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Evil demon
The evil demon, also known as evil genius, and occasionally as malicious demon or genius malignus, is a concept in Cartesian philosophy. In his 1641 Meditations on First Philosophy, René Descartes hypothesized the existence of an evil demon, a personification who is "as clever and deceitful as he is powerful, who has directed his entire effort to misleading me." The evil demon presents a complete illusion of an external world, including other minds, to Descartes' senses, where there is no such external world in existence. The evil genius also presents to Descartes' senses a complete illusion of his own body, including all bodily sensations, when Descartes has no body. Some Cartesian scholars opine that the demon is also omnipotent, and thus capable of altering mathematics and the fundamentals of logic, though omnipotence of the evil demon would be contrary to Descartes' hypothesis, as he rebuked accusations of the evil demon having omnipotence.[1][2]
It is one of several methods of systematic doubt that Descartes employs in the Meditations.[1]
Deus deceptor
Further information: Theodicy and Dystheism
Another such method of systematic doubt is the deus deceptor (French dieu trompeur), the "deceptive god". Cartesian scholars differ in their opinions as to whether the deus deceptor and the evil demon are one and the same. Among the accusations of blasphemy made against Descartes by Protestants was that he was positing an omnipotent malevolent God.
It's interesting but I don't see how it decimates all arguments for the existence of God. It's hypothetical, there is no proof. Therefore same old problem as with all such arguments.In the process of exploring Cartesian Doubt, which brought us "I think therefore I am", Descartes stumbles upon this concept. Later versions included "The Brain in the Vat" and the basic plot of The Matrix. The long and the short of it, what if technology or a powerful being were bent on deceiving us at the most fundamental level of human perception.
While I'm not suggesting taking this so seriously that we should disregard human perception completely, this idea serves a very important purpose in philosophical discussion.
It absolutely decimates all arguments for the existence of God by necessity.
Thoughts?
It's interesting but I don't see how it decimates all arguments for the existence of God. It's hypothetical, there is no proof. Therefore same old problem as with all such arguments.
In the process of exploring Cartesian Doubt, which brought us "I think therefore I am", Descartes stumbles upon this concept. Later versions included "The Brain in the Vat" and the basic plot of The Matrix. The long and the short of it, what if technology or a powerful being were bent on deceiving us at the most fundamental level of human perception.
While I'm not suggesting taking this so seriously that we should disregard human perception completely, this idea serves a very important purpose in philosophical discussion.
It absolutely decimates all arguments for the existence of God by necessity.
Thoughts?
It basically has the same problem as the arguments for the existence of God by necessity.. it relies not testable and not provable assumptions.
shagg said:In the process of exploring Cartesian Doubt, which brought us "I think therefore I am", Descartes stumbles upon this concept. Later versions included "The Brain in the Vat" and the basic plot of The Matrix. The long and the short of it, what if technology or a powerful being were bent on deceiving us at the most fundamental level of human perception.
shagg said:While I'm not suggesting taking this so seriously that we should disregard human perception completely, this idea serves a very important purpose in philosophical discussion.
It absolutely decimates all arguments for the existence of God by necessity.
Thoughts?
How? It certainly didn't wreck Descartes' belief in a Christian God.It absolutely decimates all arguments for the existence of God by necessity.
Erm... I have yet to see any such argument. The Argument From Necessity is a logical one, not an empirical one. It's not affected by an unfalsifiable claim such as "You are in The Matrix."Just arguments from necessity. Notably Aquinas, but any argument that deduces god must exist because of things observed in empirical reality.
Well I don't know about that, Aquinas and stuff. I'd never agree that we could define god, perhaps on any level. Anyone who thinks they can do that...Just arguments from necessity. Notably Aquinas, but any argument that deduces god must exist because of things observed in empirical reality. Its a consequence of shifting the definition of god from the traditional omnipotent/omniscient/omnibenevolent to something simply defined as "whatever designed people" or "the uncaused cause". I have yet to see an argument for gods existence by necessity that doesn't use this method.
