Visbek said:
The Cosmological Argument fails, because it's special pleading ("everything needs a cause, except this special thing over here")
That's a misunderstanding of both the fallacy of special pleading, and Cosmological arguments.
Some claim P is special pleading just in case:
Proposition P names some member x of some set A and claims that x has property ~F, where F is a criterion for inclusion in A.
So: "Byron is immortal" names Byron, a member of the set of men, one criterion for inclusion in which is mortality. But then the claim is that Byron lacks at least one property needed for inclusion in A. Given that we know Byron was a man, we should conclude he has the same property all men have, namely, mortality.
God isn't a member of any such set. If God exists, then God is the ultimate special case. Point: special things do exist, and we can know this through reasoning. It's possible to construct an argument to demonstrate the existence of a number (0) that is neither positive nor negative, and that has other unique properties. So there's no particular reason why Cosmological arguments are cases of special pleading.
Generally speaking, here's how I understand Cosmological arguments: We observe some property of some set of things or states of affairs X. Let members of the set be called x, and then we observe that any x perforce enters into relation Y with other objects with property x (for example, every event is caused by some other event). We then take note of the paradoxes of infinity--if there had been an infinite number of cause-effect pairs (assuming that causation has a temporal component), we would never be
here and now. We are here and now, and so therefore
something special, z, must exist but not be a member of X.
That seems pretty good to me. Maybe not quite sound--I suppose someone may object that Y-relations are not distributed in the right way, or alternately, that they don't really exist. The beef I have with that line is that it seems to have the consequence that the universe is fundamentally unintelligible. And if
that is true, then we have no basis for science in the first place.
The problem for Cosmological arguments, of course, is that z isn't shown to be the Christian (or Muslim, or Jewish, or Pastafarian) God. On the other hand, it does seem that z cannot share very many properties with the members of X, so it's unlikely to be material in the usually understood sense, for example. Most especially, z might be natural in some sense of the word, but not natural in the sense that it could not be studied by science, even in principle.
As a final adendum, I would also point out that some Cosmological arguments are actually
reductio ad absurdam arguments. When Aquinas says "all things need a cause," he's ultimately out to show that this proposition, in conjunction with another about finished infinite causal chains, results in a contradiction. He then goes on to say that the first premise must be false, but only false of some limited set.
Again, of course he cannot show what is in that set. There could be many gods. It could be Zeus. Who knows?
Visbek said:
The Ontological Argument fails, because existence is not a predicate (per Kant)
Actually, that's not quite what Kant said. He said it's a special predicate, but the ontological argument treats it like a regular predicate. It's not clear to me he was correct, and anyway, surely you'll agree that
because Kant said it isn't a good way to argue.
Visbek said:
Argument From Design: Logically sound but factually incorrect. It is entirely possible for organisms to develop goals and exist without a conscious designer.
I don't want to get into this one. See Plantinga's analysis in
Where the Conflict Really Lies.
Visbek said:
Ever heard of Lonergan's Proof for the Existence of God?