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Democracy and human rights will not work because people hate each other too much? I think I've heard that one before.
These nice folks don't seem to get along well with anyone: Christians, Jews, Hindus and Buddhists. Why is there any surprise that they don't get along with other Muslims either?
Democracy and human rights will not work because people hate each other too much? I think I've heard that one before.
The Sunni-Shia schism is long-running. Tensions were kept under the lid by authoritarian regimes, but once central power eroded, the rivalry regained vigor.
The need for human rights is made more urgent on account of this rivalry. The UN Development Program's Arab Human Development reports talk about the need for human rights if the Arab World is to close the gap with the developed world.
The rivalry does make democratic governance very difficult to achieve. Rather than witnessing the rise of inclusive representative governments that work for the interests of all citizens, one is seeing illiberal regimes that focus largely on the interests of the majority, often at the expense of the needs and rights of ethnic or religious minorities. That these governments might be elected does not make them democracies. They are proto-democratic. They have some characteristics of democratic governments, but they also lack the institutional, legal, and policy framework typical in democratic governments (basic protections for all citizens, accommodation of basic needs, reasonable transparency, assured meaningful role in society for all citizens, etc.).
This makes it all the more apparent that Western intervention is needed. Proto-democratic is all we can expect for a generation.
If one is talking about economic, political, or technical assistance, that's not an unreasonable approach. If one is talking about regime change with the hope that it might lead to democratic governance, that's another. Today, Iraq is proto-democratic, but its government is becoming more and more tilted toward the majority Shia domestically, frequently against the interests of the Sunnis and Kurds. In the larger geopolitical context, Iraq is becoming a less reliable partner to the U.S. as it continues to slide closer to Iran in its overall foreign policy orientation. At the same time, it remains an almost unyielding opponent of broader regional peace with Israel.
If one is talking about economic, political, or technical assistance, that's not an unreasonable approach. If one is talking about regime change with the hope that it might lead to democratic governance, that's another. Today, Iraq is proto-democratic, but its government is becoming more and more tilted toward the majority Shia domestically, frequently against the interests of the Sunnis and Kurds. In the larger geopolitical context, Iraq is becoming a less reliable partner to the U.S. as it continues to slide closer to Iran in its overall foreign policy orientation. At the same time, it remains an almost unyielding opponent of broader regional peace with Israel.
That is true DS and to just state this would be acceptable as what ONE thinks would be a beneficial result all based over the concept of a Proto Democracy. Wherein those have a different idea as to what Democracy is in the first place. Are doing nothing more than deceiving themselves as well as anyone else they are trying to tell.....everything will be alright.
It never was nor will it ever be. For some.....Democracy was never intended to be the way of their lives.
No one promised utopia overnight. These things take time and generally a few internal upheavals in the process.
Unfortunately, the U.S. does not have unlimited resources (financial, military, and manpower) to expend effort for an indefinite time period.
I don't have a problem with the US standard of living dropping in an effort to push world development.
Unfortunately, the U.S. does not have unlimited resources (financial, military, and manpower) to expend effort for an indefinite time period. Even if, down the road, Iraq manages to become a democratic state, but completes its evolution into a reliable Iranian ally, it would be difficult to define that outcome as a "success." More likely, Iraq will evolve to a situation where it continues to hold elections, but the result of Shia dominance and Shia-focused leadership would be an assured outcome. As a result, its foreign policy path will take it closer to Iran. At the same time, it is unlikely to become a champion of Mideast peace and it could become even more opposed to accommodation with Israel than it already is. Meanwhile, its disenfranchised Kurds and Sunnis will continue to face tough choices: acquiesce to what could become an increasingly marginal societal role, depart Iraq for other countries, or try to fight to safeguard some basic rights. All of those options will be chosen by some people.
The number of people making each of those choices, something that remains uncertain, will make a huge difference in shaping Iraq's more distant future. The result could be a continuation of today's simmering tension. But the result could be worse. There could be a risk of periodic violence, and some possibility of a fresh full-fledged insurgency. In turn, should a vigorous insurgency erupt, that could lead to a return to authoritarian rule. If the insurgency is defeated, the victorious government would very likely take on more authoritarian than democratic characteristics to try to preempt future challenges to its power. If the government is toppled by minority elements, an authoritarian regime could almost be guaranteed in order for the minority to retain its grip on power. Between those two outcomes would be a risk of fragmentation, which could be destabilizing not just for Iraq but also for neighboring states. Stable, liberal democracy appears to be a low probability outcome, and Baghdad's recent political evolution toward an increasingly Shia-centric focus has probably reduced that probability.
For now, at least in the near-term, Iraq will likely remain on a path of increasingly illiberal rule aimed at further strengthening Shia power and serving Shia interests. Its foreign policy trajectory will likely continue to bring it closer to Iran, making it slowly but unmistakably a less reliable partner for the U.S. Low-level violence will persist with periodic bombings and perhaps some armed clashes. Areas neighboring Syria could see a higher level of violence.
I don't have a problem with the US standard of living dropping in an effort to push world development.
The rest of your post is speculation.
This is fairly likely to occur (although not guaranteed); keep in mind, though, that in Iraq there was a very limited opposition to Saddam's rule, and (apparently) most of Iraq's social capital had been eliminated by Saddam. In Syria there is a powerful, organized front opposing Assad that is led by Western-educated individuals, not all of whom are Muslims. Once Assad has been toppled, assuming the Islamists haven't overshadowed the FSA, the Syrian rebel leaders are more likely to set up a democratic (though not entirely Western) government than the people who took charge in Iraq.
And I would disagree that the Kurds are facing marginalization by the Iraqi government. They've been given far greater autonomy since the fall of Saddam, and Iraq's current president is a Kurd. Iraqi Kurdistan's recent quarrel with the government has more to do with economic disagreements than racial supremacy.
I don't mean to go too far off-topic, but what instances are you thinking of in terms of majoritarianism against Sunnis and Kurds?
I doubt that most Americans would willingly trade down the nation's standard of living to finance activities that may provide little or no long-term benefit to the nation's strategic interests.
The speculative aspect is largely based on the region's history and recent developments. Given the absence of clear reasons for a different outcome, it provides a set of scenarios, though it isn't all-inclusive. Inattention to history (not from Generals Shinseki and Zinni) led to bad post-war planning for Iraq, as the highly likely outbreak of insurgency was discounted. The same lack of attention to Afghanistan's history, societal and institutional structure, British and Soviet experiences, and risks of a lack of supply chain flexibility again led to poor planning. In both cases, a lot of catching up was required e.g., troop surges. At the same time, at least through the present, the situations in both countries are less favorable than they could or should have been given the resources and effort that had been expended. In short, I don't believe one should rely on best-case scenarios. If such scenarios unfold, that's great. Unfortunately, in the Mideast, such scenarios have rarely materialized. If not, consideration of less favorable scenarios leads to better preparation and an ability to mitigate major risks.
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