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The Kremlin Hierarchy Is Fast Decaying | The Moscow Times
The Kremlin wolves are beginning to set their table on the assumption (and hope) that Putin is a lame duck president and will retire to his luxurious mansions in 2024.

By Tatyana Stanovaya
2/22/19
Anonymous Russian Telegram channels, which over the past year have begun to position themselves as an alternative media source, suddenly last week launched a campaign against Dmitry Peskov, President Vladimir Putin’s press secretary. Normally, this news wouldn’t be a very big deal. But as several credible investigations revealed, a large number of these channels are actually directly connected to the Russian government. This points to the attack against Peskov coming from within. This isn’t the first time we’ve seen such a conflict occur within the power “hierarchy.” Parliamentary Speaker Vyacheslav Volodin, the only speaker in Putin’s regime who has managed to remain a prominent public political figure, has seen his place threatened recently as he does not fit into the new model of thinking presented by Kremlin’s domestic policy curators, notably Sergey Kiriyenko and Andrei Tarchuk. These conflicts illustrate a new reality: an increasing sense of competition within the regime, rather than a carefully designed power vertical. This political scramble will define Putin’s final term.
In St. Petersburg, political operators connected with Yevgeny Prigozhin, Putin’s ‘Chef,’ constantly compete with political consultants selected by the presidential administration. In the recent scandalous regional elections in Primorsky Krai, Deputy Prime Minister Yuri Trutnev’s political consultants stole the thunder from the political technologists sent by Moscow. All of these mini-conflicts tell a very important story. First, they demonstrate that high-ranking officials feel uncertain of the future. Second, this uncertainty makes it impossible to make mid-term plans, not to mention long-term plans. “Better an egg today than a hen tomorrow” is the motto by which the Russian bureaucracy and elite have begun to live by. Third, and most importantly, the boundaries of what’s permissible are expanding. You can now arrest a senator during a federation council session even though this simultaneously destroys the reputation of one of the key institutions of any government — including Putin’s — the upper chamber of Parliament. All of this has led to a completely new political climate that marks a return to the atmosphere of the ‘90s. Albeit without the acute criminalization and with a more healthy economic situation — though this too is headed towards demise. What Putin so carefully built during his first two terms as president — the notorious power vertical — is gradually beginning to splinter from the inside, reducing the barriers to entry for a war of everyone against everyone which will ultimately make the regime less uniform and manageable.
The Kremlin wolves are beginning to set their table on the assumption (and hope) that Putin is a lame duck president and will retire to his luxurious mansions in 2024.