That is clear to me. I have very much the same political philosophy as the men who founded this country, and there is not much I would change about the Constitution. I would leave the power Art. II, sec. 2, cl. 2 gives the president to appoint justices of the Supreme Court by and with the advice and consent of the Senate just as it is. I would probably also keep as is the provision of Art. III, sec. 1 by which justices of the Supreme Court, like other appointed federal judges, "shall hold their offices during good behaviour," although I am interested to see just what Sen. Cruz is proposing to change about that tenure.
Alexander Hamilton said this about the tenure of appointed judges in The Federalist No. 78 about providing for them to hold office during good behavior:
[This] is conformable to the most approved of the state constitutions . . . . Its propriety having been drawn into question by the adversaries of that plan, is no light symptom of the rage for objection, which disorders their imaginations and judgments. The standard of good behavior for the continuance in office of the judicial magistracy, is certainly one of the most valuable of the modern improvements in the practice of government. In a monarchy it is an excellent barrier to the despotism of the prince; in a republic it is a no less excellent barrier to the encroachments and oppressions of the representative body. And it is the best expedient which can be devised in any government, to secure a steady, upright, and impartial administration of the laws.
I agree with Hamilton. The main problem I see with decisions like Obergefell is the doctrine of substantive due process they rely on. As the Court itself has discussed, it tends to lead to rulings whose lack of any reasoned constitutional basis invites the suspicion they are nothing more than arbitrary, undemocratic dictates. In fact that was the main reason the Court ended its three-decade-plus "Substantive Due Process Era" in 1937, as far as economic regulations are concerned. It is in reaction to the excesses of that era, during which the Court struck down more than 200 laws for violating an implied constitutional "liberty of contract," that ever since, laws setting maximum work hours, imposing professional licensing standards, or similarly regulating economic matters have been presumed constitutionally valid and have only had to meet the extremely deferential standards of rational basis review.
But when it comes to controversial social issues, the Court has shown none of that restraint. Due process has become a convenient excuse for concocting liberties that no one who drafted or approved the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868 ever imagined in his wildest dreams. Maybe Congress should start viewing flagrant misuse of the Due Process Clause in cases like Obergefell as a violation of the standard of "good behaviour."