Paper Suggests Arab Support for Democracy and Gender Equality is Low

[donsutherland1]

Early on, there were generally enthusiastic perceptions of the nature of the uprisings in parts of the Mideast. The early assumption among many policy makers, especially in the U.S., was that the uprisings represented a desire for democracy. Hence, the label "Arab Spring" was used to describe the events. Realists (foreign policy school) argued that the situation was more complex, desires for democracy were uncertain at best, and that a renewal of sectarian rivalries in an environment of waning centralized authority might well have explained the developments.

A recent academic paper suggests that, in fact, support among Arabs for democracy and gender equality (political and social liberalism) is low, both of which are key for fully representative democracy rather than a protodemocratic situation where only a small share of the population can participate. Moreover, contrary to popular perceptions, the younger cohort has grown less supportive of those attributes. The abstract for the paper, which is behind a paywall states:

This article analyses the relationship between support of democracy and attitudes to human rights, in particular, support for gender equality, in the countries covered by the first wave of the Arab Barometer project. We use cluster analysis and negative binomial regression modelling to show that, unlike in most countries of the world, correlation between support of democracy and gender equality is very low in the Arab countries. There is a group of people in the region who support both democracy and gender equality, but they are a small group (about 17% of the population) of elderly and middle-aged people characterized by higher education and social status. A substantial number of poorly educated males express support for democracy but not for gender equality. Many people, especially young males aged 25–35 in 2007, are against both gender equality and democracy. Younger people tend to be both better educated and more conservative, those belonging to the 25–34 age group being the most patriarchal in their gender attitudes. Yet, controlling for age, education does have a positive effect on gender equality attitudes. Nevertheless, this phenomenon may reflect two simultaneous processes going on in the Middle East. On the one hand, people are getting more educated, urbanized, etc., which means the continuation of modernization. On the other hand, the fact that older people are the most liberal age group may point to a certain retrogression of social values in the younger generations.

Abstract

It should be noted that this is perhaps the first early work that looks at the attitudes of the region and provides greater insight into the Arab Spring. It should be noted also that attitudes vary from country to country, so one should not view all countries and all Arab populations as having nearly identical attitudes. For example, there were limits as to how far authoritarians e.g., the Morsi government, in Egypt could go before they went beyond what the public found acceptable in Egypt. That government, despite taking office following an election, increasingly ruled by decree and attempted to suppress the authority of Egypt's judicial system. That position proved unsustainable among Egypt's populace and it was swept from power with broad public support. In another country, events could well have unfolded differently.

In sum, this paper provides some insight, but one should be cautious about overgeneralizing. For the foreign policy angle, it does provide a degree of weight to the Realist interpretation of events and caution Realists expressed when it came to the military intervention in Libya, bipartisan calls for the U.S. to aid Syria's anti-government forces in their fight against an authoritarian regime, or strong U.S. criticism of Bahrain's actions in suppressing a Shia uprising that could have seen the state fall into the Iranian orbit had that uprising swept the minority Sunni government from power.

 

[OrphanSlug]

Of course Arab support for democracy and gender equality is low, they both speak against their primary belief ideologies.

I do not have access to the full text of the report, but it is not rocket science to see how those that overwhelmingly subscribe to Islam reject the principles of Democracy, freedoms, equality, etc. By design most flavors of Islam are all about social and governmental controls all devoid of western ideologies, "religious authority" as dominant in cultural relationships, the place and even baked into the text value of men and women in society, and many other core tenets that all reject western governmental and sociological ideologies.

To understand that means understanding why the dominant government type in this region is often aristocratic and very social controlling, some bridge of military dictatorship and religious dictatorship were basic freedoms do not exist. It explains well why treatments for social crimes are harsh, and controls over the population equate to strong showings of sexism. Education in that culture is often with the confines of what authority allows, meaning it makes sense for education in that context to come with the social conservatism baked into the text of Islam. Contrast that to western ideologies and education tends to lean liberal where those confines do not exist.

This is all ice is still cold thinking... unless there is something Earth shattering in this $40 article.

 

[Ben K.]

Of course Arab support for democracy and gender equality is low, they both speak against their primary belief ideologies.

