Competing IR Theories

[xxmattnxx]

I was hoping I could get some assistance from those with more IR experience than myself. I am struggling to find a specific topic to write on for a term paper. The assignment is as follows :

"Your paper must apply at least two competing theories to explain a country’s security policy during a specific instance. The paper should introduce the competing theories, apply the theories to the case, and assess which theory best explains the policy or outcome. Remember the goal of the paper is not a historical description of the event but to use different theoretical perspectives to explain why the event occurred, and conversely to use the event to evaluate the usefulness of the theoretical perspectives. "

We studied your basics in IR which includes realism, balance theory,constructivism and many liberal theories. While I understand the theories themselves I am struggling to find two competing ones that provide an analysis on a particular conflict in the international realm.

I'm not asking for someone to do the work for me, but can someone provide a suggestion on what theories would apply a particular case?

Thanks in advance.

 

[StillBallin75]

It's been awhile but realism vs. idealism vs. liberalism are usually the main theories that are out there.

Maybe you might want to focus on the formation of NATO or something of that nature.

 

[Fiddytree]

It's been awhile but realism vs. idealism vs. liberalism are usually the main theories that are out there.

Maybe you might want to focus on the formation of NATO or something of that nature.

Either that or compare realist or liberal interpretations with some of the marxist ones, by looking at colonial empires of Britain and France or the various international organizations that attempt to develop the third world in more recent times.

This is a political science matter. Models largely die in historical writing

 

[donsutherland1]

I'd also add Détente or the opening to China as additional examples. The Cold War era is rich with opportunities to discuss the various IR theories.

 

[StillBallin75]

Either that or compare liberal interpretations with some of the marxist ones, by looking at colonial empires of Britain and France or the various international organizations that attempt to develop the third world in more recent times.

This is a political science matter. Models largely die in historical writing

That's correct. Political science is all about theories and observing patterns - whereas historians tend to gravitate toward the "no, but my case is special" attitude lol. As someone who has studied in both fields they both have their merits and weaknesses.

 

[Fisher]

Maybe something having to do with balance of power policies with Iran and Iraq when they were going at it. We were kind of all over the place with that one so should be fertile ground no matter which theories you go with either in the policies or the consequences.

 

[Fiddytree]

That's correct. Political science is all about theories and observing patterns - whereas historians tend to gravitate toward the "no, but my case is special" attitude lol. As someone who has studied in both fields they both have their merits and weaknesses.

There's that and the self-fulfilling essay that pigeonholes itself to one perspective. "Base-superstructure explains everything. [Pages and pages later of cherry-picking] Ah ha! I told you the base-superstructure model works in evaluating this period!"

 

[Oberon]

What level is this? If it's basic, try Kissinger's Diplomacy, or Massie's Dreadnought if it's just basic intro comparisons; bound to find something in those two that will fit a model, though Kissinger, and all diplomats and policy wonks in general, are notorious liars, and most historians never cover complete situations, which is why so many books are written on the same subjects for decades after the real events are over. There was an interesting article a few months ago in New Republic discussing Rumsfeld's 'minimalist' strategies and Obama's continuation of that 'soft diplomacy', though in a negative spin, but decent fodder for a paper. I'll get the month and the name of the article and author in a little while.

 

[Oberon]

Here's a short article re "realism", by Leon Wieselter, discussing policy failure in Iraq and now possibly Syria as well.

The Obama Doctrine: Light Footprint, Lightweight Thinking | New Republic

When that document was released, its revisions in the scale and the mission of the American military were interpreted as the inexorable effect of the fiscal crisis, but that is not the whole story. Obama is acting also in the name of a strategic concept. It is an old, cold concept. Obama's loftiness has provided cover for the ascendancy of "realism"—which is not always the same as realism, as the consequences of our abdication in Syria will eventually demonstrate. The Obama-Rumsfeld lineage is only one of the ironies of the new foreign policy consensus. There is also the bizarre enthusiasm of progressives for the amoral likes of Brent Scowcroft and Zbigniew Brzezinski. And richest of all is their sudden reverence for Chuck Hagel, whom none of them admired, and rightly not, when he was in the Senate. (No, he is not an anti-Semite. Congratulations.)

Should be more than enough to expand on for a term paper or several.

 

[StillBallin75]

Here's a short article re "realism", by Leon Wieselter, discussing policy failure in Iraq and now possibly Syria as well.

The Obama Doctrine: Light Footprint, Lightweight Thinking | New Republic



Should be more than enough to expand on for a term paper or several.

Seems more like an opinion piece than an academic source one might use in a college paper, I'd probably use that for background only.

 

[donsutherland1]

Here's a short article re "realism"...

