Absolute Objective Moral Truths

[Spartacus FPV]

This does nothing to show that values can be deduced purely from facts.

Are you honestly suggesting that one's values cannot be deduced from facts?

Please tell me how one makes a valuation without facts. To even judge a thing is to accept that it in fact exists; Facts are necessary.

This is my only argument. The assertion was that Rand proved Hume wrong.

Rand proved Hume wrong about what?

Is a seed to be planted in soil in order to grow—right or wrong? Is a man's wound to be disinfected in order to save his life—right or wrong?

I believe that it is quite clear that Rand didn't even understand the argument she was attacking.

Which argument? Are you making the oh-so common mistake in confusing disagreement with a failure to understand?

She misunderstood Hume, made a fallacious argument, and then declared victory over a strawman.

What fallacy did she commit? What was the straw man and what was her intended target? And why are Rand or Hume relevant to this debate at all?

 

[J.Anderson]

Are you honestly suggesting that one's values cannot be deduced from facts? Please tell me how one makes a valuation without facts. To even judge a thing is to accept that it in fact exists; Facts are necessary.

Not merely suggesting, I'm asserting that it's obvious. This is not the same as saying that facts cannot be used to bolster moral evaluations. It is merely stating that a value cannot be derived from facts alone. Again, this is not saying (as you seem to believe) that facts should not be used in moral evaluations.

Rand proved Hume wrong about what?

Rand claimed that she solved the is/ought problem.

Is a seed to be planted in soil in order to grow—right or wrong? Is a man's wound to be disinfected in order to save his life—right or wrong?

Not sure what you're trying to say. It depends on your goal. If your desire (value) is to grow a vegetable, then it would follow that one ought to plant a seed. If your desire is to save a man's life, then you ought to treat his wound.

Which argument? Are you making the oh-so common mistake in confusing disagreement with a failure to understand?

The is/ought problem. She seemed to believe that Hume was arguing that there could be no relation at all between facts and values. Hume argued no such thing.

What fallacy did she commit?

Begging the question.

What was the straw man and what was her intended target?

She misunderstood and misstated the is/ought problem. This was also her target.

And why are Rand or Hume relevant to this debate at all?

I'm not sure Rand is relevant. Hume, however, is one of the most significant individuals in the history of moral philosophy.

 

[Mach]

That doesn't follow at all
Just because we obviously cannot deduce values from facts does not mean that we must deduce them from non-facts.

No. Here is the logic:
P1. Values can be deduced
P2. Values cannot be deduced from facts.
Therefore-> Values can be deduced from not-facts.
So, you're stuck with what logic, I'm afraid.

You can accept the error, and change your claim to "values cannot be deduced", but then that's a new argument. OK, but we have to accept Hume's failure first.

There is no reason why they must be correctly deducible at all.

Strawman. Correctly deducible is irrelevant.
Can be deduced
Cannot be deduced.
An attempt to use "correctness" as an escape hatch doesn't work, because "can be deduced" does not imply 100% accuracy on each attempt made by a human to know it, so the logic remains as it is. As an FYI, all facts of reality are not 100% correctly deducible each attempt, if they were we'd be omniscient...(why we use science, evidence, experiments..to get as close as we can, as often as we can).

Hume contends that values are not derived from reason, but are merely feelings, tastes, and desires.

How does this refute the logic I posted? It doesn't.

Hume is wrong on this one as well.
What is a taste? Taste must, at root, represent a fact of reality.
Right there Hume wrote, "values are not derived from reason, but from facts".
Again, read the definition of fact. Look, back in the day people thought emotions/senses were magical, inexplicable. That's fine, we have new shoulders to stand on now. We don't do a disservice by showing them wrong, we in fact, carry the torch.

Let me give an example. I like to listen to Beethoven. But nobody would pretend that we could deduce that I ought to listen to Beethoven, or to something else.

You're tricking yourself though (and have good company doing it).
Just because you don't have the knowledge to deduce it, doesn't mean it cannot be deduced, so the logic still stands.

