Funny you should mention that. It seems in at least some cases, that actually works.
"some American interrogators consistently managed to extract useful information from prisoners. The successful interrogators all had one thing in common in the way they approached their subjects. They were nice to them."
"I often tell a prisoner right at the start what my attitude is! I consider a prisoner (i.e. a man who has been captured and disarmed and in a perfectly safe place) as out of the war, out of the picture, and thus, in a way, not an enemy … Notice that … I used the word "safe." That is the point: get the prisoner to a safe place, where even he knows … that it is all over. Then forget, as it were, the "enemy" stuff, and the "prisoner" stuff. I tell them to forget it, telling them I am talking as a human being to a human being."
http://www.budiansky.com/atlantic0506.html
Ticking Bombs and Torture Warrants
John Kleinig
There is a familiar argument that goes somewhat as follows:
An evil scientist, Dr Doom, has planted a nuclear device capable of devastating the whole of the Melbourne metropolitan area. However, he and his devilish plot are discovered only after the device has been activated, and it will explode within an hour. There is no way to evacuate the area in time. In such circumstances, would we not be justified in using whatever means necessary – including torture – to get Dr Doom to reveal the whereabouts of the device so that it can be deactivated?
Expecting our assent – even if grudging – proponents of the argument then go on to suggest that this shows the issue of torture to be less than cut-and-dried; it is not something to be absolutely prohibited, but a matter of circumstances. It is not whether but when. So, where and how shall we draw the line?
We have seen a lot of this kind of argument – most recently in The Age but especially since 9/11 – though in fact it was heard, and was even used to form public policy, well before that as others sought to address the challenges of terrorism. From 1987, when the Israeli government accepted the Landau Commission Report, until 1999 when its High Court finally ruled against it, what was euphemistically called “moderate physical pressure” was standardly employed by the General Security Service in Israel when interrogating those suspected of having terrorist connections. (It goes back further, of course, to British policies and practices in Northern Ireland.)
Some people use the ‘ticking bomb’ argument to justify the expanded use of torture. That was the way it was used in the Landau Report: the ticking bomb was used to sanction an almost routine use of torture in the Israeli war on terrorism. For others, though, the ticking bomb argument is appealed to in order to rule out such a resort. It is said to set the bar for its use impossibly high.
How should we understand it?
If faced with the situation I initially described, I guess that most of us, whatever we might think of torturing Dr Doom, would be somewhat relieved to have the bomb-defusing information tortured out of him. Perhaps, as Max Weber famously put it in his 1918 essay, ‘Politics as a Vocation’, we would prefer to have people in power who were not so concerned about their personal purity that they would give it priority over their commitment to the public good. Taking on a political role requires that we give a certain preference to the public weal, one that we might not otherwise accord it.
Nevertheless, if it takes the ticking bomb argument to justify torture, we might wonder whether it ever justifies any actual torture that we might encounter. For, consider what gives the ticking bomb argument such persuasiveness as it has:
First, it posits a known – and not merely a possible or even probable – threat. Second, there is a pressing need for action. Third, the threatened evil is of enormous magnitude. Fourth, only torture is likely to succeed in getting the information needed to avert the evil. Fifth, the person to be tortured is the perpetrator of the threat. And finally, as a result of the torture, the evil is very likely to be averted.
The first assumption requires that we can, if you will, ‘hear’ the ‘ticking bomb’, know it to be such, and know that unless deactivated it will go off. If torture is ever to be justified, it will have to be justified for the strongest possible reasons, and not simply because of a conjecture or hunch or even prima facie case that some evil will occur. Rarely, if ever, will we be as well placed as the argument supposes. Yet it is the known fact of there being a ‘ticking bomb’ that gives us the urgency and epistemic warrant required by the argument.
The second assumption focuses on the imminence of the danger – or at least on the need for immediate action if the evil is to be averted. This is not a situation in which one has the luxury of exploring too many – or any – alternatives. The bomb will go off in an hour. Any delay will be costly.
The third assumption envisions a catastrophe of such magnitude that only an upholder of the maxim, ‘let justice be done, though the heavens fall’, could be expected to cavil at the overriding of principle. Although not originally intended as such, the maxim might be considered a reductio ad absurdum. Any hesitation on the grounds of principle – a refusal to do what is necessary – will smack of a type of rule worship, moral self-indulgence, or a narcissistic concern with one’s own virtue, though the exact moral status of any such overriding is left unclear. Even so, we might wonder whether this is a case in which torture would be justified, or excusable, or merely regrettable, or sanctioned by a necessity that nevertheless leaves one’s hands dirty? Nevertheless, whatever we might want to say, in the ticking bomb argument there is some proportionality between the action to be taken and the end that is sought.
The fourth assumption is that we have good – or good enough – reasons to believe that other ways of getting this essential information (within the available time frame) will fail. Perhaps the device could be located using some other means – but not to our knowledge and almost certainly not within the present time frame. Torture is not resorted to simply as a convenient short cut or as something that will do the job. Here it answers the demands implicit in what is known as the principle of ‘the least restrictive alternative’, namely, that we should use the least costly means to the achievement of our ends.
The fifth assumption is that the person tortured is not an innocent conduit but the very one who has initiated the threat. The argument will not work nearly as well if Dr Doom is ‘encouraged’ to talk by torturing his baby daughter before his eyes – or even by torturing his ageing mother, should she just happen to know (but be unwilling to disclose) where the bomb has been hidden. It is not that Dr Doom has fewer rights than others, but that if those rights can be overridden, they can be more easily overridden in his case. If torture can be justified or rationalised at all, torture of the guilty for all-important ends whose endangerment they have initiated will provide the most plausible context.
The sixth and final assumption is that what is learned will – or will very likely – enable the threat to be averted. If the information that is sought will not enable the bomb to be deactivated, or if getting it will leave too little time for it to be deactivated, the justificatory story loses much of its momentum (as it does when Clint Eastwood’s Dirty Harry tortures the psychopathic Scorpio). If the bomb will go off anyway, what good and presumably ‘justifying’ end will be secured? Are good – and even reasonably well-grounded – intentions enough? Or do we, perhaps, as Kant seemed to think, still produce a morally better world by ‘punishing’ the miscreant in advance?
These are very strong assumptions, and in the form in which I have stated them they are unlikely to be replicated in the real world. Even so, how necessary they are, how interdependent they are, and whether they may be modified, still remain to be seen. But because the assumptions are so strong in the argument’s primary version, it does not immediately provide the kind of moral warrant sought by our current crop of users of the third degree or torture. For them, raisons d’état tend to constitute their own warrant, unconstrained by moral niceties.
web.gc.cuny.edu/Philosophy/kleinig_ticking_bombs.doc