In part, the New Republic article states, "...the amoral likes of Brent Scowcroft..." Its caricature of Realists such as Scowcroft does not provide much value when it comes to assessing how Iraq would have been dealt with under the major schools of IR theory. It does little to allow one to analyze the various trade-offs/limitations associated with each of the foreign policy schools of thought.

Furthermore, in practice, there are some differences among those who subscribe to the Realist school. For example, Henry Kissinger leaned in favor of the Iraq war albeit with substantial reservations that U.S. policy makers and military planners had not undertaken the degree of critical analysis required to deal with the complexities involved and to mitigate the corresponding risks. At the same time, Brent Scowcroft opposed the war, with concerns that it would have more adverse effects than benefits as far as U.S. interests were concerned. Such nuance is lost in the article's caricature.

In short, the article might make for a good piece for public consumption. However, it is not a serious work of a caliber to be utilized in academic research.

 

[donsutherland1]

As the New Republic article was included in this thread, I’ll provide my thoughts on the article in this thread. Those thoughts run beyond the narrower issue of the article’s lack of utility for academic research.

First, the article conflates tighter focus on the national interest with “withdrawalism.” They are not synonymous. If a nation has been neglecting its critical overseas interests or those interests have increased, its role must necessarily increase. On the other hand, if a nation has been overreaching and giving priority to interests that are less than critical, then its role should shrink.

Second, the author seems unable or unwilling to grasp the reality that power projection depends on resources. As resources are not unlimited, neither is a nation’s power. Power depends on a nation’s economic strength, fiscal position (as government allocates those resources to military/security/foreign policy), manpower, and technology. A nation’s commitments cannot indefinitely exceed its capacity (or resources) without eroding its power. Not surprisingly, Realists argue that a nation must know when to deploy its power. To do so, it should be guided by its critical interests. At the same time, it must also take into consideration the balance of power. No nation—not even the U.S., which is the world’s leading power—has preeminence, meaning that no nation can treat the balance of power as irrelevant in its calculations. Hence, Realists understood from the onset, that the Rumsfeld-Franks “go light” approach was seriously flawed (e.g., Kissinger’s concern that the policy makers and military planners didn’t employ the critical analysis necessary in their planning the Iraq war, as the senior military leadership rejected information that argued for more manpower i.e., General Shinseki’s advice, General Zinni’s “Desert Crossing” exercise that placed a high risk of insurgency in Iraq, etc.).

Third, the author accuses the U.S. of “abdication” on Syria, because the nation is not militarily intervening in Syria’s bloody civil war. The author provides no argument, much less evidence, that such intervention would serve a critical U.S. interest. He provides no evidence that a victory by the anti-Assad forces would serve American interests and those of America’s regional allies (indeed, they have had abundant time to articulate the kind of government and approach they would take, but have failed to do so). He provides no evidence that what would amount to a victory of the Sunni majority over the Alawite minority in what is an ethnic conflict (not a liberal democratic revolution) would lead to stable, pluralistic rule. He also fails to articulate how a post-Assad Syria, especially if it proves unstable, would impact the region’s balance of power and stability. Those are essential questions. Would it lead to more problems in Lebanon? Would a post-Assad regime, which has already criticized Assad for his failure to retaliate against Israel’s strike on Syria’s nuclear facility, adopt a much more militant anti-Israel policy creating instability and violence in the Golan Heights? Would such a regime pose a risk of destabilizing Jordan?

In sum, the piece is badly flawed, lacks much rigor, and overgeneralizes. It rests on implied assumptions that may have little basis with regard to the Syrian civil war in particular and foreign policy doctrine in general.

 

[Oberon]

Seems more like an opinion piece than an academic source one might use in a college paper, I'd probably use that for background only.

I didn't claim it was, just that it had some example ideas for a term paper. Same answer for all the other responses following.

I posted the article in International Politics while I was here last night; I didn't post it here for discussion, just an idea, which is what the OP is asking for.

 

[Oberon]

Another good book, and a relatively recent one, is David Stevenson's Cataclysm: The First World War as Political Tragedy. It covers the lead up to the war and the political consequences of its aftermath. It goes into extensive detail on the politics, domestic and international, of the major powers involved, though depending on when your term ends it may be too extensive a treatment for getting a paper in on time. Several IR 'theories' and the interplay against each other can be examined in that book. Of particular interest are the interactions of the Allies themselves, as well as the changing relations among Germany, the Dual Monarchy, and the Russian revolutionaries. The breakdown of the traditional 'Concert of Europe' checks and balances is probably the most interesting era of the 20th century.

The contrasts between American goals versus British and French goals during the Versailles talks and the aftermath would fit your bill, possibly. Several 'theories' are involved there.

 

[Jack Hays]

That's correct. Political science is all about theories and observing patterns - whereas historians tend to gravitate toward the "no, but my case is special" attitude lol. As someone who has studied in both fields they both have their merits and weaknesses.

Political scientists want to be in the conversation without doing any research.eace