This obviously does not mean that my desire and taste is "not the case". Similarly, I think that you ought to like Beethoven also, but that doesn't mean that it must necessarily be an absolute deducible truth that you ought to like Beethoven.

No, it's like a puzzle.
Take a puzzle piece, one other piece fits, it's a fact one fits to the other, we can get our mind around that, and accept it, right?

Now imagine a puzzle with more pieces and combinations than we could solve in 1000 years, and that actually changed each second.... Yes, to us, it certainly seems crazy to assume you can find the other piece, yet you can. But that's if I tried to discover what atoms in your brain lead to the value.
When really, I can probably learn the answer just by observing you or asking you (your body/reality does the puzzle for us, it's what it does).

And, it just so happens, people can, with some degree of accuracy, tell you at any given time, what they DO, and DO NOT, like. Also, their behavior often indicates it. In all cases, the identifying facts of reality is science, and is falsifiable...so certainty is irrelevant.

The complexity of the human brain, and reality in general, does trick us all, every day, into all sorts of bad premises. But we're catching on to it.

 

[J.Anderson]

No. Here is the logic:
P1. Values can be deduced
P2. Values cannot be deduced from facts.
Therefore-> Values can be deduced from not-facts.
So, you're stuck with what logic, I'm afraid.

You can accept the error, and change your claim to "values cannot be deduced", but then that's a new argument. OK, but we have to accept Hume's failure first.

Strawman. I never assumed nor stated your first premise (neither did Hume). How can I be stuck with something I never supposed, nor supported? However, there is no reason why we cannot deduce values from values (you can even call those "non-facts" if you wish). I was merely pointing out a flaw in your argument. We simply cannot deduce values purely from facts.

Strawman. Correctly deducible is irrelevant.
Can be deduced
Cannot be deduced.
An attempt to use "correctness" as an escape hatch doesn't work, because "can be deduced" does not imply 100% accuracy on each attempt made by a human to know it, so the logic remains as it is. As an FYI, all facts of reality are not 100% correctly deducible each attempt, if they were we'd be omniscient...(why we use science, evidence, experiments..to get as close as we can, as often as we can).

There is sound and unsound deduction. My statement was that values cannot be deduced merely from facts without presupposing values in the premises. You have yet to refute or even challenge this.

How does this refute the logic I posted? It doesn't.

Hume is wrong on this one as well.
What is a taste? Taste must, at root, represent a fact of reality.
Right there Hume wrote, "values are not derived from reason, but from facts".
Again, read the definition of fact. Look, back in the day people thought emotions/senses were magical, inexplicable. That's fine, we have new shoulders to stand on now. We don't do a disservice by showing them wrong, we in fact, carry the torch.

You're getting confused by the philosophical terminology. Let me restate in a way you might fully understand. One cannot derive moral evaluations from purely non-moral premises without presupposing or inserting a moral premise.

You're tricking yourself though (and have good company doing it).
Just because you don't have the knowledge to deduce it, doesn't mean it cannot be deduced, so the logic still stands.

Are you suggesting that taste in music, clothing, colors, and so forth are representative of absolute truths? So, there is a "right or wrong" when it comes to taste in music, fashion, and so forth?

 

[Mach]

Strawman. I never assumed nor stated your first premise (neither did Hume). How can I be stuck with something I never supposed, nor supported? However, there is no reason why we cannot deduce values from values (you can even call those "non-facts" if you wish). I was merely pointing out a flaw in your argument. We simply cannot deduce values purely from facts.

Glad you are in agreement now.
Your claims summarized:
C1: J.A. = Values cannot be derived from facts. (original claim)
C2: J.A. = Values can be derived from non-facts (logically follows, and accepted above)

My statement was that values cannot be deduced merely from facts without presupposing values in the premises. You have yet to refute or even challenge this.

I've reduced it to absurdity, I have refuted it, and challenged it. This is the refutation (again)
>C3: An "ought" CAN be deduced/induced from things that have not really occurred, or are not the case.
(logical equivalent to C2, definition of fact)

You think values cannot be derived from things that have really happened or are the case.
You DO think values can be derived from things that are NOT the case, and have NOT really happened.

