"Agnostic"

[Mithrae]

Your demonstration is making a modal error. X is proposed as self-justifying and necessary, where Z and Z1 lack this property

It's a magic explanation in other words

Seems like it's more or less time to wrap this discussion up. I really did try, but if you can't persuade a theist-leaning agnostic that your argument is even coherent - let alone plausible, let alone persuasive or conclusive - it's pretty obvious that it's not likely to impress anyone but the Believers. As a quick recap, let me try to steelman your argument and fill in some of the blanks for you:

1. Human reason is associated with or predicated on certain immaterial, invariant universals like the Law of Identity
2. Something has to ground those "universals" as precondition for reason's possibility (or intelligibility?)
3. Since reason exists, it must be necessarily possible (possible in all possible worlds, via S5’s axiom 5)
4. From 2 and 3, some necessary thing has to ground those universals in all possible worlds in order for reason to be possible in them
5. The only thing capable of grounding intelligible universals would be a universal intelligence
6. From 4 and 5, a universal intelligence not only exists but does so as a necessary being, which aptly describes God

Sadly you didn't offer anything even remotely along the lines of #5 - in your arguments so far, God supposedly grounds these universals just because you said so, compounded by "X (God)" being presented as a premise in post #164 - while you've instead cluttered your argument up with extraneous verbiage about "transcendence" and "self-justification."

But as we've discussed at length,
-- #1 is dubious at best since - much like our language on which it heavily depends - human reason functions fine or indeed best with what we might call a more localized and flexible 'principle of identity' A≈A (which also more accurately reflects the world we experience and have come to know). More importantly
-- #2 seems pretty much incoherent, at least as far as I've been able to decipher; I don't think you've even tried to explain what it means to 'ground' a law or principle or why that is needed for the mere possibility of reason (and I suspect that you have equivocated on this point between its possibility and its intelligibility, as below, not that it's clear even the latter would be any more coherent).
-- #3 is.. not too bad really, I can kind of see why that axiom might have been created and can entertain it in terms of speculation or for the sake of argument, but it's obviously not a sound basis for building further conclusions about the Ultimate Nature of Reality.
-- #4 by this point is built on quicksand so fails already; and while imagining something to be "necessarily possible" is fun to speculate, imagining something to be necessarily actual (besides perhaps existence or reality in the vaguest sense as the baseline for a 'possible world' at all) is just mental masturbation; and as I highlighted above this makes the argument self-contradictory in any case since it makes the "necessary possibility" of reason merely contingently possible (for which your workaround seems to be equivocation between possibility and intelligibility).
-- #5 is about the best I could come up with for your massive, unsubstantiated leap between these dubious universals you've invoked and the deity you invoked to *ahem* 'ground' them, but it's not a fact or even really an argument, just a bit of word-play.

So all in all... not really even a coherent argument as you've presented it, or even as I've tried to tidy it up and fill in the blanks, and even if we went waaaay out on a limb and blindly assumed that #1 and #2 were both true and coherent, we'd still fail at #4 (to avoid self-contradiction) and #5 (with existence or reality in the vaguest sense being a plausible candidate to 'ground' universals, and the only 'thing' we can reasonably posit as necessarily existing).

 

[watsup]

God’s nature as the basis for logic’s universality.

Logic is a human invention and applies only to human communications.

My argument is that these require a metaphysical basis for proper epistemic justification, not just observed patterns or brain matter which are insufficient.

Brain matter produces thought which is all that is needed.

 

[watsup]

It's clear that our universe is a highly complex system. As I've highlighted a number of times before, there are only two observed mechanisms which explain the development of highly complex systems from simple antecedents: Biological evolution based on enduring selection from genetic variation, and conscious thought based on enduring selection from 'memetic' variation. So while the highly complex and unchanging omni-god of traditional Christianity fails the parsimony test as any kind of explanation for our complex reality, extrapolating from our certainty that consciousness is real to the likelihood that reality is conscious also provides a plausible potential answer to some other enduring mysteries we face; it opens up the possibility of an observation-derived simple-to-complex mechanism that applies to reality as a whole, ironically essentially mirroring parts of Hume's "infant deity" rhetoric.

Still no God.

