Morgenstern opened his book with a description of the Japanese attack, and noted that a 1932 U.S. Navy exercise showed that Pearl Harbor was open to air attack by carrier based planes. An entire chapter was devoted to the question of why the fleet came to be home-based at Pearl Harbor from May 1940. The author cited the testimony of the former commander of the Pacific Fleet, Admiral J.O. Richardson, who, in October 1940, protested Roosevelt's decision to move the fleet from the protected waters of the American west coast to the vulnerable base at Hawaii. Richardson was relieved of his command four months after his meeting with FDR and was replaced by Rear Admiral Kimmel.
Attack on Pearl Harbor - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Attack_on_Pearl_
Harbor
Military planning
Preliminary planning for an attack on Pearl Harbor to protect the move into the "Southern Resource Area" (the Japanese term for the Dutch East Indies and Southeast Asia generally) had begun very early in 1941 under the auspices of Admiral
Isoroku Yamamoto, then commanding Japan's
Combined Fleet.[SUP]
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Over the next several months, pilots trained, equipment was adapted, and intelligence collected. Despite these preparations,
Emperor Hirohito did not approve the attack plan until November 5, after the third of four Imperial Conferences called to consider the matter.[SUP]
[45][/SUP] Final authorization was not given by the emperor until December 1, after a majority of Japanese leaders advised him the "
Hull Note" would "destroy the fruits of the China incident, endanger Manchukuo and undermine Japanese control of Korea."[SUP]
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By late 1941, many observers believed that hostilities between the U.S. and Japan were imminent. A
Gallup poll just before the attack on Pearl Harbor found that 52% of Americans expected war with Japan, 27% did not, and 21% had no opinion.[SUP]
[47][/SUP] While U.S. Pacific bases and facilities had been placed on alert on many occasions, U.S. officials doubted Pearl Harbor would be the first target; instead, they expected the Philippines would be attacked first. This presumption was due to the threat that the air bases throughout the country and the naval base at Manila posed to sea lanes, as well as to the shipment of supplies to Japan from territory to the south.[SUP]
[48][/SUP] They also incorrectly believed that Japan was not capable of mounting more than one major naval operation at a time.[SUP]
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Ever since the Japanese attack, there has been debate as to how and why the United States had been caught unaware, and how much and when American officials knew of Japanese plans and related topics. Several writers, including journalist Robert Stinnett and former United States rear admiral Robert Alfred Theobald, have argued that various parties high in the U.S. and British governments knew of the attack in advance and may even have let it happen or encouraged it in order to force the U.S. into war via the so-called "back door". However, this
Pearl Harbor advance-knowledge conspiracy theory is rejected by mainstream historians.[SUP]
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