Literalism is an interpretative philosophy prone to error. Say I draft a piece of legislation relating to bill-posting. It says that bill-posting is prohibited on 'lamp-posts'. A 'lamp-post' is defined in the Act as 'any street post with an attached streetlight'. A literalist interpretation of this would produce such absurdities as the finding that bill-posting on telegraph poles, however, might be entirely appropriate, even if the legislation in its context is clearly intended to prohibit bill posting on both lamp-posts and telegraph poles.
In this country we have legislatively-enforced rules stating that an interpretation which promotes the purpose of the legislature must be preferred to one which does not. There are numerous ways in which a so-called 'purposive construction' can be developed by the courts:
- Reading the statute as a whole in order to understand its context;
- Interpretation of individual words or sections within this context;
- Consultation of the statute's long title and/or preamble;
- Consultation of the 'objects clause' which is present in some statutes;
- Consultation of definitions of important words provided within the statute, or within similar acts in pari materia (in other jurisdictions);
- Referring to reading speeches or parliamentary debates on the legislation; and
- Referring to 'explanatory memoranda' released by the Government on the subject and purpose of the legislation.
Clearly there are ways and means to determine legislative intent to resolve ambiguities within legislation.
Statutory interpretation is never subject to the whims of whatever judge happened to 'clock in'. Common law rules on statutory interpretation are very well-defined, regardless of jurisdiction, and a judgment that fails the apply the appropriate rules will of course be appealable.