 

[Gozaburo]

But as we've discussed at length,
-- #1 is dubious at best since - much like our language on which it heavily depends - human reason functions fine or indeed best with what we might call a more localized and flexible 'principle of identity' A≈A (which also more accurately reflects the world we experience and have come to know). More importantly
-- #2 seems pretty much incoherent, at least as far as I've been able to decipher; I don't think you've even tried to explain what it means to 'ground' a law or principle or why that is needed for the mere possibility of reason (and I suspect that you have equivocated on this point between its possibility and its intelligibility, as below, not that it's clear even the latter would be any more coherent).
-- #3 is.. not too bad really, I can kind of see why that axiom might have been created and can entertain it in terms of speculation or for the sake of argument, but it's obviously not a sound basis for building further conclusions about the Ultimate Nature of Reality.
-- #4 by this point is built on quicksand so fails already; and while imagining something to be "necessarily possible" is fun to speculate, imagining something to be necessarily actual (besides perhaps existence or reality in the vaguest sense as the baseline for a 'possible world' at all) is just mental masturbation; and as I highlighted above this makes the argument self-contradictory in any case since it makes the "necessary possibility" of reason merely contingently possible (for which your workaround seems to be equivocation between possibility and intelligibility).
-- #5 is about the best I could come up with for your massive, unsubstantiated leap between these dubious universals you've invoked and the deity you invoked to *ahem* 'ground' them, but it's not a fact or even really an argument, just a bit of word-play.

#1 A≈A still presupposes a stable framework for approximation, which itself relies on logical universals. How does A≈A function without assuming some invariant logical structure?

#2 As I've outlined multiple times now, grounding means providing an ontological basis for why universals exist and apply universally. If laws of logic are contingent, they could vary across worlds, making reason unreliable or impossible in some. A necessary grounding ensures their invariance. Reason’s possibility requires intelligibility and if logic isn't grounded invariantly, why trust it in any world?

#3 So what grounds reason’s possibility across all worlds without invoking necessity? How do you account for logic’s reliability without invoking necessity?

#4 There’s no equivocation between possibility and intelligibility: for reason to be possible, it must be intelligible, meaning it relies on stable logical principles. Without a necessary ground, reason could fail in some worlds, but we both assume it doesn’t. The reason used in S5 here is valid and sound. If universals require a necessary ground, and only a rational, necessary intelligence (God) can account for their invariance and intelligibility, then God’s existence follows logically, not speculatively. I'm curious what your alternative is here?

#5 How is it a leap and not a reasoned conclusion? If the rest of S5 is true, then universals like the laws of logic are immaterial, invariant, and prescriptive: they don’t just exist; they govern rational thought universally. For reason to be possible, these universals must be necessary - true in all possible worlds - otherwise, logic could vary, and reason would collapse. Grounding them requires something that explains both their existence and their rational character.

 

[Gozaburo]

So all in all... not really even a coherent argument as you've presented it, or even as I've tried to tidy it up and fill in the blanks, and even if we went waaaay out on a limb and blindly assumed that #1 and #2 were both true and coherent, we'd still fail at #4 (to avoid self-contradiction) and #5 (with existence or reality in the vaguest sense being a plausible candidate to 'ground' universals, and the only 'thing' we can reasonably posit as necessarily existing).

I'm not really dogmatically committed to the worldview, rather I think it's reasonable and sound. I'd accept a coherent and sound alternative and would accept the possibility my articulation of the argument could be better, although I think I've defended it just fine.

I can understand the other side of the steelman. Universals being grounded in reality's structure or brute facts, theism's circularity being no different than naturalisms (especially since naturalism has some means to empirically ground itself, a proposed strength), parsimony of naturalism, arguments about the need for a particular deity, and pragmatism. I just think each one of these can be easily refuted without much effort and when we're making transcendental arguments, I still haven't really seen anyone provide a counter argument which has the same level of coherence and internal consistency as the theistic position.

 

[watsup]

How do you account for logic’s reliability without invoking necessity?

Ad hoc.

 

[watsup]

#1 A≈A still presupposes a stable framework for approximation, which itself relies on logical universals. How does A≈A function without assuming some invariant logical structure?

#2 As I've outlined multiple times now, grounding means providing an ontological basis for why universals exist and apply universally. If laws of logic are contingent, they could vary across worlds, making reason unreliable or impossible in some. A necessary grounding ensures their invariance. Reason’s possibility requires intelligibility and if logic isn't grounded invariantly, why trust it in any world?