In the process of exploring Cartesian Doubt, which brought us "I think therefore I am", Descartes stumbles upon this concept. Later versions included "The Brain in the Vat" and the basic plot of The Matrix. The long and the short of it, what if technology or a powerful being were bent on deceiving us at the most fundamental level of human perception.
While I'm not suggesting taking this so seriously that we should disregard human perception completely, this idea serves a very important purpose in philosophical discussion.
It absolutely decimates all arguments for the existence of God by necessity.
Thoughts?
Doubting all the evidence of one's senses over the course of a lifetime on the basis that is MIGHT be some sort of sophisticated illusion, seems to border on insanity. Paranoid delusions in particular.
It certainly proves nothing, as it is mere speculative hypothesizing without evidence.
Evil Genius (EG) doubt goes well beyond doubting propositions based on human perception. Descartes, by invoking the EG, wants to doubt mathematical propositions, historical propositions, geometric proofs, etc. Of course, he does also want to doubt propositions based on his sense data. There are a number of controversies about just how Cartesian doubt is supposed to work. He obviously cannot doubt what he calls "basic notions" in the Principles, since he uses them to escape EG doubt. But generally speaking, he tries to doubt as much as may be possible.
I guess my thought is I have no idea how this is supposed to work. You mention Aquinas later in the thread--do you mean, by "arguments for the existence of God by necessity," Aquinas' argument from contingency? Unless the scope of EG doubt is such as to call into question the modes of necessity and contingency, or the axioms of logic, there is no obvious threat from EG doubt to Aquinas' third argument. Of course, if EG doubt has that kind of scope, then no argument survives. It seems unlikely that's what Descartes could have intended--keep in mind he was writing at a time when the notion that mathematics and logic might rest on the same principles hadn't yet been floated.
So I'm a little curious to understand what you mean. It strikes me you might mean something like this: EG doubt calls into question the existence of the physical universe, and so therefore, cosmological arguments which reason from properties of the universe or things in the universe to God are called into question. It's not clear to me that this is correct. Will you be good enough to explain a little more clearly what you mean?
Doubting all the evidence of one's senses over the course of a lifetime on the basis that is MIGHT be some sort of sophisticated illusion, seems to border on insanity. Paranoid delusions in particular.
It certainly proves nothing, as it is mere speculative hypothesizing without evidence.
In the process of exploring Cartesian Doubt, which brought us "I think therefore I am", Descartes stumbles upon this concept. Later versions included "The Brain in the Vat" and the basic plot of The Matrix. The long and the short of it, what if technology or a powerful being were bent on deceiving us at the most fundamental level of human perception.
While I'm not suggesting taking this so seriously that we should disregard human perception completely, this idea serves a very important purpose in philosophical discussion.
It absolutely decimates all arguments for the existence of God by necessity.
Thoughts?
Aside from the various weaknesses of the arguments: None of Aquinas' logical / cosmological arguments prove that a specific deity exists in the first place.As for how this is supposed to work. Take any of Aquinas' 5 ways.... The premise that God must be the (insert new definition here) fails in the face of another, equally explanatory, plausible, and consistent theory.
Aside from the various weaknesses of the arguments: None of Aquinas' logical / cosmological arguments prove that a specific deity exists in the first place.
E.g. the "Unmoved Mover" could be Allah; the "Uncaused Cause" could be Brahama; the "Pinnacle of Perfection" could be Gotama Buddha; the Designer of All Things could be the Formless God of the Sikhs; the necessary external entity could be Marduk.
Along similar lines, let's say that your skepticism is so radical that you reject the very existence of causality, perfection, motion, necessity and contingency. All you are now saying is that you have no information about anything except your own existence. This means you cannot prove or disprove the existence of any deity.
Such radical doubt would also devastate any materialist claims, since you cannot prove or disprove the existence of any deity, or anything other than the most protean self.
So no, the Cartesian Demon doesn't pose any particular challenge to theism.
