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Essentially, the insurgents would rather get paid than be killed. Such an incentive would not exist in the absence of our aptly demonstrated military superiority. The insurgents capitulated because they were smart enough to realize that money is better than bullets.
Moreover, this misses another point I was trying to make e.g., collateral damage is not as detrimental to our strategic objectives as everyone would like to think.
And since we know collateral damage does not preclude the completion of strategic objectives, considerations of such should not jeopardize the safety of our troops.
Interesting you think that after I explicitly stated the problem of water and fish to apsdt. I take it you did not understand the analogy?
Your analogy is flawed.
The whole, "hearts and minds", idea has really, really been beaten to death.
You think so because you don't understand it.
Do you realize that that fish water concept was used by General P's think tank?
Do you even know what the fish and what the water represent?
it's not actually about hearts and minds. It's about mere tolerance. Do we give a **** if they like us? No. We give a **** about their tolerance. We don't care if you like us or not, only if you are willing to work with us.
But the British were superior to the Afghans when they ruled Afghanistan. Why didn't it work then? If the French really wanted to, they could have brought in sufficent troops and equipment to aptly demonstrate military superiority.
Okay, so what level of detriment do you think that collateral damage has?
Strategic? Or do you mean tactical? I'd agree on tactical, but not on strategic. Especially if you are considering COIN in terms of economic development. Killing lots of civilians to the point where they will not work with Americans in economic development does not achieve strategic goals.
Sound CI tactics are inherent to military superiority; the British and French obviously lacked them; not to mention the technological disparity.
If you've never served, just keep your tactical and strategic advice to yourself.
What most people don't understand is that the winning of hearts and minds in Iraq and Afghanistan mostly consists of being the biggest, baddest mother on the block; killing the enemy in every engagement; demonstrating our ability to close with and destroy anyone who opposes us. It's kind of hard to do this when you have little armchair generals telling us how to conduct tactical operations because of some imagined strategy.
Collateral damage doesn’t do as much to undercut the “winning of hearts and minds” as most people would like to think; especially when the collateral damage is the result of a legitimate engagement. Iraq is a perfect example of this, as they (the Iraqis) have suffered innumerable casualties as the result of collateral damage, yet we were still able to win them over. Why is that? Because they are smart enough to realize two things:
1. The Americans are bad mothers. We do not want to fight them.
I'm sure this fact is taken as further evidence by some that they aren't really human and don't need to be treated as such.
Thety should by all means be treated as humanely. However, American lives should never be made the price of that humane treatment.
Well, if Americans aren't willing to risk their lives, we can always leave.
I'd be totally down with that. Then the risk would be reduced to nil.
As long as we're in their country, though, it is incumbent upon us to treat them humanely, regardless of the risk.
If we're going to fight the war in such a half ass manner, with tactics cost more lives than neccessary, then leaving is exactly what we should do.
I seriously take issue with the use of such tactics. I guess it's because I can see things from a soldier's perspective. It's real easy to say all that when you're not the one doing the dieing.
Their army is not composed solely of women and children.God help us when an enemy nation decides to put together an army composed soley of women and children...
No, it's not "real easy".
There's not a mother in this world who wouldn't prefer to stand between her child and danger, rather than the other way around.
You're obviously not a parent if you think so.
I'm growing weary of your suggestions that it's "real easy".
Regardless, I'm not sending my son halfway around the world to treat the inhabitants of other countries inhumanely when they pose no direct threat to us. Not with my blessing.
He's a United States soldier, not a killing machine.
There is honor in being a soldier, but no honor in dehumanizing or indiscriminately killing innocent people or even not-so-innocent people on their own soil. If he took part in such a thing, he wouldn't come back the same person, anyway.
I know all this. I was there when all this was happening.
Essentially, the insurgents would rather get paid than be killed. Such an incentive would not exist in the absence of our aptly demonstrated military superiority. The insurgents capitulated because they were smart enough to realize that money is better than bullets.
Moreover, this misses another point I was trying to make e.g., collateral damage is not as detrimental to our strategic objectives as everyone would like to think. If it was those insurgents wouldn't have bargained with us, period.
And since we know collateral damage does not preclude the completion of strategic objectives, considerations of such should not jeopardize the safety of our troops.
Yea, what would I know about it…:roll:
Your entire argument is advocating shock and awe tactics, which have been proven to fail when used against insurgencies. I won't try to say that I've been to Iraq or Afghanistan, because I haven't, but I know enough to know that it wasn't force that turned the tide in Iraq but a change in strategic objective and tactics that was people-centric instead of focusing on the transitioning of forces... As well as an end to the shock and awe tactics that once reigned in policy early in the war.