#3 So what grounds reason’s possibility across all worlds without invoking necessity? How do you account for logic’s reliability without invoking necessity?

#4 There’s no equivocation between possibility and intelligibility: for reason to be possible, it must be intelligible, meaning it relies on stable logical principles. Without a necessary ground, reason could fail in some worlds, but we both assume it doesn’t. The reason used in S5 here is valid and sound. If universals require a necessary ground, and only a rational, necessary intelligence (God) can account for their invariance and intelligibility, then God’s existence follows logically, not speculatively. I'm curious what your alternative is here?

#5 How is it a leap and not a reasoned conclusion? If the rest of S5 is true, then universals like the laws of logic are immaterial, invariant, and prescriptive: they don’t just exist; they govern rational thought universally. For reason to be possible, these universals must be necessary - true in all possible worlds - otherwise, logic could vary, and reason would collapse. Grounding them requires something that explains both their existence and their rational character.

This all just sounds so made-up. You know, like any theism.

 

[watsup]

#1 A≈A still presupposes a stable framework for approximation, which itself relies on logical universals. How does A≈A function without assuming some invariant logical structure?

#2 As I've outlined multiple times now, grounding means providing an ontological basis for why universals exist and apply universally. If laws of logic are contingent, they could vary across worlds, making reason unreliable or impossible in some. A necessary grounding ensures their invariance. Reason’s possibility requires intelligibility and if logic isn't grounded invariantly, why trust it in any world?

#3 So what grounds reason’s possibility across all worlds without invoking necessity? How do you account for logic’s reliability without invoking necessity?

#4 There’s no equivocation between possibility and intelligibility: for reason to be possible, it must be intelligible, meaning it relies on stable logical principles. Without a necessary ground, reason could fail in some worlds, but we both assume it doesn’t. The reason used in S5 here is valid and sound. If universals require a necessary ground, and only a rational, necessary intelligence (God) can account for their invariance and intelligibility, then God’s existence follows logically, not speculatively. I'm curious what your alternative is here?

#5 How is it a leap and not a reasoned conclusion? If the rest of S5 is true, then universals like the laws of logic are immaterial, invariant, and prescriptive: they don’t just exist; they govern rational thought universally. For reason to be possible, these universals must be necessary - true in all possible worlds - otherwise, logic could vary, and reason would collapse. Grounding them requires something that explains both their existence and their rational character.

You still haven’t defined your god very well. Is it an entity, a force, an aura, a background energy? Or is it just another figment of imagination like every other god ever constructed by humans. The latter is the most obvious choice.

 

[Gozaburo]

You still haven’t defined your god very well. Is it an entity, a force, an aura, a background energy? Or is it just another figment of imagination like every other god ever constructed by humans. The latter is the most obvious choice.

I don't know what the definitions of any of these things are to you. If God exists, there's necessarily no way we would be able to deduce His nature with complete certainty. Any atheist asking for a complete description of God's nature is making a category error and any theist proposing a complete description is describing a contingent entity.

I'd call God an entity, but not in a mundane sense.

 

[watsup]

I don't know what the definitions of any of these things are to you. If God exists, there's necessarily no way we would be able to deduce His nature with complete certainty. Any atheist asking for a complete description of God's nature is making a category error and any theist proposing a complete description is describing a contingent entity.

That’s fine, but the decision remains easy for the atheist to reject either kinds of those gods until some evidence for them can be presented that can be independently verified.

 

[Gozaburo]

That’s fine, but the decision remains easy for the atheist to reject either kinds of those gods until some evidence for them can be presented that can be independently verified.

Yeah and I'm saying that if you're calling for empirical evidence for God's existence, you're making a category error since God's existence necessarily cannot be known through empirical means. Not all evidences are presented or deduced in the same way.

You wouldn't prove what you ate for lunch on this day 2 years ago in the same way you would prove whether or not there are crackers in your pantry. Demanding the same criteria for both is absurd.

 

[watsup]

If laws of logic are contingent, they could vary across worlds

I’m not sure what “worlds” you are speaking of, but even in this Earth world, logic remains ad hoc in that there is no given Ultimate Logic that I know of. Do you? Here is a quick AI statement: “Logic encompasses various types, including formal, informal, symbolic, and mathematical logic, each with unique approaches to reasoning, argument analysis, and inference.“
I suppose that there needs to be some preciseness in mathematical logic, but beyond that, it remains a work in progress, ad hoc.
Hmmm—perhaps I will start a different thread in this regard when I have the time.