I think, therefore I favour science over philosophy. If all the philosophy departments in every universtity in the world had been shut down 150 years ago nothing would be any different. Perhaps this process could be started now? The guys and gals staffing them could muse on 'arguments for the existence of God by necessity' while doing something useful like flipping burgers.
shagg said:Without going into a detailed review of Cartesian Doubt, "I think therefore I am" really means that when one calls human perception into doubt the only thing which is undoubtedly true is that I exist and that I am a thinking being.
shagg said:Basic Notions was a cop out and holds no logical value is it relies on a subjective feeling to discern the true from the untrue.
shagg said:As for how this is supposed to work. Take any of Aquinas' 5 ways. Your definition of god changes depending on which argument you're entertaining.
shagg said:The watch must have a designer, so the designer must exist. I do not challenge that notion with the concept of the EG, instead I challenge premise that follows. that God must be that designer.
shagg said:There is nothing inconsistent with any of these definitions and the EG. Thus the premise that God must be the (insert new definition here) fails in the face of another, equally explanatory, plausible, and consistent theory.
Sweden said:I think, therefore I favour science over philosophy. If all the philosophy departments in every universtity in the world had been shut down 150 years ago nothing would be any different. Perhaps this process could be started now? The guys and gals staffing them could muse on 'arguments for the existence of God by necessity' while doing something useful like flipping burgers.
I did not say all arguments. I was referring to the Quinque viae you listed in your post. (Though generally speaking, few successful arguments for the existence of God today rely on empirical data.)The challenge is to arguments from necessity, not all theological arguments.
....yes, but the larger point is that the argument from contingency can't narrow down the deity in the first place. It's already vague. Saying "all perceptions could be wrong" doesn't add anything that a more narrow skepticism did not provide in the first place.Sure you could argue for Brahma or Allah, but those are deities with their own religion and theology.
No, that's not quite correct. Descartes called perception into doubt with the dream argument, and found that was not sufficient, since lots of propositions remained true. Blue is still blue, for example, even if no instances of blue in sense experience can be relied upon to indicate the existence of something blue outside the mind of the perceiver. Similarly, the square root of 16 is still 4, whether or not perception is reliable.
You seem to be confusing basic notions with clear and distinct ideas. As examples of basic notions, Descartes gives: knowing what doubt is and knowing what thinking is. IIRC, he took a basic notion to be such that any single such notion makes no metaphysical claims and is insufficient to support a metaphysical claim. His answer to EG doubt is to combine a few such notions to show that, together, they do support a substantive metaphysical claim.
Well, sure, though have you read some of the recent stuff by Richard Gale and Alexander Pruss on their modal cosmological argument? The basic upshot is that, once you've shown that, given certain facts about the universe, there must be an unmoved mover, the gap problem (as it is usually called) maybe isn't quite as big as it first appeared. Of candidate ideas about what an unmoved mover could be, concepts like the theistic God are definitely in the neighborhood. And so for the other definitions (G and P's reasoning is more complex and about a different version of the CA). The point is that Aquinas may have had some such thoughts hanging around, but, lacking modern developments in formal modal logic, lacked the tools to properly express them.
OK, so a couple of things just to be clear:
1. Now you're talking about teleological arguments, though you seem to be saying that in all five of Aquinas' arguments, there is an analogous move from what should be inferred from the argument to God. While I don't quite agree, I suppose it's clear enough that we can proceed.
2. The "premise that follows" isn't a premise, but a conclusion, though I would agree it's not a well-supported one.
Do you mean that it is possible for a proposition expressing EG doubt to be true while Aquinas' definitions of God are also true? It still isn't clear how this is a threat to any of Aquinas' arguments.
I did not say all arguments. I was referring to the Quinque viae you listed in your post. (Though generally speaking, few successful arguments for the existence of God today rely on empirical data.)
Here's the argument from contingency/necessity
- Since objects in the universe come into being and pass away, it is possible for those objects to exist or for those objects not to exist at any given time.
- Since objects are countable, the objects in the universe are finite in number.
- If, for all existent objects, they do not exist at some time, then, given infinite time, there would be nothing in existence. (Nothing can come from nothing—there is no creation ex nihilo) for individual existent objects.
- But, in fact, many objects exist in the universe.
- Therefore, a Necessary Being (i.e., a Being of which it is impossible that it should not exist) exists.
