National Rifle Association of America v Vollu

[Bok Tuklo]

Six decades ago, this Court held that a government entity’s “threat of invoking legal sanctions and other means of coercion” against a third party “to achieve the suppression” of disfavored speech violates the First Amendment. Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 67 (1963). Today, the Court reaffirms what it said then: Government officials cannot attempt to coerce private parties in order to punish or suppress views that the government disfavors. Petitioner National Rifle Association (NRA) plausibly alleges that respondent Maria Vullo did just that. As superintendent of the New York Department of Financial Services, Vullo allegedly pressured regulated entities to help her stifle the NRA’s pro-gun advocacy by threatening enforcement actions against those entities that refused to disassociate from the NRA and other gun-promotion advocacy groups. Those allegations, if true, state a First Amendment claim.

...

The NRA’s allegations, if true, highlight the constitutional concerns with the kind of intermediary strategy that Vullo purportedly adopted to target the NRA’s advocacy. Such a strategy allows government officials to “expand their regulatory jurisdiction to suppress the speech of organizations that they have no direct control over.” Brief for First Amendment Scholars as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner 8. It also allows government officials to be more effective in their speech-suppression efforts “ecause intermediaries will often be less invested in the speaker’s message and thus less likely to risk the regulator’s ire.” Ibid. The allegations here bear this out. Although “the NRA was not even the directly regulated party,” Brief for Respondent 32, Vullo allegedly used the power of her office to target gun promotion by going after the NRA’s business partners. Insurers in turn followed Vullo’s lead, fearing regulatory hostility.


Nothing in this case gives advocacy groups like the NRA a “right to absolute immunity from [government] investigation,” or a “right to disregard [state or federal] laws.” Patterson, 357 U. S., at 463. Similarly, nothing here prevents government officials from forcefully condemning views with which they disagree. For those permissible actions, the Constitution “relies first and foremost on the ballot box, not on rules against viewpoint discrimination, to check the government when it speaks.” Shurtleff v. Boston, 596 U.S. 243, 252 (2022). Yet where, as here, a government official makes coercive threats in a private meeting behind closed doors, the “ballot box” is an especially poor check on that official’s authority. Ultimately, the critical takeaway is that the First Amendment prohibits government officials from wielding their power selectively to punish or suppress speech, directly or (as alleged here) through private intermediaries.

Justia

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Suddenly relevant.

Not that I trust this Court to agree with itself from ... **checks notes** ... last year, but it was a unanimous decision.

 

[ttwtt78640]

This has become a complex mess via the creation of ‘regulatory agencies’ empowered by the legislature to make (or change) ‘rules’, which serve as laws.

 

[Bok Tuklo]

This has become a complex mess via the creation of ‘regulatory agencies’ empowered by the legislature to make (or change) ‘rules’, which serve as laws.

It is not complex.

And this Court killed Chevron last year, so you may be behind the times.

 

[verrip1]

Also, from the OP's link above, the Concurrence of Justice Gorsuch:

"I write separately to explain my understanding of the Court’s opinion, which I join in full. Today we reaffirm a well-settled principle: “A government official cannot coerce a private party to punish or suppress disfavored speech on her behalf.” Ante, at 11. As the Court mentions, many lower courts have taken to analyzing this kind of coercion claim under a four-pronged “multifactor test.” Ibid. These tests, the Court explains, might serve “as a useful, though nonexhaustive, guide.” Ante, at 12. But sometimes they might not. Cf.Axon Enterprise, Inc. v. FTC, 598 U.S. 175, 205–207(2023) (Gorsuch, J., concurring in judgment). Indeed, the Second Circuit’s decision to break up its analysis into discrete parts and“tak[e] the [complaint’s] allegations in isolation” appears only to have contributed to its mistaken conclusion that the National Rifle Association failed to state a claim. Ante, at 15. Lower courts would therefore do well to heed this Court’s directive:Whatever value these “guideposts” serve, they remain “just” that and nothing more. Ante, at 12. “Ultimately, the critical”question is whether the plaintiff has “plausibly allege[d] conduct that, viewed in context, could be reasonably understood to convey a threat of adverse government action in order to punish or suppress the plaintiff ’s speech.” Ante, at 12, 19."

Further, the Concurrence of Justice Jackson (in part):

"The NRA’s complaint advances both censorship and retaliation claims, yet the lower courts in this case lumped these claims together and ultimately focused almost exclusively on whether Vullo’s conduct was coercive. See ante, at 6–7.Consequently, the strength of the NRA’s claim under the Mt.Healthy framework has received little attention thus far. On remand, the parties and lower courts should consider the censorship and retaliation theories independently, mindful of the distinction between government coercion and the ways in which such coercion might (or might not) have violated the NRA’s constitutional rights.That analysis can and should likewise consider which First Amendment framework best captures the NRA’s allegations in this case. See, e.g., VDARE, 11 F. 4th, at1159–1175 (separately analyzing censorship and retaliation claims)."

 

[ttwtt78640]

It is not complex.

And this Court killed Chevron last year, so you may be behind the times.

IMHO, the SCOTUS limited (narrowed?) Chevron rather than kill it.