 

[watsup]

I'm saying that if you're calling for empirical evidence for God's existence, you're making a category error since God's existence necessarily cannot be known through empirical means

And I’m saying that all that you are doing is presenting a definition rather than an absolute fact. Lots of others in this forum have done exactly the same. Simply defining a particular god as “cannot be known” is mostly just of excuse to avoid presenting evidence.

You wouldn't prove what you ate for lunch on this day 2 years ago in the same way you would prove whether or not there are crackers in your pantry. Demanding the same criteria for both is absurd.

Why would I want to prove what I ate for lunch two years ago? By evening, I can barely remember what I ate for lunch that very same day. Perhaps some people can perform that feat, which would simply be a by-product of “memory”, which is a result of the “thought” of biological brain, just as some people can “count cards” in their brain/thought in an attempt to beat the odds At Vegas.

 

[Gozaburo]

And I’m saying that all that you are doing is presenting a definition rather than an absolute fact. Lots of others in this forum have done exactly the same. Simply defining a particular god as “cannot be known” is mostly just of excuse to avoid presenting evidence.

The tension is in how we could claim facts are deduced - or put another way - how we determine confidence in a claim.

Why would I want to prove what I ate for lunch two years ago? By evening, I can barely remember what I ate for lunch that very same day. Perhaps some people can perform that feat, which would simply be a by-product of “memory”, which is a result of the “thought” of biological brain, just as some people can “count cards” in their brain/thought in an attempt to beat the odds At Vegas.

Lol. It's just a demonstration that not all evidences are gathered or presented in the same fashion and demanding that they are is incoherent.

 

[watsup]

It's just a demonstration that not all evidences are gathered or presented in the same fashion and demanding that they are is incoherent.

This is yet another strawman that has been used by most every agnostic, theist, or religionist that has ever entered this forum, the demand that atheists see themselves as pure empiricists. Still, there needs to be some way to independently verify evidence in some manner, which then dismisses the “witnessing” of most religionists or the purely philosophical claims of would-be theists.
As you know, I often compare atheism to science in the search for evidence, and science can certainly affirm the Big Bang without ever having seen it directly, of course. There are indeed numerous types of evidence, but none of them has affirmed the actuality of a God or gods.

 

[Mithrae]

#1 A≈A still presupposes a stable framework for approximation, which itself relies on logical universals. How does A≈A function without assuming some invariant logical structure?

By comparing and contrasting A to 'itself' (that is, the slightly different thing that it is from second to second and that each person differently perceives) and to other things. You may as well claim that we couldn't measure temperature unless we blindly assumed or until we discovered or an absolute zero, or that we suddenly stopped being able to determine positions in the early/mid 20th century once we realized that there is no absolute fixed point of reference.

#2 As I've outlined multiple times now, grounding means providing an ontological basis for why universals exist and apply universally.

No wonder your argument came across as incoherent. Firstly, your "universals" don't exist any more than Pythagoras' theorem or Middle Earth do, which is to say in our minds and literature, and until we find another intelligent species apparently nowhere else. Secondly, on looking back to see how I had missed this absurd claim that you supposedly outlined multiple times, it seems that you have rather consistently referred to epistemic grounding rather than ontological:

"I presented earlier in the thread why I believe contingent universals like the laws of logic cannot be epistemically grounded in themselves"

"You might say that epistemic justification doesn’t add additional utility to its pragmatic effect, but I’d argue the pragmatic use assumes its epistemic grounding in something reliable."

'If it can be demonstrated that there exists a possible Godless worldview which can provide a more coherent and consistent epistemic grounding for universals, then the argument is disproven."

"I didn't concede that grounding A=A epistemically is only a feature of reasoning"

"You continue to miss this and treat reason’s existence as a given that needs no deeper ground. You're arguing at the level of description, I'm arguing at the level of justification, which is prior to describing quality."

"Totally irrelevant unless you're trying to make a naturalist claim that the epistemic ground for knowledge is human brain matter."

"You're just storytelling about a state of cognition, not providing an epistemic ground for the claims and assertions you make."

