Russia Substantially Withdraws Forces from Georgia

[donsutherland1]

Late last week and during the weekend, Russia began withdrawing its forces from Georgia. However, Russian forces retained a buffer zone around South Ossetia and Abkhazia and continued to patrol several strategic spots deeper into Georgia, including the port city of Poti. There are differences of opinion as to whether the reduced Russian presence is consistent with the terms of the six-point ceasefire agreement or whether Russia needs to withdraw all of its forces from Georgia, excluding South Ossetia and Abkhazia.

While there is danger that those differences could come to a head this week, I believe the more urgent diplomatic task entails the development of an interim framework that would further reduce the Russian troop presence in in Georgia while, at the same time, accommodating Russia's concerns.

Toward that end, one possible formula could entail some or all of the following elements:

1. Joint monitoring of the buffer zones and strategic Georgian sites by Russian and Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) monitors, which would be replaced by sole OSCE monitoring in those areas once an agreement is signed by Russia and Georgia that prohibits the use of force in South Ossetia and Abkhazia.

2. Agreement that would keep Georgia's armed forces a set modest distance from South Ossetia and Abkhazia until a final settlement of the historic dispute is achieved.

3. A temporary ban on arms shipments to Poti until an accord is signed by the parties that would bar the use of force in South Ossetia or Abkhazia as called for in previous UN Security Council resolutions.

4. Adoption of a UN Security Council resolution based on the Sarkozy ceasefire plan.

5. Russia's refraining from recognizing the independence of either South Ossetia or Abkhazia until a political mechanism for resolving their status is created and sufficient effort is made to determine the desires of all the parties.

This formula would have several advantages. First, it would create an alternative to Russian patrols in Georgia. Initially, joint patrols would take place until the parties agree to refrain from the use of force in South Ossetia or Abkhazia as is stipulated in several UN Security Resolutions. Second, an agreement that keeps Georgia's military forces a set distance from the two breakaway provinces could ease tensions and the risk of accidental or deliberate incidents that result in fresh confrontation. Third, while Georgia would not be receiving arms through Poti, that ban would only be temporary. Once the sides have agreed to refrain from the use of force over South Ossetia and Abkhazia, that ban would be lifted. Hence, the ban would be linked strictly to South Ossetia and Abkhazia and not Georgia's ability to rebuild afterward. Fourth, the UN Security Council's ratification of the ceasefire agreement would help provide it with weight, even as such a resolution is not indispensable. Fifth, Russia would hold off on recognizing the breakaway provinces as sovereign states until an appropriate political process is created and utilized. This approach would not deprive the peoples of those two breakaway provinces of the right of self-determination that Russia demands. It would merely delay recognition until appropriate efforts at political mediation are attempted, the peoples of those provinces have made their desires clear in unambiguous fashion, and the risk of new conflict has been reduced.

Clearly, the kind of framework I describe assumes that a return to the status quo ante is not likely in the near-term, if at all. It also leaves open a situation in which the two breakaway provinces could well reject Georgian jurisdiction and seek a political arrangement outside of Georgia. Nevertheless, that is the reality of the on-the-ground situation following Georgia's failed military bid to resolve the status of South Ossetia. Those "facts on the ground" are not irrelevant. It is unreasonable to demand that an interim framework wholly achieve for one party what it could not hope to achieve on its own. Consequently, the near-term focus needs to involve limiting the fallout from the conflict and reducing prospects for a fresh eruption of hostilities.

Insisting on an idealistic but unrealistic approach of a return to the status quo ante would only create a formidable barrier to addressing the urgent near-term tasks that are required to mitigate the risk of new fighting, allow for a significant humanitarian and reconstruction effort, and begin laying the groundwork for a political settlement of the historic status of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Given the recent combat and on-the-ground situation, one can no longer realistically seek to prejudice the outcome of that political process without assuring deadlock and renewed risk of confrontation.​

 

[donsutherland1]

On Sunday, I noted at the beginning of this thread that the task of laying out an interim formula that reduced the Russian troop presence in Georgia and addressed Russia's concerns was more urgent than the continuing bickering over whether or not Russia was complying with the Sarkozy ceasefire agreement. Neither Sunday evening nor yesterday witnessed any such diplomatic activity. At the same time, Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili poured more fuel on the fire when he repeated a narrative of events that has been discredited by the widely-reported facts.

Today, Russia's formal recognition of the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia offers a vivid illustration of just how urgent the missed opportunity for diplomacy was. With Russia's Parliament scheduled to vote on a non-binding resolution for recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia yesterday, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev little time to delay a decision and much need to have a tangible reason for defying the expected overwhelming call--in fact, it proved to be unanimous--from Russia's lawmakers for recognizing the two breakaway provinces. Had such a diplomatic process been underway, President Medvedev might have had a reasonable case to postpone his decision.

President Medvedev's statement on Russia's recognition of the two breakaway provinces echoed a number of the points I noted previously. Briefly, I posted the following:

...one possible formula could entail some or all of the following elements:

1. Joint monitoring of the buffer zones and strategic Georgian sites by Russian and Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) monitors, which would be replaced by sole OSCE monitoring in those areas once an agreement is signed by Russia and Georgia that prohibits the use of force in South Ossetia and Abkhazia.

2. Agreement that would keep Georgia's armed forces a set modest distance from South Ossetia and Abkhazia until a final settlement of the historic dispute is achieved.

3. A temporary ban on arms shipments to Poti until an accord is signed by the parties that would bar the use of force in South Ossetia or Abkhazia as called for in previous UN Security Council resolutions.

