- Joined
- Apr 18, 2013
- Messages
- 94,343
- Reaction score
- 82,729
- Location
- Barsoom
- Gender
- Male
- Political Leaning
- Independent
Turkey’s Unpalatable Choices in Syria
Basically, what I wrote about HERE
2/24/
Syria’s northwestern province of Idlib is experiencing a deepening humanitarian crisis. As the Russia-backed Syrian regime pushes to retake this last major enclave of the Syrian opposition, hundreds of thousands of people have fled towards Turkey’s borders. According to the United Nations, 700,000 people have fled Idlib since Dec. 1. As the main backer of the opposition in Syria, Ankara has desperately tried to convince Moscow to halt the Syrian regime’s offensive, but to little avail. Aggravating the matter, the Syrian regime killed 13 Turkish soldiers in two deadly Russia-backed attacks in the past week. Turkish and Russian positions around the larger Syria issue, including their visions for the endgame for that country’s crisis, have remained starkly different. While Russia and its partner in Damascus long focused on winning the civil war in other parts of Syria, the recent onslaught on Idlib has shed daylight on Russian-Turkish differences and exposed the limits of their cooperation. Beyond Syria, the strategic aspirations of Turkey and Russia, respectively, remain competitive in almost all of their shared neighborhood. The relationship is characterized by mistrust, not geopolitical convergence. As such, cooperative relations have faced a built-in limit from the start. Political expediency, realism, and shared discontent towards the West might have been enough to initiate this cooperation, but not sufficient to truly bring Turkey and Russia together, geopolitically.
The crisis in Idlib occurs at a time when Turkey’s government is already facing domestic backlash over the presence of around 3.5 millions Syrian refugees. As such, it will resist new waves of refugees, doing its utmost to keep the people fleeing Idlib on the Syrian side of the border. Yet given the unfolding humanitarian crisis and tough winter conditions, Turkey’s strong resistance to accept new people will come with moral and political costs—further contributing to the Ankara’s worsening international image. In addition, the strain in Turkish-Western relations is further deepening Turkey’s vulnerabilities. Turkey’s fast-improving relations with Russia in recent years have alienated Ankara’s Western allies, particularly the U.S. It is also likely that the U.S. sees an opportunity in Turkey’s predicament in Syria. The U.S. is likely to push Turkey either to agree to some form of modus vivendi with the largely Kurdish-run SDF, against which Turkey launched a military incursion in northeastern Syria a few months ago, or some concession on the S-400 missile system that Turkey purchased from Russia. Meanwhile, Turkey’s position in Idlib continues to worsen. Conscious of its unpalatable choices, Ankara reached out to Moscow to push for a ceasefire. Yet, despite Turkey’s repeated efforts to prevent the military onslaught on Idlib, Russia has supported the Syrian regime in its offensive there. Ominously, as the recent killing of Turkish soldiers illustrates, the situation in Idlib can quickly get out of hand—what is essentially a proxy war could become a direct military confrontation between Turkey and the Syrian regime. In fact, Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan threatened a military strike anywhere, including using air power, if one more Turkish soldier is targeted. At this stage, Turkey’s best hope is to freeze the crisis until a political process in Syria starts, at which point Turkey hopes to leverage its military presence for political concessions. To Ankara’s chagrin, Moscow has thus far ignored Turkey’s such demands.
Basically, what I wrote about HERE