"I'm not denying reasoning's useful. I'm saying that grounding truth in that utility is absurd, ad-hoc, and circular. I'm sure we'd both agree that humans do not always reason truths, so if we're talking about the epistemic value of grounding truth in a contingent (apparently fallible) biological story, how could it possibly serve as an epistemic justification?"

"You're assuming universal categories and making logical leaps to conclude 'facts' without a proper epistemic grounding, which is the entire point of my argument."

I've only kept assuming that couldn't be the full story because you kept erroneously claiming that the practical success attending our use of reason did not constitute valid 'grounding' (when on the contrary, between one or the other pragmatic justification is a more valid epistemic grounding than merely rational justification, and much more valid than simply inventing things!).

If you had been honest and clear from the beginning that your argument hinges on the opinion that the Law of Identity actually exists 'out there' somewhere and you're searching for an ontological basis for that rather far-fetched assumption, this would have been a much shorter discussion



I'd end it there, but I may as well include a little syllogism I thought of last night:

If laws of logic are contingent, they could vary across worlds, making reason unreliable or impossible in some. A necessary grounding ensures their invariance. Reason’s possibility requires intelligibility and if logic isn't grounded invariantly, why trust it in any world?

#3 So what grounds reason’s possibility across all worlds without invoking necessity? How do you account for logic’s reliability without invoking necessity?

1. If Mithrae does not exist, then Mithrae's forum posts are impossible
2. Since my forum posts do exist, they must be possible in all possible worlds (via S5’s axiom 5)
3. Therefore I must exist in all possible worlds - I am a necessary being

 

[Mithrae]

Still no God.

Of course not, it's merely a balance of probability, the best available theory.

 

[watsup]

Of course not, it's merely a balance of probability, the best available theory.

It’s binary. There either is a God or there isn’t. Probabilities have to do with actual realities, not figments of imagination, and theories must still have valid and credible evidence to support them.

 

[Gozaburo]

By comparing and contrasting A to 'itself' (that is, the slightly different thing that it is from second to second and that each person differently perceives) and to other things. You may as well claim that we couldn't measure temperature unless we blindly assumed or until we discovered or an absolute zero, or that we suddenly stopped being able to determine positions in the early/mid 20th century once we realized that there is no absolute fixed point of reference.

Alright, but temperature or position are contingent measurements; logic’s laws are what let you measure or argue at all. A≈A via ‘comparing and contrasting’ sounds nice, but without an invariant framework, why’s your comparison stable? If A can be ≈~A, reason’s incoherent - you’re assuming logic’s reliability to deny it.

No wonder your argument came across as incoherent. Firstly, your "universals" don't exist any more than Pythagoras' theorem or Middle Earth do, which is to say in our minds and literature, and until we find another intelligent species apparently nowhere else. Secondly, on looking back to see how I had missed this absurd claim that you supposedly outlined multiple times, it seems that you have rather consistently referred to epistemic grounding rather than ontological:

God grounds universals ontologically (why they exist, as His rational nature) and epistemically (why we grasp them, as His image). My ‘epistemic justification’ always pointed to ontology - brain matter can’t explain A=A’s invariance, but God can.

If universals don't exist, how are you even arguing coherently? Reason assumes non-contradiction holds beyond your mind and your own words rely on it. My entire argument is that universals aren't situationally pragmatic tools, they’re truths reason needs to work anywhere. To even say that they depend on the human mind assumes a universal concept of 'mind' which all minds possess, when you can't even know with a nominalist position. If universals are just human ideas, why do they hold universally?

1. If Mithrae does not exist, then Mithrae's forum posts are impossible
2. Since my forum posts do exist, they must be possible in all possible worlds (via S5’s axiom 5)
3. Therefore I must exist in all possible worlds - I am a necessary being

This immediately fails because you equivocate on 'possibility' and 'necessity'. I posit reason’s possibility (◊Y) as tied to universal, invariant truths (A=A), requiring a necessary ground (X). Your posts are contingent - dependent on forums, devices, and their own existence - not universal or necessary.

And more broadly a misuse of S5. Premise 1 wrongly leaps from your non-existence to posts’ impossibility without justifying why posts are necessarily possible across all worlds.

