President Saakashvili's Narrative Clashes with Facts, Undermines Trust

[donsutherland1]

In an interview published in the Financial Times, Georgia’s President Mikheil Saakashvili claims of the recent conflict with Russia, “The first thing that happened was that the Russian tanks came in… We almost had an ideology here, no matter what [the separatists do] we don’t respond in South Ossetia.” President Saakashvili’s latest assessment, which clashes with the facts that have been widely reported, is not constructive.

The evidence shows that Georgia, not Russia, initiated the most recent military hostilities in South Ossetia. On August 8, 2008, The Chicago Tribune reported, “Just hours after Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili declared a cease-fire with South Ossetian separatist troops, Georgian military forces unleashed a barrage of shelling on the province's capital, Tskhinvali, late Thursday and early Friday. By the morning, Georgian tanks had entered the South Ossetian capital.”

If Georgia had a policy of “no matter what” South Ossetia’s separatists do, “we don’t respond,” then why did Georgia launch a military operation against South Ossetia and Tskhinvali? If “the first thing that happened was that the Russian tanks came in,” then why did news reports concerning the outbreak of fighting reveal the arrival of Georgian tanks in Tskhinvali rather than Russian ones in South Ossetia? All said, Georgia had launched military operations. It did so either to improve its bargaining position in South Ossetia or possibly to try to resolve the political status of that breakaway region through military force.

In the wake of that disastrous endeavor, Georgia has very likely lost any opportunity for a return to the status quo ante, much less the prospect that it will be able to retain those two breakaway provinces in a future political settlement. President Saakashvili’s misleading commentary—perhaps intended to deflect the responsibility he bears from what amounted to an incredibly reckless decision, so as to shore up his political standing ahead of a potential domestic political struggle that could lie ahead—is diminishing what diplomatic possibilities still remain for a reasonable settlement. Furthermore, as the residents of South Ossetia are intimately familiar with what happened, his narrative reduces the already low prospect that South Ossetia’s political leadership would agree to any arrangement that would keep their breakaway province under the jurisdiction of Tbilisi, regardless of the extent of political autonomy that Tbilisi offers.

When it comes to diplomacy, trust is an essential intangible ingredient. For parties to enter into agreements, they need to have a sufficient degree of confidence that their interlocutors have the capacity and willingness to make a good faith effort to uphold the terms of any agreements that the parties might reach. When trust is lacking, opportunities for diplomacy are undermined. In general, barring matters that might take precedence over a trust deficit e.g., an imbalance of power, parties do not enter into commitments that they reasonably doubt will be honored by the other side. In this case, Georgia has the weaker hand in terms of power, so it is only undermining its own prospects given Russia’s far stronger position. Its revisionist narrative concerning the ceasefire agreement it shattered has also given South Ossetia’s residents little reason to trust Tbilisi to honor any autonomy arrangements under which South Ossetia would remain within Georgia’s political framework.

Now, each new outburst from the Georgian President makes it less likely that an already wary Russia will take meaningful risks to enter into agreements with a leader Russia does not trust. Instead, Russia might reserve any meaningful concessions for a future Georgian leadership. Furthermore, Russia finds itself in an even stronger position to insist on self-determination for the peoples of South Ossetia and Abkhazia and any future political framework will likely be founded on that principle.

In the larger geopolitical framework, President Saakashvili’s persistent misrepresentation of the circumstances that led to the recent conflict risks squandering what public support he still enjoys within the West. It also makes potential NATO membership for Georgia an even riskier proposition.

Already, some Western leaders have already begun reaching out to Georgia’s political opposition. Geopolitical stability in the volatile Caucasus region is important. Both the West and Russia share an interest in such stability. In the end, diplomatic efforts will more than likely place greater emphasis on advancing such stability than nursing President Saakashvili’s self-inflicted political wounds.

What decisions the European Union (EU) makes in its September 1 discussion on Georgia will offer fresh insight into how things are beginning to evolve. My initial guess is that President Saakashvili will not find the uncompromising and non-negotiable support from the EU that he likely craves.

Instead, one will witness a balance of criticism for Russia’s presence on Georgian soil outside of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, restraint when it comes to implementing concrete punitive measures, and flexibility on the part of the European Union to accept a political reality that diverges from the status quo ante President Saakashvili wrecked with his military operation in South Ossetia.

 

[metreon]

Pat Buchanan also has put forth a number of contrarian viewpoints both in op-eds and in an interview on
Russia Today, (a russian english language TV broadcast similar to Deutsch Welle).
YouTube - Georgia started the war -- Pat Buchanan
Part of the problem of interpretation of this shadow conflict between the west and Russia is simply that I am not sure of the what the linked motivations are which are often cited as sources of the distrust. Why was NATO being expanded and why does Russia really care if it is? What that says to me is either: (1) Russia does not understand the reasons and therefore distrusts them, (2) Russia does know the reason (or thinks they know it) and knows it to be part of a deliberate assault on their economic growth (these days the only power worth having is economic, so therefore the only meaningful threat).

I think a good resolution to this would be for Russia to both recognize the independence of Kosovo (which it currently opposes) as well as the breakaway states of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. It would be interesting to see what sort of distinctions western governments and Russia would cite to justify a distinction between the cases. I suspect putting Russia's reasoning under the world microscope may be the underlying goal anyway since recognizing only Abkhazia and South Ossetia's quest for freedom (which has been seething at least since Stalinist times) would put the burden of hypocrisy on Russia and serve to spotlight their selective reasoning as a sign of imperial ambition rather than justice.

If western countries continued to split hairs over the matter after a hypothetical recognition of independence in triplicate by Russia, then the onus of hypocrisy would be placed on the West to explain their ulterior motives.

