Technocratic_Utilitarian said:
No. THere is no hypocrisy. A fetus doesn't have moral personhood. A dog has a far greater level of awareness than an early fetus.
I would disagree not on the ground of awareness but on the issue of personhood and I would question the threshold of moral consideration. Is awareness the definition of moral consideration? And does that mean late term abortions are killing life if the dog's awareness is least common denominator in determining moral consideration.
It may be that the topic fascinates me so much because my cat opted to help with this project by running across the keyboard a few times and playing with the screen’s moving imagery. Perhaps, given her exercise of something I can only call “free will,” I am the one playing and Simba is the one working. Certainly, she thinks the roles are reversed. At what point does something become a person?
Contemporary ethicists, philosophers and theologians tend to look for the lowest common denominator when defining personhood: what must we have in common in order “to be” considered a person? The anthropocentric perspective says human beings, Homo sapiens, are the only true persons. With the possible exception of God (not all anthropocentrists accept a personal God), human beings are the only persons.
Biocentrists argue that the title of personhood could be bestowed to sentient animals, some even basing sentience solely on the basis of capacity to feel pain. From this perspective, it is possible even earth worms and amoeba deserve to be called persons. Actually for many biocentrists, the title of “person” gives way to the more legal-sounding descriptive, “beings of moral consideration,” as this avoids the anthropological connection centuries of usage attach to the word “person.”
The irony is that Western personhood is a concept originally “fleshed-out” in an attempt to understand the perichoretic onto-relation between Father, Son and Holy Spirit. It is important reading the Bible, particularly in reference to the eschaton, that the New Testament writers struggled to put words to the experience of resurrection, in part because the category of personhood was not precisely, explicitly available. Paul’s struggle in 1 Corinthians 15 effectively demonstrates this. The seed and wheat, spiritual body and person of dust and image in heaven all point to Paul struggling to express the reality that our whole being will be raised, because of the personal relationship we share with God through Jesus Christ and in the Holy Spirit.
What then does this say about personhood? Some Native American traditions offer an understanding of the glorified “body,” when brought to the Great Spirit and appearing in the “great beyond,” our bodies are composed of a conglomeration of all the living entities we have eaten. I am not sure I entirely subscribe to this image of God’s kingdom, but it does shed light on Torrance’s understanding of “person.” Personhood is defined in significant part by the relationships we engage in.
Let me say that this relational qualification of “person” does not grow out of a “least common denominator” explanation for personhood. In fact, from the philosophical perspectives, personhood is more defined by “distinction from” than “relation to” other people, species, and creation. Degrees and differentiation have segregating effect in the defining of personhood when a lowest common factor is sought, in fact the terminology implies a threshold of quality, a barrier for membership. Sadly, the threshold in some parts of human history has not merely been anthropocentric but gender, race, culture, intellect, age, handicap-based or economic status within the human family.
Ultimately, the “least common denominator” approach to understanding personhood defines a person in distinct autonomy, by separation from other beings. Relationships are extrinsic to being. This gives birth to insipient relational dualism. It allows us to separate what we do from who we are, in a way that James 2:18 criticized. It is an extrapolation of this understanding of personhood that allows people to do wicked things to each other and say, “Nothing personal, it’s just business.” The biblical witness does not view relationships with other beings in such an impersonal way.
Instead, a relational qualification of personhood grows out of the biblical witness to God’s salvific plan, but is not expressed directly in the Bible. This fits directly into your comparison about the magic eye. It is upon the indwelling of God’s presence in our lives, through our participation in the reality of the whole of the biblical witness, as revealed through the illumination of the Holy Spirit, and the ultimate self-revelation in Jesus Christ, that a biblical view of personhood emerges. It is from the entirety of God’s Trinitarian activity that we truly comprehend, as far as our categorical limitations allow, personhood. This scope is not limited to Old or New Testament witness, and in fact we must incorporate both or the understanding of personhood, especially as defined in the perichoretic co-activity of the Trinity, is incomplete.
…the ‘I AM’ of Yahweh and the ‘I AM’ of the Lord Jesus were brought together within the threefold manifestation of God as Father, Son and Holy Spirit, that not only deepened the Old Testament understanding of the Being of God as profoundly ‘personal,’ but forced the church in giving explicit expression to the implicitly Trinitarian self-revelation of God to develop the theological concept of the ‘person.’
What, then, is a person? On surveying the Bible for the word Trinity, it quickly becomes obvious that the Trinity is not explicitly mentioned. There are many places where Trinitarian activity is clearly evident, but generally in the “differentiated” activity of Father, Son and Holy Spirit. Jesus and the Holy Spirit do things that only God can do. In light of that, from the “least common denominator” model of personhood, it would seem the Bible advocates tri-theism or Modalism rather than Triunity and to an extent that is what the ancestors of our faith struggled mightily with.
If tri-theism were the answer then the autonomy of persons would mitigate against the “I AM” statements of John, especially the words of John 14:10, “Don’t you know that I am in the Father and the Father is in me.” Even beyond that are the words of John 14:20, that carry this mutual indwelling even to those who follow Jesus. If tri-theism and extrinsic relationships, expressed in the least common denominator model, define personhood this mutuality and indwelling constitutes a profound violation of personhood. Indeed, the pneumatological activity involved in the prophets and New Testament church becomes de-personalizing from the perspective of extrinsic relationship. The answer is found in a return to the broader biblical witness.
The biblical witness leads us to understand that there is one God, and yet there is Father, Son and Holy Spirit: which one is God? They all are the one God so how can there be three? The key to understanding lies in the role relationship plays between Father, Son and Holy Spirit. Even this statement is problematic, because if relationship is between the parties, it is extrinsic, leading to above dilemmas in understanding “person.” If however relationships are intrinsic and constitutive, a part of being “person” is relationship. By this we mean God is Father precisely in relationship to the Son. The reciprocal is true as well and likewise the Spirit is the Spirit in relation to the others.
The relations between the father, Son and Holy Spirit are not just modes of existence but hypostatic interrelations which belong intrinsically to what Father, Son and Holy Spirit coinhere in themselves and in their mutual objective relationships with and for each other.
If then, we receive our personhood from God through Jesus Christ and in the Holy Spirit is that not setting the bar for least common denominator at God-hood? Not at all, rather it is saying that God chooses to draw creation into “onto-relationships” with God, in effect saying, all parts of creation are worthy of moral consideration, not because of a human standard of personhood, but because of the divine nature of love. God looked down at creation and proclaimed, “It is very good.” Personhood becomes a barrier in human relationships, but the divine sui generis personhood breaks down barriers.
What does this say to human beings then? First, we are not the arbiters of personhood; we are not the arbiters of moral consideration: God is! We are persons only through Jesus Christ and in the Holy Spirit. There certainly is also an ethical element to it. What does it say if part of who we are is rooted in the relationships we engage in? The “doing” and “being” dualism is not as sharp as we presume.
From this understanding, I am ethically opposed to abortion except in the case where the life of the mother is endangered, beyond normal birthing complications (it ain't an easy process). I am also opposed to the death penalty and any form of involuntary euthenasia. There is no hypocricy in it, though many who do not like the witness of faith see in this witness for life something less.