 

[Mithrae]

This immediately fails because you equivocate on 'possibility' and 'necessity'. I posit reason’s possibility (◊Y) as tied to universal, invariant truths (A=A), requiring a necessary ground (X). Your posts are contingent - dependent on forums, devices, and their own existence - not universal or necessary.

And more broadly a misuse of S5. Premise 1 wrongly leaps from your non-existence to posts’ impossibility without justifying why posts are necessarily possible across all worlds.

No. It's a valid argument following the same format as yours. It's unsound, but not for either of those reasons; if and when you work out why it's unsound you'll have found yet another reason (as if we needed any more) why yours doesn't work.

Or we could just conclude that I am a necessary being, I suppose

 

[quip]

The only real question then is whether you 'believe' there is a god(s), in which case you are a theist or believer or whether you don't, in which case you're an atheist. The term 'agnostic' is just some weird combination of intellectual laziness and cowardice.

Much ado over nothing. Agnosticism contends with knowledge regarding God's existence.....not belief.

 

[Mithrae]

It’s binary. There either is a God or there isn’t.

No-one's holding a gun to your head to say "yes" or "no" As I've noted again and again, that's just a relic of Christian binary thinking which many atheists have for some reason (more effective proselytizing?) chosen to adopt as their own dogma.

But if someone were to go around holding a gun to people's head, evidently the rational folk would say yes there is a god simply because that is where the balance of probabilities lie, with the most parsimonious and closest-to-observation theory of reality.

If "no onus, no evidence, no belief" atheists were consistent in their approach and rhetoric they would be adamant that reality must be based in some kind of cosmic mind/s and ridicule speculation to the contrary as being on par with Santa or the Tooth Fairy because, obviously, there is "no evidence" for non-conscious stuff at all. Kind of sad that the mere probability of theism is so threatening to them that they need to apply a special pleading standard against it

 

[watsup]

No-one's holding a gun to your head to say "yes" or "no" As I've noted again and again, that's just a relic of Christian binary thinking which many atheists have for some reason (more effective proselytizing?) chosen to adopt as their own dogma.

But if someone were to go around holding a gun to people's head, evidently the rational folk would say yes there is a god simply because that is where the balance of probabilities lie, with the most parsimonious and closest-to-observation theory of reality.

If "no onus, no evidence, no belief" atheists were consistent in their approach and rhetoric they would be adamant that reality must be based in some kind of cosmic mind/s and ridicule speculation to the contrary as being on par with Santa or the Tooth Fairy because, obviously, there is "no evidence" for non-conscious stuff at all. Kind of sad that the mere probability of theism is so threatening to them that they need to apply a special pleading standard against it

More gaslighting. Get back to me when you want to discuss the issue, per se, without the apparent need for constant generalized insult towards atheists.

 

[Michael Cole]

No-one's holding a gun to your head to say "yes" or "no" As I've noted again and again, that's just a relic of Christian binary thinking which many atheists have for some reason (more effective proselytizing?) chosen to adopt as their own dogma.

But if someone were to go around holding a gun to people's head, evidently the rational folk would say yes there is a god simply because that is where the balance of probabilities lie, with the most parsimonious and closest-to-observation theory of reality.

If "no onus, no evidence, no belief" atheists were consistent in their approach and rhetoric they would be adamant that reality must be based in some kind of cosmic mind/s and ridicule speculation to the contrary as being on par with Santa or the Tooth Fairy because, obviously, there is "no evidence" for non-conscious stuff at all. Kind of sad that the mere probability of theism is so threatening to them that they need to apply a special pleading standard against it

The balance of probability that a human can describe an unknowable being to another human is zero. Same probability that my dog can explain humans to the cats.

Without knowing what "god" is, it can never be proven. Gun to your head, magic tricks, loaves and fishes, doesn't matter. Unless you have an example of this god, it cannot be known whether any performance by any being is indeed from the almighty.

 

[Hawkins]

More often, humans don't know what they are doing! You need a rather long history to speculate about what it really is. The Chinese history has the so-called Canonical history and non-canonical history (unverified by an authority which is usually the government). That's the nature of how history is conveyed, and what drives a canonization. What humans don't know is, the exclusive and legitimate way of conveying long history. Here the Church represents the authority, so you may call it <whatever> if it's deemed unverified by the Church! That's what it is.

Isaiah 6:9
Be ever hearing, but never understanding; be ever seeing, but never perceiving.