4. Adoption of a UN Security Council resolution based on the Sarkozy ceasefire plan.

5. Russia's refraining from recognizing the independence of either South Ossetia or Abkhazia until a political mechanism for resolving their status is created and sufficient effort is made to determine the desires of all the parties.

Today, President Medvedev declared, "The Georgian leadership, in violation of the UN Charter and their obligations under international agreements and contrary to the voice of reason, unleashed an armed conflict victimizing innocent civilians. The same fate lay in store for Abkhazia. Obviously, they in Tbilisi hoped for a blitz-krieg that would have confronted the world community with an accomplished fact." The established facts confirm that President Saakashvili launched the military operation. Saakashvili claimed yesterday that the arrival of Russian tanks ushered in the military hostilities. No Western leaders repudiated Saakashvili's inaccurate account. From Russian eyes, the absence of a repudiation suggested Western acceptance of the Saakashvili narrative.

Medvedev added, "...our persistent proposals to the Georgian side to conclude agreements with Abkhazia and South Ossetia on the non-use of force remained unanswered. Regrettably, they were ignored also by NATO and even at the United Nations." Past Security Council resolutions e.g., UNSC Res. 1808, called on the parties "to finalize without delay the document on the non-use of violence..." Georgia has long opposed such terms. The Secretary-General's April 2, 2008 report concerning Georgia noted, "On 15 March, the Georgian leadership reiterated Georgia's commitment to settling its internal conflicts by peaceful means, but opposed signing new documents on the non-use of force in the conflict settlement process..." Nevertheless, the UN Security Council made no attempt to adopt a resolution following the hostilities between Georgia and Russia that reaffirmed this provision. Had such an effort been underway, Medvedev would have had a weaker case in making such an argument. A UN Security Council resolution that embraced the terms of the Sarkozy ceasefire agreement would have contained the condition for non-use of force.

Finally, in echoing Russia's position on self-determination, President Medvedev stated:

The peoples of South Ossetia and Abkhazia have several times spoken out at referendums in favor of independence for their republics. It is our understanding that after what has happened in Tskhinval and what has been planned for Abkhazia they have the right to decide their destiny by themselves.

The Presidents of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, based on the results of the referendums conducted and on the decisions taken by the Parliaments of the two republics, appealed to Russia to recognize the state sovereignty of South Ossetia and Abkhazia.

As previously noted, a return to the status quo ante was highly unlikely. Russia had left a narrow window open to that possibility in stating that it would respect the wishes of the peoples of the two breakaway provinces. Georgia's disastrous decision to try to settle the status of South Ossetia by force, the facts on the ground following the hostilities, the sentiments of the peoples of the two breakaway provinces, and Georgia's persistent refusal to formalize a commitment to non-violence with respect to those provinces made such an outcome very likely in the medium- to longer-term.

Had diplomacy aimed at establishing a political process to resolve the future of the two breakaway provinces been underway, Russia would have had no need to immediately recognize Abkhazia's or South Ossetia's sovereignty. In fact, it would have had good reason to postpone the decision, as Russia's hasty decision can only exacerbate existing tensions.

However, in the larger scheme of things, Russia is recognizing what was the highly likely outcome of any political process in which the peoples of the two provinces were given the ability to express their preferences. Therefore, with skillful diplomacy, the damage can still be contained.

Unfortunately, given the opportunity to pursue urgently-needed diplomacy that was missed, I do not have high confidence that additional preventable tactical and strategic errors will be avoided in coming days and weeks. While I still expect a number of states in the European Union (EU) to try to avoid a more confrontational approach at the EU's September 1 meeting on the situation in Georgia, I suspect others within the EU, Georgia, Russia, and the U.S., will seek a more provocative course. The ensuing struggle between those who seek a realistic course toward mitigating and containing the conflict, and later undoing the damage to the extent that it is possible, and those who seek to worsen the dispute will likely produce more missed opportunities for all parties.

 

[donsutherland1]

At the beginning of this thread, one of the tasks I thought should be pursued would involve the joint monitoring of the buffer zones and strategic Georgian sites by Russian and Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) monitors, which would be replaced by sole OSCE monitoring in those areas once an agreement is signed by Russia and Georgia that prohibits the use of force in South Ossetia and Abkhazia.

In an encouraging development, Russia has now called for OSCE monitors. The BBC reported, "During Saturday's telephone conversation with Mr Brown, President Medvedev said Russia was 'in favour of the deployment of additional OSCE [Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe] monitors in the security zone' in Georgia, the Kremlin statement said." This development may offer the first hint that behind Russia's recent bluster, highlighted by Prime Minister Putin's absurd charge that the U.S. had instigated the recent mini-conflict, that Russia is quietly seeking a path toward face-saving compromises. If so, it may yet be possible for an agreement to be reached that allows for a transparent political process to determine the status of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

Russia's call for additional OSCE monitors could further reduce any prospects that the European Union would seek to impose sanctions on Russia in its September 1 meeting. As noted earlier, I expect that the EU to focus on ensuring that Russia and Georgia meet the terms of the Sarkozy ceasefire. With Russia showing some flexibility, the two sides could try to move quickly to capitalize on a possible opportunity for conciliation before that opportunity passes.

Separately, in a provocative move, Georgia was reported to have withdrawn from the 1994 ceasefire concerning Abkhazia. At its September 1 meeting, the EU would do well to reaffirm the ceasefire and insist that its terms be honored. In the end, a political process continues to afford the optimal means for resolving the status of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Additional violence would not be helpful.

 

[bilbus]

Georgia is done with now. That was just a test to see if the UN / Nato would back Georgia ... they did not.

Russia has proved that they are back in power, and no one has the balls to counter them. So i would say success for them.