Really I can just leave it at that. It's an absurd position.
Here are some examples of Mach deriving values from non-facts:
1. killing is good because the grim reaper told me so
2. cheating is good because a magical fairy told me so, after all, when you're small you need all the tools at your disposal.

No ambiguity, each step is clearly written out, I really don't understand why you're not accepting it.

One cannot derive moral evaluations from purely non-moral premises without presupposing or inserting a moral premise.

We already have your claim above, C1, C2, C3. You claim I'm confused, I claim you're confused, so let's drop it that accusations.
If you can show the error in the logic, or that the absurdity is actually sensible...please do. If you want to forfeit, and take up a new set of claims that are logically distinct, OK, you let me know.

Are you suggesting that taste in music, clothing, colors, and so forth are representative of absolute truths? So, there is a "right or wrong" when it comes to taste in music, fashion, and so forth?

Of course, what else would be the case? Try it, you'll like it.
1. Mikey likes the taste of Life cereal.
2. Bobby claims that that Mikey DOES NOT like Life cereal.
3. Bobby is incorrect. The truth is that Mikey DOES like Life Cereal.
There is, in fact, a absolute truth on the matter, represented by the facts of reality that make up Mikey's brain and the yummy cereal colliding.
It's not like this is esoteric stuff we're dealing with, can you just accept that poor little Mikey likes his cereal?

 

[J.Anderson]

You think values cannot be derived from [facts].

Not purely. For instance:

It is against the law to murder human beings.
Socrates is a human being.
Therefore, one ought not to murder Socrates.

Premise 1&2 are facts, and the prescription does not follow without presupposing that one ought to obey the law. So, one cannot derive values purely from facts without presupposing a value. It is, in fact, trivially obvious.

Of course, what else would be the case? Try it, you'll like it.
1. Mikey likes the taste of Life cereal.
2. Bobby claims that that Mikey DOES NOT like Life cereal.
3. Bobby is incorrect. The truth is that Mikey DOES like Life Cereal.
There is, in fact, a absolute truth on the matter, represented by the facts of reality that make up Mikey's brain and the yummy cereal colliding.
It's not like this is esoteric stuff we're dealing with, can you just accept that poor little Mikey likes his cereal?

So, it is wrong for Mikey not to eat Life cereal, given that he likes it? What if Mikey likes eating rat poison?

 

[J.Anderson]

Also, I'm not saying that Mikey does not like Life cereal. I'm saying that his liking of Life cereal is not "right" or "wrong", unless another value is added. So,

1.Mikey likes eating rat poison.
2.Eating rat poison will probably kill Mikey.
3.Therefore, Mikey should not eat rat poison.

This does not follow unless one presupposes that Mikey ought not do something that might kill him. However,

1.Mikey likes eating rat poison.
2.Eating rat poison will probably kill Mikey.
3.Mikey ought not do something that might kill him.
4.Therefore, Mikey ought not eat rat poison.

This would be valid, but it is not deriving a value purely from facts.

Also,

1.Mikey likes Life cereal.
2.Therefore, it is right for Mikey to eat Life cereal.

This obviously doesn't follow, unless we assume that Mikey ought always to do what he likes.

 

[Mach]

What about the original claims? Do you accept the rejection of them or what?

Not purely. For instance:
It is against the law to murder human beings.
Socrates is a human being.
Therefore, one ought not to murder Socrates.
Premise 1&2 are facts, and the prescription does not follow without presupposing that one ought to obey the law. So, one cannot derive values purely from facts without presupposing a value. It is, in fact, trivially obvious.

All that I get from that is that your conclusion doesn't follow your premises. It doesn't imply anything else.

So, it is wrong for Mikey not to eat Life cereal, given that he likes it? What if Mikey likes eating rat poison?

I have no idea, we'd need to ask Mikey.

 

[Mach]

Also, I'm not saying that Mikey does not like Life cereal. I'm saying that his liking of Life cereal is not "right" or "wrong", unless another value is added.