Nothing about this really changes because of the Cartesian Demon scenario.
You might not be able to prove that things come into being and pass out of being, but you also cannot deny it. You lack information, except that the illusion includes those features.
You might try to deny countability, but I'd say that type of math is a priori, not a posteriori.
You know at least two things exist -- you, and whatever creates your perceptions.
Rejection of creation ex nihilo is not an empirical claim, ultimately it's a logical one.
And of course, the scenario itself cannot rule out the nature of the illusion. Evil supernatural demon? Matrix? No way to know.
We should also note there are substantial criticisms of this argument. There really isn't much need to invoke an unfalsifiable scenario to posit yet another one.
....yes, but the larger point is that the argument from contingency can't narrow down the deity in the first place. It's already vague. Saying "all perceptions could be wrong" doesn't add anything that a more narrow skepticism did not provide in the first place.
I guess, but it just doesn't seem necessary to me.I think I see where we're not connecting. Saint Thomas' 5 ways are often used in attempts to prove gods existence. The EG does not cause a problem for most of the argument, only that the necessary being at the end of the argument has to be God. In college my professors never mentioned "the gap problem" (this was 15 years ago), but we did discuss the concept at legnth, and it is really what I'm using the EG to point out here.
shagg said:You'll have to forgive me, I'm a touch rusty. Its been a long time since I've discussed this with anyone and some of the finer details have gone a little fuzzy on me. You're 100% correct that I'm confusing Basic Notions with Clear and Distinct Ideas. I seem to recall the latter being Descartes solution to the EG, but I'm willing to take your word for it since you seem more familiar with the entirety of the work than I am, and since it doesn't really change anything with regards to my position.
shagg said:I took a few minutes to read a little on this. Interesting stuff, but I didn't see anything (in my admittedly brief perusal) that made the gap problem any less severe. It boils down to the same problem, if one can prove that there are in fact Necessary Beings through abstract logic, how does one prove anything about the nature of said beings? All you can prove is that there must be something that started the chain on contingent beings.
shagg said:#6 is a declaration that sits independent of the argument and does not follow from the premises.
You'll have to forgive me, I'm a touch rusty. Its been a long time since I've discussed this with anyone and some of the finer details have gone a little fuzzy on me. You're 100% correct that I'm confusing Basic Notions with Clear and Distinct Ideas. I seem to recall the latter being Descartes solution to the EG, but I'm willing to take your word for it since you seem more familiar with the entirety of the work than I am, and since it doesn't really change anything with regards to my position.
I took a few minutes to read a little on this. Interesting stuff, but I didn't see anything (in my admittedly brief perusal) that made the gap problem any less severe. It boils down to the same problem, if one can prove that there are in fact Necessary Beings through abstract logic, how does one prove anything about the nature of said beings? All you can prove is that there must be something that started the chain on contingent beings.
I did jump to a different argument, it just seemed a better example, and any of the 5 ways fall into the same trap, imo.
To put it simply, using the argument from design.
1. A watch can not come from nature
2. Watches exist
3. A watchmaker therefore must exist, because a watch can not exist without a watchmaker
4. Like the watch, life is too complex to arise from nature
5. A designer of life must therefore exist.
6. This designer is God.
#6 is a declaration that sits independent of the argument and does not follow from the premises. #5 is really the conclusion, and leaves you with an undefined necessary being. #6 could just as easily be "This designer is the EG", and the entire package would be just as plausible. Therefore, god does not exist by necessity, since the EG could just as easily be the designer of life. Arguments from necessity like this always attempt to prove the existence of something, and sometimes succeed. But never do they prove the existence of god, only The Uncaused Cause, Designer of life, etc. I suppose this all falls under the gap problem, and the EG is just one way of pointing out that if one wishes to prove gods existence using an argument from necessity, one must find a way of addressing the gap problem, because it will always arise if the person listening to you isn't just looking for something to hang their faith on.
Unless one is not out to prove god exists, and is happy applying the label of God to whatever necessary being lies at the end of their argument. I suppose this is possible. I wouldn't want to pray to the EG though lol.
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