The - so entitled - exceptional nature of abortion brings about a exceptional complexity of physiological details with ethical considerations that can't easily lend itself to simplistic, idealistic appeals to a consistent "do no harm" precept.
The principle of "do no harm" is not about simplicity but about consistency in medical ethics. The principle is applied across various medical situations with different complexities.
You have two lives subsisting simultaneously, one within the womb of the other, both with competing ethical concerns.
The physician's "do no harm" ethical directive for one, inherently comes at the cost of the other.
False dichotomy. You falsely imply that valuing the fetus's health always conflicts with valuing the mother's health, which is not the case. As an example, fetal surgery is undertaken to improve the health outcomes of the fetus while still considering the mother's health. The medical community balances these interests rather than prioritizing one absolutely over the other. Most people who get abortions do so for socioeconomic reasons, not for health reasons.
You've reiterated several declarations yet, you've failed to provide support as to exactly. why the physician's principle to "do no harm", toward incipient life, should be consistently held superlative to a woman's right, volition and physicians' concern for her well-being?
Your question suggests that there is a blanket prioritization of fetal health over the mother's, which is not true. The principle of "do no harm" applies to BOTH the fetus and the mother. In the case of abortion, the decision ought to involve weighing the health and rights of both the mother and fetus.
Medical ethics consistently involves complex decision-making and the principle of "do no harm" guides these decisions by striving to balance the health of all patients involved. This consistency should extend to all procedures, including abortion, unless a clear and rational basis is provided for treating it as an exception, which your argument lacks.
This would indicate that they value a woman's right to medical decisions regarding her body more than they value the life of the fetus.
No, it indicates that they value the consent from all patients involved in a medical decision. If a woman denies consent for fetal surgery, it means that the surgery can't be performed because it involves her body, not because the fetus’s wellbeing is disregarded. This is to prevent harm or a violation of autonomy from being done to the woman without her agreement and not to devalue the fetus's wellbeing.
In the case of fetal surgery, both the mother and the fetus are patients. The fetus is a patient because it's subject to surgery. As mentioned above, since the procedure involves the mother's body, her consent is also required. No medical procedure can proceed on her body without her informed consent.
When it comes to consent from the fetus, the fetus can't provide informed consent. In medical ethics, when a patient can't give consent, the principle of implied consent is applied. This means the procedure must be in the best interest of the patient. In cases where the fetus's wellbeing is the focus, such as fetal surgery to correct a congenital issue, the implied consent is assumed to be in favor of the procedure because it aims to improve the fetus's health and chances of survival.
However, in the case of abortion, the situation is completely different. Abortion is not aimed at improving the health of the fetus but instead killing the fetus. If we were to apply the principle of implied consent for the fetus then it would suggest denying the procedure since abortion is not in the interest of the fetus's survival.
In summary, consent is valued more than wellbeing, but it does not extend to causing harm to others. Consent can justify actions involving the consenting individual's own body and wellbeing, but it does not extend to permitting harmful actions against other individuals.