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But then you say:
After just saying "war is not an experiment waged to prove academic or commercial theory" you are promoting the attack on Iraq as the "ultimate laboratory" of change in the Middle East. You seem to be arguing in favor of the attack upon Iraq because it is a good place to experiment with "academic or commercial theory," right after asserting war is not an experiment.
War is not an experiment. You missed the point completely and confused what I stated. The effort to realize a Muslim government that enforces the rule of law and gives every Muslim, no matter the sect, an equal voice is the experiment. It's up to Muslims to prove to the world whether they can or cannot do it. But warfare itself should not be the experiment.
The "academic or commercial theory" of the Rumsfeld coven was to prove that "sterile" warfare was the future. With the embracement of technology and fantastical ideologies, Operation: Iraqi Freedom was to prove that ground forces were obsolete-this, of course, all goes back to the Gulf War success where our enemy was out in the open and away from civilian communities.
As Rumsfeld began his tenure as secretary of defense, he declared that he was going to transform our military. This was needed and the letters and policy changes were distributed throughout the commands. However, he lied or he simply made the ignorant mistake of professing to be able to prescribe innovative solutions to something he had no experience with. Had he meant it, transformation would have started with the cancellation of platinum plated Cold War-era systems designed to fight a nonexistent Soviet Navy and Air Force. Instead the Defense Industry got a front row seat with Congress. Rumsfeld declined to cancel a single big-ticket weapons system. Systems were given an extra letter (F-22 changed to FA-22) in their nomenclatures to justify a future existence in our arsenol. And those insignificant letters are costing us trillions.
The mantra of privatization-an excuse for tossing still more money into the laps of contractors-meant that our battlefield supply system no longer had the robust qualities that helped us win previous wars. Units in battle were running out of bullets, feul, food, and water (I had my Marines empty half their mags just to supply the unit 200 yards in front of us). The contractors who were supposed to pick up the slack in the rear were nowhere to be seen.
The failures of Rumsfeld's phony defense reforms have been hidden behind assertions of greater efficiency. But war isn't about efficiency. It's about effectiveness. The concept of just-in-time spare parts may work down at a local auto dealership, but the approach doesn't work on the battlefield. An Infantry Battalion can't wait for FedEx to deliver its machinegun ammunition-quite literally when it comes to parts in Iraq today.
Consider the events....
Operation Iraqi Freedom began with a hi-tech sound-and-light show that achieved nothing. Unable to locate the Iraqi leadership, despite the billions spent on target acquisition technology (Cold War systems), the Air Force bombed empty buildings - and not many of them, at that. We wanted to win without breaking windows. The over hyped "shock-and-awe" campaign fizzled overnight. Among other things, it had failed to take into the psycology of the enemy. A mere display of our technological prowess was supposed to persuade Saddam Hussein and his regime to surrender. But the Iraqi leadership had no incentive to sue for peace. They knew it would mean the loss of their prestige, power, and personal freedom-if not their lives.
The war had to be fought and won the old way, with ground troops engaging in close-range combat in sandstorms - and in some places like Al-Basra and An-Dhanariya, Marines were hand-to-hand. The plan of a minimum ground force to mop up the surrendering masses was all we had. Faced with failure of its initial gambit, the Air Force's emphasis shifted toward providing more battlefield support to the Army and Marines. As our services started working together instead of the on seperate agendas, the effectiveness of each of the parts increased and our old way of inter-branch Combined Arms emerged. The result was to win one of the most lopsided vistories in history. Had we faced a more determined, more capable enemy (not trained to 20th century Soviet tactics), a significant portion of our airpower would have been grounded for lack of armaments. Whole units could have easily been surrounded forcing us to fight in all directions. Even our hi-tech intelligence network (Ironically, funding for was cut by Rumsfeld's vision of future warfare and sent to the failed RMA) couldn't locate the enemy leadership, it missed the mass shift of Saddam's fidayeen, his private thugs, to the cities and towns along our lines of advance.
We won because our troops and our combat leadership made up for the deficiencies in the Rumsfeld theories. But the effort was far riskier than it had to be. Because the intent was to prove that ground forces were obsolete, Rumsfeld refused to send more troops. We lacked cavalry regiments and extra Marine Battalions to guard our lengthening supply lines, which led to resupply disruptions and deadly ambushes. Fatefully, we got to Baghdad with insufficient numbers of troops to inundate the Sunni Triangle, the regime's bastion of support. In the cities that later became hotbeds of the insurgency-Fallujah, Ramadi, Samarra, Baquba, and others-we could not establish a robust, convincing presence. Towns and villages in the Sunni heartland did not see an American "soldier" for month. A hostile population was never forced to comprehend its defeat. Warfare still requires adequite numbers of ground troops. As we have learned yet again, occupations cannot be staged on the cheap. Especially in conflicts waged between asymmetrical cultures, sheer human presence-in uniform-is essential if we want to extract long-term benefits from our battlefield victories.
And, of course, during all of this, our civilian leadership in Washington continued to refuse a hearing to military leaders like General Shinseki, or to the many other military officers, diplomats, and intelligence hands who sought to talk sense to them. Our occupation of Iraq would have gone far more smoothly, far fewer of our troops would have died or sufferred wounds in the war's aftermath, and the people of Iraq would have had to endure far less chaos, confusion, and bloodshed on the road to their futures. And while they denied the wisdom of military affairs and fist hand cultural knowledge, they were grandstanding behind microphones and insisting that Saddam has large amounts of WMD just around the corner and that proof of a Osama/Saddam collaberation was just a file cabinet away. Reasons of nobility and great strategic regional change was just a subtle hint overshadowed by empty promises they thought they needed.
Rumsfeld and his bench of incompetence set out to do the right thing by deposing Saddam Hussein for a number of reasons. But they did it very, very badly. Not only did they purposefully choose to cover it from the wrong aspect, they denied us of opportunities we can't get back.
This botching of military affairs and conduct was a result of academic and commercial theory.
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