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I don't think we can restrict the self-possession of someone who is known to be an autonomous person in favor of someone who only might be. And as is there is no agreement - or, right now, even an opportunity for one - on when a fetus attains this theoretical parity with a born person, it seems prudent to maintain that birth is the boundary event.Too many people make it about semantics, which is just begging the question. In my opinion the only questions you need to ask yourself are the following:
1. What are the characteristics of a human being AFTER it is born that make us believe it should be illegal to kill it?
2. When, if ever, does an embryo or fetus have enough of those characteristics to justify limitations on the freedom of the mother in order to protect it BEFORE it is born?
I think most rational people would agree that a 10-12 week old fetus has no more of those characteristics than what a lot of us ate for dinner, and therefore no restrictions on the freedom of the mother are warranted in order to protect it.
On the other hand, I also think that most rational people would agree that a 39 week old healthy fetus has pretty much all of those characteristics, to the point where it potentially justifies a week of restriction on the freedom of the mother.
Let's maybe approach this another way, and as a caveat I'm using this example from (kinship) familiarity and to emphasize something like a state of continued dependence:
The autonomies of adults are and can be restricted for any number of causes, the most notable of which is becoming parents; in short, people with children are expected to and compelled to surrender some autonomy and not a little self-possession and freedom of movement in order to care for, and provide for, their born children. This obligation is both affirmative (they must do it, and are broadly protected in that exercise) and negative (there are varying penalties for not doing it).
This obligation becomes especially evident in the case of adult children who have their legal majority and self-possession deprived, limited or withdrawn, say for a person with Down's Syndrome who has been placed into guardianship, or whose majority has been forestalled. The legal guardians - quite often birth parents - still have the restrictions of their full freedom of movement, autonomy and self-possession in place; they must provide for and may not neglect another person, for whom they are compelled to care, who is otherwise adult.
This is not especially problematic, because they have accepted full responsibility for persons they created, in choosing to bring them to bear, in an ethical and legal climate where that choice was freely exercised.
But this will not and cannot be true for persons compelled to bring to birth other persons whom they do not want, and for whom they do not want to or cannot care.
And it is not true of any given fetus, the existence of which may be accident, a product of violation and abuse, non-viable, or subject to changing circumstance like war, divorce, plague, death of a partner, threats to health, biological defect, loss of assets, or a dearth of medical providers.
So it just seems best, I think, to keep the boundary where all autonomies are known, and the fewest are curtailed in the service of mere potential.