I also wonder, on what stage do separatists in any country stop being terrorists and emerge as freedom-fighters and illegal succession become legal quests for independence? It would seem those actors must often subordinate their ideals to the casting whims of other world powers, and in front of such an audience, represent people other than themselves for the more desired role.

How does Saakashvili's crude improvisation play into this? I suspect his emotional impulsivity was a known factor long before he came to power. Was the potential for his cocky brashness a result of diplomatic oversight, or was it simply only a matter of time before he played his part? One can only speculate.

 

[donsutherland1]

Why was NATO being expanded and why does Russia really care if it is? What that says to me is either: (1) Russia does not understand the reasons and therefore distrusts them, (2) Russia does know the reason (or thinks they know it) and knows it to be part of a deliberate assault on their economic growth (these days the only power worth having is economic, so therefore the only meaningful threat).

Russia almost certainly views alliances such as NATO in the traditional sense that they are devised to address a specific threat. NATO was organized to counter the threat posed by the Soviet Union. In his speech of April 4, 2008, then Russian President Vladimir Putin, illustrated Russian thinking along those lines. He declared, "NATO was created at a time when there were two blocs confronting each other. Let's not get into the question of who were the good guys at the time. But it is obvious that today there is no Soviet Union, no eastern bloc and no Warsaw Pact. So NATO exists to confront whom?"

Of course, following the end of the Cold War, after the Warsaw Pact was dissolved, NATO evolved to deal with more amorphous security threats to NATO members e.g., that posed by terrorism. Nevertheless, with Russia possessing only a limited role vis-a-vis NATO and NATO's eastward expansion, the historic fear of being encircled has animated Russian foreign policy thinking.

At present, Russia does not see how NATO expansion into Eastern Europe and possibly the Caucasus addresses NATO's core responsibilities of providing security for existing NATO members. Instead, Russia suspects that such geographic expansion is aimed at limiting its own freedom to address its security needs. As many of the former East Bloc states have remained wary of Moscow following their breaking free from Soviet domination, Russia is concerned that NATO expansion into its "Near Abroad," and what it believes is its natural sphere of influence, is really more about "containing" Russia than safeguarding the security of NATO's existing members. Russia also sees the planned deployment of anti-missile systems in Poland and the Czech Republic as merely infant steps along the way toward a larger system that would be aimed at neutralizing Russia's offensive capabilities. Its fears on that matter have been stoked by the United States' refusal to consider a Russian compromise proposal whereby a joint missile defense system could be placed in Azerbaijan rather than in Poland or the Czech Republic.

Russian President Dmitry Medvedev's comments earlier today illustrate how Russia presently perceives NATO along the lines of its historic fear of encirclement. He explained, "We worked consistently to develop our relations with NATO for quite a long time. We would like to have a full-fledged partnership. What we do not want is an illusion of partnership, when NATO surrounds us with its bases and takes in more and more countries, while telling us, 'don't worry, everything is fine.' Of course we do not like this."

 

[dirtpoorchris]

Finally some recognition of events from our side.

Collin Powell puts in his 2 cents. Makes sense.
LiveLeak.com - Powell says Georgia provoked Russians, hints McCain?s response was hasty, reckless

Just listening to any of Sack-a-Villa's speeches I get the feeling hes a piece of crap.


So much big crap as all happening at once its hard to pay to much attention to each crisis.

 

[donsutherland1]

Today's edition of The New York Times reported that the observations of independent military observers, while not fully conclusive, undermined Georgia's claims that it had engaged Russia in self-defense. In part, the article reported:

Newly available accounts by independent military observers of the beginning of the war between Georgia and Russia this summer call into question the longstanding Georgian assertion that it was acting defensively against separatist and Russian aggression.

Instead, the accounts suggest that Georgia’s inexperienced military attacked the isolated separatist capital of Tskhinvali on Aug. 7 with indiscriminate artillery and rocket fire, exposing civilians, Russian peacekeepers and unarmed monitors to harm...

President Mikheil Saakashvili of Georgia has characterized the attack as a precise and defensive act. But according to observations of the monitors, documented Aug. 7 and Aug. 8, Georgian artillery rounds and rockets were falling throughout the city at intervals of 15 to 20 seconds between explosions, and within the first hour of the bombardment at least 48 rounds landed in a civilian area. The monitors have also said they were unable to verify that ethnic Georgian villages were under heavy bombardment that evening, calling to question one of Mr. Saakashvili’s main justifications for the attack.

http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/07/world/europe/07georgia.html

Upon taking office, the new Obama Administration would do well to deliberately and carefully examine what actually took place. In doing so, the incoming President would find that the matter was not an open-and-shut case of Russian aggression. Instead, it was a reckless gamble by the Georgian government to impose a military solution on the breakaway region of South Ossetia that led to Russian intervention.

 

[shiznit770]

Today's edition of The New York Times reported that the observations of independent military observers, while not fully conclusive, undermined Georgia's claims that it had engaged Russia in self-defense. In part, the article reported:



http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/07/world/europe/07georgia.html

Upon taking office, the new Obama Administration would do well to deliberately and carefully examine what actually took place. In doing so, the incoming President would find that the matter was not an open-and-shut case of Russian aggression. Instead, it was a reckless gamble by the Georgian government to impose a military solution on the breakaway region of South Ossetia that led to Russian intervention.

It would also be wise to not bribe countries into helping with an unpopular war.

 

[dirtpoorchris]

BBC NEWS | Programmes | Newsnight | What really happened in South Ossetia?

After gaining exclusive access to South Ossetia, Tim Whewell has discovered evidence Georgia may have committed war crimes in its attack on its breakaway region in August.

 

[Maximus Zeebra]

Mikheil Saakashvili is a crazy man, he is just simply mad and mentally disturbed.