is a weird case all around and the secrecy is telling.
Somebody along the lines doesn't want the public to know what happened here.
This was a plea deal, if it wasn't neither side would know what their role was in this.
Before I respond to your specific elements/assertions above, I want to remind you that this case has, from its start, been one overwhelmed with multifaceted apparent rushes to judgment regarding what did/didn't happen, who did/didn't do "this or that," culpability and lack thereof, and outcomes. That presumptuousness occurred prior to the matter arriving in court. Now we have a court decision to dismiss the matter, and rather than exercising postulary prudence, learning from very recent history so as not to repeat it, people yet again hasten to conclude on what effected the outcome we today observe.
Moreover, folks are again disregarding a fundamental principle of American jurisprudence: one is innocent until, in a court of law, proven guilty. Now had the Smollett matter not arrived in a court of law, then fine, folks can, about it, natter normatively
ad nauseum, but it did to to court; thus what cannot be shown based on content proffered in the court's proceedings and related laws and procedures is ingermane conjecture.
In my post to which your above post is a reply, I cited and linked-to an IL code section, and I referenced the remarks of the IL state attorney overseeing the case. I didn't proffer anything other than that the specific terms of the noted code section and the procedural facts of the case aren't a perfect fit. I suggested nothing based on that code not because I hadn't an idea (I had one the instant I finished reading the code) that reconciles that code, the prosecutor's remarks and the manifested events, but to see whether you'd apply that information in your own analysis and posit a rational resolution rather than remaining on a conspiracy-theory-style line. You didn't.
I'm sitting here saying, "X is the body of applicable extant information available to me; thus I will form my conclusion based on X." What I'm not doing, and what many others are doing, is forming my conclusion based on what I think may have happened. Why am I not doing that? Because I cannot show that what I think may have happened did happen. I don't need to compromise my credibility by proffering postulates predicated on behavior I can't
show occurred or most likely occurred, no matter my suspecting that behavior occurred. In other words, I don't need to "
over-work" the evidence available to me. I gain nothing by doing so.
IL code 730 ILCS 5/5-6-3.3, which I linked-to in my prior post, provides for dismissal of a matter provided the defendant meets certain character criteria. It appears Jussie meets them. The statute also has a procedural element that doesn't comport perfectly with the sequence of events in Smollett's case -- Jussie has pled, and the sequence seems typically to apply 730 ILCS 5/5-6-3.3 prior to a plea's entry. But for the sequencing, 730 ILCS 5/5-6-3.3 would apply, and that code section is what the state's attorney overseeing the case said was applied. That means the judge basically opted to overlook the sequencing irregularity (or it may be Jussie withdrew his plea; we don't know which) and apply 730 ILCS 5/5-6-3.3, thus the dismissal.
The noted code section, as the content to which I earlier linked indicates, has been applied 5000+ times. Evaluating the matter in consideration of that code section is rational, Occamesque, comports with IL law, aligns with the facts of the case, aligns with the state attorney's assertion, and bids one to neither proffer nor ascribe to conspiracy-theory-style lines of explanation.
(continued due to character limit)
