- Joined
- Oct 17, 2007
- Messages
- 11,862
- Reaction score
- 10,300
- Location
- New York
- Gender
- Male
- Political Leaning
- Centrist
I don't think it is unreasonable to ask Japan and Europe to make a larger contribution to their defensive capabilities, but that does not mean that the forthcoming cuts in defense spending are aligned with the evolving security environment. If one examines the projected spending over the next 5 years, Defense is slated to be reduced an average of 1.8% per year in nominal dollars and 3.2% in real (after inflation) dollars assuming that the abnormally low inflation rate of the last five years continues. U.S. nominal and real GDP are both projected to continue to grow, meaning that the U.S. will be spending less on defense per dollar of GDP. After 5 years, U.S. defense spending will have decreased approximately 17% in real terms.
Can one reasonably argue that the world will have become comparably safer five years from now to justify such a reduction? Can one maintain U.S. power will have remained essentially stable relative to the world at large in which China will likely have increased its own military spending by 10% or more each year (published figure) and Russia will have carried through with additional significant investments in modernizing its conventional and nuclear forces?
In the longer-term, that growing disinvestment in U.S. defense spending relative to the rest of the world could erode the present U.S. technological military edge. For example, with China and Russia actively investing in hypersonic jet and space-related research, even as the U.S. is currently maintaining a managed retreat from both areas, would there be implications were either one of those countries to achieve a qualitative breakthrough in some of that technology? For instance, would the military balance of power shift if one of those countries achieved a breakthrough in developing a hypersonic fighter jet (not likely in 5 years but something that can't be written off in the medium term, much less beyond)?
The above longer-term discussion is more speculation right now. The slowly shifting balance of power in a multipolar world is current reality. Ignoring it creates longer-term risks. Furthermore, addressing it does not require the U.S. to embrace radical measures that would lead to fiscal ruin. It does not require spending levels relative to revenue and/or GDP consistent with the Cold War or a perpetual war footing. In addition, to reduce or avoid less than necessary expenditures, the U.S. could refrain from intervening militarily in areas where critical American interests or strategic allies are not at risk. Examples would including refraining from playing any military role in Syria's civil war (the U.S. wisely backed off military intervention there), not having gotten involved in Libya's civil war, having maintained the prior deterrence regime against Iraq, etc. Deterrence is far less expensive than the costs of war (human, financial, and economic), but deterrence requires sufficient power, a willingness to use it when critical interests/allies are threatened, and a would-be adversary's clear understanding of a nation's power and willingness to use it.
Prudent defense policy cannot be tied solely to a nation's domestic desires, even as it might be tempting to turn inward. Instead, its defense posture needs to be consistent with the security environment that confronts it. In that environment, careful attention should be given to the requirements of protecting its critical interests and strategic allies and maintaining a balance of power to deter would be aggression against its interests, strategic allies, and itself. Afterward, financing should be consistent with its long-run economic capacity. Sources of defense funds would depend on its level of taxation, ability to reallocate existing spending to make its fiscal policy more consistent with the nation's priorities, and leveraging possible opportunities for savings from efficiency, etc. Alliances and partnerships can also magnify its hard and soft power.