I do not have access to the full text of the report, but it is not rocket science to see how those that overwhelmingly subscribe to Islam reject the principles of Democracy, freedoms, equality, etc. By design most flavors of Islam are all about social and governmental controls all devoid of western ideologies, "religious authority" as dominant in cultural relationships, the place and even baked into the text value of men and women in society, and many other core tenets that all reject western governmental and sociological ideologies.

To understand that means understanding why the dominant government type in this region is often aristocratic and very social controlling, some bridge of military dictatorship and religious dictatorship were basic freedoms do not exist. It explains well why treatments for social crimes are harsh, and controls over the population equate to strong showings of sexism. Education in that culture is often with the confines of what authority allows, meaning it makes sense for education in that context to come with the social conservatism baked into the text of Islam. Contrast that to western ideologies and education tends to lean liberal where those confines do not exist.

This is all ice is still cold thinking... unless there is something Earth shattering in this $40 article.

This is the core of the issue but the fact that they point to a 'retrogression' of social values in younger generation poses a question of its own. The religion is quite old at this stage, so what generational social changes occurred to cause regression rather than progression in its interpretation?

Maybe the $40 expands on that, I dunno.

 

[Paleocon]

Early on, there were generally enthusiastic perceptions of the nature of the uprisings in parts of the Mideast. The early assumption among many policy makers, especially in the U.S., was that the uprisings represented a desire for democracy. Hence, the label "Arab Spring" was used to describe the events. Realists (foreign policy school) argued that the situation was more complex, desires for democracy were uncertain at best, and that a renewal of sectarian rivalries in an environment of waning centralized authority might well have explained the developments.

A recent academic paper suggests that, in fact, support among Arabs for democracy and gender equality (political and social liberalism) is low, both of which are key for fully representative democracy rather than a protodemocratic situation where only a small share of the population can participate. Moreover, contrary to popular perceptions, the younger cohort has grown less supportive of those attributes. The abstract for the paper, which is behind a paywall states:

This article analyses the relationship between support of democracy and attitudes to human rights, in particular, support for gender equality, in the countries covered by the first wave of the Arab Barometer project. We use cluster analysis and negative binomial regression modelling to show that, unlike in most countries of the world, correlation between support of democracy and gender equality is very low in the Arab countries. There is a group of people in the region who support both democracy and gender equality, but they are a small group (about 17% of the population) of elderly and middle-aged people characterized by higher education and social status. A substantial number of poorly educated males express support for democracy but not for gender equality. Many people, especially young males aged 25–35 in 2007, are against both gender equality and democracy. Younger people tend to be both better educated and more conservative, those belonging to the 25–34 age group being the most patriarchal in their gender attitudes. Yet, controlling for age, education does have a positive effect on gender equality attitudes. Nevertheless, this phenomenon may reflect two simultaneous processes going on in the Middle East. On the one hand, people are getting more educated, urbanized, etc., which means the continuation of modernization. On the other hand, the fact that older people are the most liberal age group may point to a certain retrogression of social values in the younger generations.

Abstract

It should be noted that this is perhaps the first early work that looks at the attitudes of the region and provides greater insight into the Arab Spring. It should be noted also that attitudes vary from country to country, so one should not view all countries and all Arab populations as having nearly identical attitudes. For example, there were limits as to how far authoritarians e.g., the Morsi government, in Egypt could go before they went beyond what the public found acceptable in Egypt. That government, despite taking office following an election, increasingly ruled by decree and attempted to suppress the authority of Egypt's judicial system. That position proved unsustainable among Egypt's populace and it was swept from power with broad public support. In another country, events could well have unfolded differently.

In sum, this paper provides some insight, but one should be cautious about overgeneralizing. For the foreign policy angle, it does provide a degree of weight to the Realist interpretation of events and caution Realists expressed when it came to the military intervention in Libya, bipartisan calls for the U.S. to aid Syria's anti-government forces in their fight against an authoritarian regime, or strong U.S. criticism of Bahrain's actions in suppressing a Shia uprising that could have seen the state fall into the Iranian orbit had that uprising swept the minority Sunni government from power.

Good. Hopefully they will be able to resist these insane ideas from taking hold in their society.