1. The coalition must establish public safety in all parts of the country.
In addition to ongoing efforts, this will involve: reviewing force composition and structure, as well as composite force
levels (U.S., coalition, and Iraqi) so as to be able to address the need for increased street- level presence in key conflictive areas; quickly hiring private security to help stand up and supervise a rapid expansion of the Iraqi Facility Protection Service, thereby freeing thousands of U.S. troops from this duty; ratcheting up efforts to recruit sufficient levels of international civilian police through all available channels; and, launching a major initiative to reintegrate “selfdemobilized” Iraqi soldiers and local militias.
2. Iraqi ownership of the rebuilding process must be expanded at national, provincial, and
local levels.
At the national level ensuring success of the newly formed Iraqi Governing Council is crucial. This will require avoiding overloading it with too many controversial issues too soon. The natural desire to draw anger away from the coalition by putting an Iraqi face on
the most difficult decisions must be balanced with a realistic assessment of what the council can successfully manage. At the provincial and local levels, coalition forces and the CPA have
made great progress in establishing political councils throughout the country, but they need direction and the ability to respond to local needs and demands. To achieve this, local and provincial political councils need to have access to resources and be linked to the national Iraqi Governing Council and the constitutional process.
3. Idle hands must be put to work and basic economic and social services provided immediately to avoid exacerbating political and security problems.
A model economy will not be created overnight out of Iraq’s failed statist economic structures. Short-term public works projects are needed on a large scale to soak up sizable amounts of the available labor pool. Simultaneously, the CPA must get a large number of formerly state-owned enterprises up and running. Even if many of them are not competitive and may need to be privatized and downsized eventually, now is the time to get as many people back to work as possible. A massive micro-credit program in all provinces would help to spur wide-ranging economic activity, and help to empower key agents of change such as women. The CPA must also do whatever is necessary to immediately refurbish basic services, especially electricity, water, and sanitation.
4. Decentralization is essential.
The job facing occupation and Iraqi authorities is too big to be
handled exclusively by the central occupying authority and national Iraqi Governing Council. Implementation is lagging far behind needs and expectations in key areas, at least to some
extent because of severely constrained CPA human resources at the provincial and local levels. This situation must be addressed immediately by decentralizing key functions of the CPA to the
provincial level, thereby enhancing operational speed and effectiveness and allowing maximum empowerment of Iraqis. The CPA must rapidly recruit and field a much greater number of
civilian experts to guide key governance, economic, social, justice, and also some security components of the occupation.
5. The coalition must facilitate a profound change in the Iraqi national frame of mind – from centralized authority to significant freedoms, from suspicion to trust, from skepticism to hope.
This will require an intense and effective communications and marketing campaign, not the status quo. The CPA needs to win the confidence and support of the Iraqi people. Communication – between the CPA and the Iraqi people, and within the CPA itself –
is insufficient so far. Drastic changes must be made to immediately improve the daily flow of practical information to the Iraqi people, principally through enhanced radio and TV
programming. Iraqis need to hear about difficulties and successes from authoritative sources.
Secondly, the CPA needs to gather information from Iraqis much more effectively – through a more robust civilian ground presence, “walk-in” centers for Iraqis staffed by Iraqis, and hiring a large number of Iraqi “animators” to carry and receive messages. Thirdly, information flow must be improved within the CPA itself through an integrated operations center that would
extend across both the civilian and military sides of the CPA, and by enhancing cell-phone coverage and a system-wide email system that could ease the timely dissemination of
information to all CPA personnel.
6. The United States needs to quickly mobilize a new reconstruction coalition that is significantly broader than the coalition that successfully waged the war.]
The scope of the challenges, the financial requirements, and rising anti-Americanism in parts of the country make necessary a new coalition that involves various international actors (including from countries and organizations that took no part in the original war coalition). The Council for International Cooperation at the CPA is a welcome innovation, but it must be dramatically
expanded and supercharged if a new and inclusive coalition is to be built.
7. Money must be significantly more forthcoming and more flexible.
Iraq will require significant outside support over the short to medium term. In addition to broadening the financial coalition to include a wider range of international actors, this means the President and Congress will need to budget and fully fund reconstruction costs through 2004. The CPA must
be given rapid and flexible funding. “Business as usual” is not an option for operations in Iraq, nor can it be for their funding.
The enormity of the task ahead must not be underestimated. It requires that the entire effort be immediately turbo-charged – by making it more agile and flexible, and providing it with greater funding and personnel.