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Shocking revelation: Kissinger gave green light for Argentina's dirty war which decin

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Newly unearthed memo says Henry Kissinger gave the "green light" for Argentina's dirty war

by David Corn | Jan. 14, 2014


Only a few months ago, Henry Kissinger was dancing with Stephen Colbert in a funny bit on the latter's Comedy Central show. But for years, the former secretary of state has sidestepped judgment for his complicity in horrific human rights abuses abroad, and a new memo has emerged that provides clear evidence that in 1976 Kissinger gave Argentina's neofascist military junta the "green light" for the dirty war it was conducting against civilian and militant leftists that resulted in the disappearance—that is, deaths—of an estimated 30,000 people.

In April 1977, Patt Derian, a onetime civil rights activist whom President Jimmy Carter had recently appointed assistant secretary of state for human rights, met with the US ambassador in Buenos Aires, Robert Hill. A memo recording that conversation has been unearthed by Martin Anderson, who in 1987 first reported that Kissinger had told the Argentine generals to proceed with their terror campaign against leftists (whom the junta routinely referred to as "terrorists"). The memo notes that Hill told Derian about a meeting Kissinger held with Argentine Foreign Minister Cesar Augusto Guzzetti the previous June. What the two men discussed was revealed in 2004 when the National Security Archive obtained and released the secret memorandum of conversation for that get-together. Guzzetti, according to that document, told Kissinger, "our main problem in Argentina is terrorism." Kissinger replied, "If there are things that have to be done, you should do them quickly. But you must get back quickly to normal procedures." In other words, go ahead with your killing crusade against the leftists.

The new document shows that Kissinger was even more explicit in encouraging the Argentine junta. The memo recounts Hill describing the Kissinger-Guzzetti discussion this way:


The Argentines were very worried that Kissinger would lecture to them on human rights. Guzzetti and Kissinger had a very long breakfast but the Secretary did not raise the subject. Finally Guzzetti did. Kissinger asked how long will it take you (the Argentines) to clean up the problem. Guzzetti replied that it would be done by the end of the year. Kissinger approved.

In other words, Ambassador Hill explained, Kissinger gave the Argentines the green light.

That's a damning statement: a US ambassador saying a secretary of state had egged on a repressive regime that was engaged in a killing spree.

In August 1976, according to the new memo, Hill discussed "the matter personally with Kissinger, on the way back to Washington from a Bohemian Grove meeting in San Francisco." Kissinger, Hill told Derian, confirmed the Guzzetti conversation and informed Hill that he wanted Argentina "to finish its terrorist problem before year end." Kissinger was concerned about new human rights laws passed by the Congress requiring the White House to certify a government was not violating human rights before providing US aid. He was hoping the Argentine generals could wrap up their murderous eradication of the left before the law took effect.

Hill indicated to Derian, according to the new memo, that he believed that Kissinger's message to Guzzetti had prompted the Argentine junta to intensify its dirty war. When he returned to Buenos Aires, the memo notes, Hill "saw that the terrorist death toll had climbed steeply." And the memo reports, "Ambassador Hill said he would tell all of this to the Congress if he were put on the stand under oath. 'I'm not going to lie,' the Ambassador declared."

Hill, who died in 1978, never did testify that Kissinger had urged on the Argentine generals, and the Carter administration reversed policy and made human rights a priority in its relations with Argentina and other nations. As for Kissinger, he skated—and he has been skating ever since, dodging responsibility for dirty deeds in Chile, Bangladesh, East Timor, Cambodia, and elsewhere. Kissinger watchers have known for years that he at least implicitly (though privately) endorsed the Argentine dirty war, but this new memo makes clear he was an enabler for an endeavor that entailed the torture, disappearance, and murder of tens of thousands of people. Next time you see him dancing on television, don't laugh.
 
Re: Shocking revelation: Kissinger gave green light for Argentina's dirty war which d

How did Kissinger have the authority to tell the Argentines what to do?
 