The kind of big-unit war your wishing Afghanistan was doesn't exist, though the thinking is reminiscent of Vietnam.... But, since I'm sick of the ****ing Vietnam shadow, I'll compare it to the Philippinnes instead. American soldiers in the Philipinnes didn't know how to fight a counter-insurgency campaign, and, as a result, they were harsh and brutal in their search for the enemy. Of course, the effect was negative because such actions turn the people against you. The reason the United States won the war was because they shifted their tactics and policy from focusing on killing the enemy and empowering the Philipinnes government to pacifying the countryside and winning hearts and minds... The people are the pool that the insurgency swims in. They recruit, arm, rest, and live with the people. Without the people's consent, the insurgency dies. That's something General Westmoreland didn't understand but General Abrams did and it is why we almost won in Vietnam.(Now, that's not to say Westy was a terrible general or that attritional warfare is not part of a counter-insurgency campaign... but it is to say that fighting a counter-insurgency campaign through purely attritional means will take years and much more blood and sweat than the mission requires. Killing the enemy is part of winning the war, but it is not the only part.)
Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife
Counter-Insurgency Field Manual
We were successful in the Phillipines. Interesting that you would use that as an example of how not to fight an insurgency.
Just a little piece of advice: 90% of a war, is destroying the enemy's ability to wage war. Killing the enemy is a huge part of winning a war.
What's the truth? That if we accept high levels of collateral damage and kill a lot of innocent civilians, our troops will be safer?
Nobody's "blind" to that fact. We know it's true.
We just aren't going to do it anymore.
Your entire argument is advocating shock and awe tactics, which have been proven to fail when used against insurgencies.
I won't try to say that I've been to Iraq or Afghanistan, because I haven't, but I know enough to know that it wasn't force that turned the tide in Iraq but a change in strategic objective and tactics that was people-centric instead of focusing on the transitioning of forces... As well as an end to the shock and awe tactics that once reigned in policy early in the war.
The kind of big-unit war your wishing Afghanistan was doesn't exist, though the thinking is reminiscent of Vietnam.... But, since I'm sick of the ****ing Vietnam shadow, I'll compare it to the Philippinnes instead. American soldiers in the Philipinnes didn't know how to fight a counter-insurgency campaign, and, as a result, they were harsh and brutal in their search for the enemy. Of course, the effect was negative because such actions turn the people against you. The reason the United States won the war was because they shifted their tactics and policy from focusing on killing the enemy and empowering the Philipinnes government to pacifying the countryside and winning hearts and minds... The people are the pool that the insurgency swims in. They recruit, arm, rest, and live with the people. Without the people's consent, the insurgency dies. That's something General Westmoreland didn't understand but General Abrams did and it is why we almost won in Vietnam.(Now, that's not to say Westy was a terrible general or that attritional warfare is not part of a counter-insurgency campaign... but it is to say that fighting a counter-insurgency campaign through purely attritional means will take years and much more blood and sweat than the mission requires. Killing the enemy is part of winning the war, but it is not the only part.)
Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife
Counter-Insurgency Field Manual
We were successful in the Philippinnes only after we shifted our tactics. You should go back and read what I actually said.
Here's other advice: 100% of the objective of war is destroying your enemy's capability to wage war. If all your doing is racking body counts while neglecting all other factors, including considerations for the indigenous people, then your gonna get a lot more of your enemy. Unless your considering genocide, your enemy will continue to grow while support for you will continue to diminish.
This isn't WWII in North Africa where the indigenous people had no side and local politics meant nothing to the foreigners warring on their land... this is an insurgency: The Enemy was breed out of the people and the political situation in the country. Instead of constructing robo-cops to go out and quell the violence, maybe you should consider the factors that have led to the insurgency's existence in the first place and take actions to ensure that people won't be led to entering or supporting the insurgency.
This whole thread has nothing to do with targetting, or otherwise intentionall endangering civilians.
It has been suggested that our troops protect themselves by disregarding or otherwise being cavalier about the safety of Afghani civilians.
Protecting them from harm should be a higher priority than killing a bad guy.
Our soldiers are innocent, too ...
Civilians are civilians; they're innocent. They're people. They're just as worthwhile as you, me, or a United States soldier.
Protecting them from harm should be a higher priority than killing a bad guy.
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