Romulus
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Just finished the book Where Keynes Went Wrong by Hunter Lewis. I'd like to post four issue I take away from the book which astonish me. Considering there are some very smart people at this forum who know considerably more about economics than I do, I would appreciate the best arguments against these issues as well as arguments which may reinforce them.
Issue One: The Definition of Full Employment/No Math
Keynes' definition of full employment is vague and convoluted. However, having a precise definition for full employment is essential to his model because it is the signal planners use to shift gears and guard against inflation. Keynesians like Tobin (I'm going to use last names here, if detailed citations are needed I can provide them) state full employment is 0%, Dillard puts it at 3% (and like Keynes considers, 'frictional/voluntary unemployment factors), Beveridge documents a range from 2% to 13% from various times in a plethora of countries then claims it is 3% also. Current conventional Keynesian definitions of full employment range from 2%-7%.
This range of definitions of full employment allows Keynesian advisers to policy makers to advocate for inflationary/anti-inflationary policies based on intuition or worse, political bias. It seems to me Friedman's NAIRU model (although, admittedly the math is currently over my head) provides a well defined mathematical model.
Issue Two: Bad Math
N=FD
Where N is employment, F is a function, and D is expected demand. This states that expected demand directly causes employment. In the real world, expectations are not a measurable quantity and have no place in an equation. Demand signals in supply/demand models are not realized until a purchase is made. That purchase could be of anything other than something which increases employment within the country. "Topping off" investment measures by government into companies can and do go overseas, and monetization policies by a central bank (converting bonds to cash) are very often invested in emerging foreign markets. In other words, getting what is actually in demand wrong can increase unemployment.
Issue Three: Further Quantifying the Unquanitifiable/the MPC and the "Multiplier Effect"
Keynes' MPC (marginal propensity to consume) stating the net result of a government or stimulus induced check going to a worker (lets call that result y) will lead to 10y because 90% of that check will be used in consumption. The problem for which from a mathematical perspective is the assumption that the 10% saved (not used for consumption) is stuffed into a mattress. It is not, when savings are invested they convert to spending (by banks, corporate capital expenditures etc.). So, when we realize 100% of stimulus is spent, the "multiplier effect" self destructs and becomes infinite. That may be a bit of a stretch but it is certainly not 10y or 4y or 2y. So what is it? Nobody seems to know.
In her capacity as head of the Council of Economic Advisers, Christina Romer studied tax cuts from 47' to 2005 and found a multiplier effect of 3, so she was fired. :lamo On the stimulus, she projected a ME of 1.57 and it came in at 1 (others disagree and say it was lower). Bevenridge (a Keynesian) predicts a multiplier of 1 or less than 1, and Keynesian economists Paul Samuelson and William Nordhaus (Keynesian authors of bestselling textbooks) state "no proof has yet been presented of an ME greater than 1".
Point being, there is no predictable ME, not even with tax cuts. Which goes back to the N=FD fallacy, there is no way to predict what will be in demand. Give workers money and they will certainly spend and save at some ratio however, they may buy cheap Chinese goods and their investments may go overseas, nullifying any ME.
Issue Four: Keynes is TeH GAy and a Eugenicist! I kid I kid.
eace
Although that was discussed in the book. I'm not sure if the topic was silly and extraneous or if Keynes was a diabolical nihilist or self-described "immoralist" who foisted a flawed economic system on the world.
Issue One: The Definition of Full Employment/No Math
Keynes' definition of full employment is vague and convoluted. However, having a precise definition for full employment is essential to his model because it is the signal planners use to shift gears and guard against inflation. Keynesians like Tobin (I'm going to use last names here, if detailed citations are needed I can provide them) state full employment is 0%, Dillard puts it at 3% (and like Keynes considers, 'frictional/voluntary unemployment factors), Beveridge documents a range from 2% to 13% from various times in a plethora of countries then claims it is 3% also. Current conventional Keynesian definitions of full employment range from 2%-7%.
This range of definitions of full employment allows Keynesian advisers to policy makers to advocate for inflationary/anti-inflationary policies based on intuition or worse, political bias. It seems to me Friedman's NAIRU model (although, admittedly the math is currently over my head) provides a well defined mathematical model.
Issue Two: Bad Math
N=FD
Where N is employment, F is a function, and D is expected demand. This states that expected demand directly causes employment. In the real world, expectations are not a measurable quantity and have no place in an equation. Demand signals in supply/demand models are not realized until a purchase is made. That purchase could be of anything other than something which increases employment within the country. "Topping off" investment measures by government into companies can and do go overseas, and monetization policies by a central bank (converting bonds to cash) are very often invested in emerging foreign markets. In other words, getting what is actually in demand wrong can increase unemployment.
Issue Three: Further Quantifying the Unquanitifiable/the MPC and the "Multiplier Effect"
Keynes' MPC (marginal propensity to consume) stating the net result of a government or stimulus induced check going to a worker (lets call that result y) will lead to 10y because 90% of that check will be used in consumption. The problem for which from a mathematical perspective is the assumption that the 10% saved (not used for consumption) is stuffed into a mattress. It is not, when savings are invested they convert to spending (by banks, corporate capital expenditures etc.). So, when we realize 100% of stimulus is spent, the "multiplier effect" self destructs and becomes infinite. That may be a bit of a stretch but it is certainly not 10y or 4y or 2y. So what is it? Nobody seems to know.
In her capacity as head of the Council of Economic Advisers, Christina Romer studied tax cuts from 47' to 2005 and found a multiplier effect of 3, so she was fired. :lamo On the stimulus, she projected a ME of 1.57 and it came in at 1 (others disagree and say it was lower). Bevenridge (a Keynesian) predicts a multiplier of 1 or less than 1, and Keynesian economists Paul Samuelson and William Nordhaus (Keynesian authors of bestselling textbooks) state "no proof has yet been presented of an ME greater than 1".
Point being, there is no predictable ME, not even with tax cuts. Which goes back to the N=FD fallacy, there is no way to predict what will be in demand. Give workers money and they will certainly spend and save at some ratio however, they may buy cheap Chinese goods and their investments may go overseas, nullifying any ME.
Issue Four: Keynes is TeH GAy and a Eugenicist! I kid I kid.

Although that was discussed in the book. I'm not sure if the topic was silly and extraneous or if Keynes was a diabolical nihilist or self-described "immoralist" who foisted a flawed economic system on the world.