Re: Shocking revelation: Kissinger gave green light for Argentina's dirty war which d

The author of the piece (Mr. Corn) flatters himself if he believes that the U.S. Secretary of State approved Argentina's human rights abuses and that those abuses might not otherwise have occurred. His account is not consistent with the transcript of the document in question.

The reality is that the U.S. was embroiled in the Cold War, which had existential risks, and that it was not in a position to dismiss possible allies who might carry out unsavory acts (neither was the USSR for that matter). The U.S. was concerned that the Argentine government consolidate power and return quickly to the constitutional/legal order. It wanted the extraordinary (not normal order of business) carried out quickly and made clear that a long-term anti-terrorism campaign was not sustainable (think today how public opinion has changed with respect to Afghanistan for a contemporary example of how difficult it is to sustain such campaigns).

In the proper context, there was a wide-ranging conversation. Argentina described itself as having a "terrorist" problem. The U.S. recognized Argentina was in a "difficult period" in working to "establish authority" with the new government facing "political, criminal, and terrorist activities." It was a murky situation. Kissinger advocated for a return to "normal" [constitutional/legal] "procedures" and the Argentine Foreign Minister expressed Argentina's desire to "restore republican rights" while adding that Argentina needed to "defeat terrorism" first. Kissinger stated, "We can't help you much on the terrorist front." Kissinger explained that the U.S. might be able to help on the economic front and acknowledged that the U.S. had a "foreign policy interest in Argentina" and that a "stable Argentina is of interest to the hemisphere." Moreover, later in the conversation pertaining to terrorism, Kissinger told the Foreign Minister, "Let me say, as a freind, that I have noteiced that military government are not always the most effective in dealing with these problems." He argued that a long-term campaign against terrorism was not sustainable. That's the context in which he advised, "If there are things that have to be done, you should do them quickly. But you must get back quickly to normal procedures." He continued, "...you cannot focus on terrorism alone," while informing the Foreign Minister, "In the United States we have strong domestic pressures to do something on human rights." Finally, he explained that the U.S. wanted Argentina to "succeed." In the proper context, "success" refers to restoring a stable government operating under "normal procedures."

http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB133/19760610 Memorandum of Conversation clean.pdf

And for purposes of context, excertps from additional documents:

It was obvious in our contacts that Guzzetti knew his country has a problem--one that requires a speedy solution. And we will continue to impress on Argentine representatives here, as we expect you to do there that the USG [U.S. Government] regards most seriously Argentina's international commitments to protect and promote fundamental human rights. There should be no mistake on that score... (http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB104/Doc9 761022.pdf, p.2)

In fact, part of of the reason the U.S. supported the new government's efforts was "in light of the government's promises to respect human rights." (http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB104/Doc3 760930.pdf, p.10).

In sum, Mr. Corn's interpretation is inconsistent with the context of the transcript in question, along with additional documents that provide greater understanding of the U.S. position. Secretary Kissinger did not approve of the "dirty war," did not support deliberate abuses, strongly advised that Argentina needed to return to "normal procedures" and explicitly noted that human rights concerns of the U.S.

Considering the larger Cold War context, putting aside hindsight as to how Argentina perceived the Secretary's message, I don't believe his approach was unreasonable. He, unlike the case with us today, did not have the enormous benefits of hindsight. Intellectual integrity requires that one strip aside hindsight and examine what was said in its context with no knowledge of how things would ultimately evolve. The article fails that test.

Like any reasonable person, I am appalled by what took place in Argentina's "dirty war." But I cannot hold the Secretary accountable for events that had yet to unfold at the time of his fateful meeting with the Argentine Foreign Minister, much less his lack of today's hindsight knowledge. Moreover, had he been armed with today's knowledge, I believe he would have framed his message differently so as to avoid the kind of perceptions the Foreign Minister took back to Buenos Aires following the meeting.
 
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