On the night of October 16, 1975, defendant Vanderwater, then an Illinois judge, arrested plaintiff Flor Lopez, caused him to be charged with petty theft, convicted him on the basis of a guilty plea that is alleged to have been forged, and sentenced him to jail for 240 days.
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Gamble also signed a blank complaint form. On the blank complaint form, Vanderwater certified in writing that Gamble had sworn to the truth of the allegations of the complaint.
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On a standard plea form, Vanderwater made entries indicating a guilty plea and a waiver of trial by jury. The form, thus modified, bears an illegible signature which Lopez says is not his.
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While Lopez, according to his testimony, remained in his jail cell, he was, in absentia, arraigned, convicted, and sentenced by Vanderwater in the booking area of the police station. Vanderwater wrote on the bottom of the guilty plea form that Lopez had pleaded guilty, had been found guilty, and had been sentenced to Vandalia for 240 days.
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The doctrine of absolute judicial immunity, as it applies to suits under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, will protect a judge against liability for a given act if two conditions are satisfied. First, the act must not have been taken in the "clear absence of all jurisdiction." ... Protection may be afforded even if the act was prompted by malicious or corrupt reasons, "flawed by the commission of grave procedural errors," or taken in excess, but not in clear absence, of jurisdiction ... Second, the act must be a "judicial act."
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Plaintiff's counsel also argues, as we understand him, that the totality of the circumstances in this case are enough to have deprived Vanderwater of all jurisdiction. Among these circumstances are the facts that Vanderwater had an interest in the case, that he had prejudged the case, and that he proceeded to judgment despite his knowledge of fundamental constitutional infirmities in the procedure that was followed. Even "grave procedural errors," however, are not enough, under Sparkman, to deprive a judge of all jurisdiction. Malice and corruption are similarly insufficient. Therefore, Vanderwater's acts in arraigning, convicting, and sentencing Lopez, outrageous as they were, were not, under Sparkman, taken in the clear absence of all jurisdiction.
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The district court was also correct in concluding that these acts were "judicial acts." They satisfy the Sparkman criterion of functions "normally performed by a judge." The second criterion, whether the parties "dealt with the judge in his judicial capacity," seems inapplicable here. Vanderwater himself was, in substance if not in form, the complainant; Lopez, the only party other than the state, was, if we are to believe his deposition testimony, unaware of the entire course of the proceedings and thus unable to deal with Vanderwater in his judicial role or otherwise during the proceedings.
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Accordingly, Vanderwater is absolutely immune from suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for his acts of arraigning, convicting, and sentencing Lopez.