Is it common to call likes/dislikes based on our taste buds, right or wrong? I doubt it, for good reason. It's just a fact of reality how we're wired up, if we get pleasure from food X or Y, etc.
And yes, that can be shown in a lab, if we respond positively or negatively to something, probably even on brain scans nowadays.

-Mach

 

[J.Anderson]

What about the original claims? Do you accept the rejection of them or what?

No. Quite frankly, it's very difficult to tell what you're on about. You may call values "non-facts" if you wish, but I reject the idea that values are the opposite of facts. You seem to believe that if values cannot be deduced purely from facts, that they must necessarily be deducible from the opposite of facts. But this is a mistake on your part, and it is not anything I have ever claimed. I suggest you read up on the fact/value distinction.

Can you give me an example of how one can correctly deduce a value purely from facts without presupposing or inserting a value into the premises? It really should be trivially obvious that this is impossible.

On tastes and opinions about art, food, and so forth:

Somehow you seem not to have understood my point. Moral values, like taste in music and food, cannot be derived purely from facts. If we accept Hume's assertion that reason is only concerned with facts—truth or falsehood—then we must conclude that reason alone cannot prescribe what one ought to do. Sentiment, emotion, feelings, desires, and whims must play a part in determining values.

 

[Mach]

I don't believe you've made any progress in communicating anything interesting about your, and Hume's, understanding of morals.

You may call values "non-facts" if you wish, but I reject the idea that values are the opposite of facts

J.A. quote "[values] cannot be derived from facts"
J.A. quote "Hume rejects that values are facts"
That's just one example of what seems to be avoidance of direct answers.

So, to ensure Hume can't wiggle out of wisdom, I'm moving to multiple choice format:

Questions:
1. Are these values that you claim to know about = facts.
Yes, No, you don't know.
If yes, they are facts.
If no, they are not facts.
If you don't know, we cant' continue.

2. Did Hume believe values were facts? You say no earlier, just confirming.
Yes, No, you don't know.

3. Can values be derived at all? You imply yes, then claim maybe no, so which is it?
Yes, No, you don't know.

4. What is the origin of a value, relative to the universe? Is it matter, energy, is it a product of the brain, or just magical? How do we arrive at them, as humans?

 

[Mach]

If we accept Hume's assertion that reason is only concerned with facts—truth or falsehood—then we must conclude that reason alone cannot prescribe what one ought to do.

Sentiment, emotion, feelings, desires, and whims must play a part in determining values.

Sentiment, emtion, feelings, desires, are all discrenable as true, or false, however. They present themselves as facts of reality. What else would they be? Hume rejected this according to you...yet he's wrong.

So if reason is concerned with facts, reason is concerend also with emotions, feelings, etc., by definition.

Anyone knows that if my feeling is negative when my hand is burned, i.e. I naturally, through no choice of my own, do not as default want my hand burned, that this is at root, a fact of reality. There is some, thankfully, wiring in my brain that has sense to pull back/avoid my body being burned. It can be tested, as all of reality can be. It can be measured, causal factors can be determined, etc., like all of reality. It has origins in the matter/energy in my brain, i.e. is real, like everything in reailty (real, reality, no coincidence).

So to attempt to pull reason, which concerns all of reality, distinct from emtions, which are certainly within reality, is fallacy.

What do you think truth is? It's correspondance with reality.
Bob is angry. Either it does, or does not correspond with reality. And if so, it's true.

-Mach

 

[J.Anderson]

Sentiment, emtion, feelings, desires, are all discrenable as true, or false, however. They present themselves as facts of reality. What else would they be? Hume rejected this according to you...yet he's wrong.

We can know for a fact that someone is experiencing the event we call "sentiment, emotion, feeling" and so forth. But it's folly to believe that we can "know" that the opinions derived from such things are "facts". For instance, it is simply a fact that a lunatic might experience an event—a feeling—that he is Napoleon. But it's not a fact that he is Napoleon. This seems to be the root of your confusion. In short, it's a "fact of reality" that people experience these events, but it's folly to confuse that with proving the correctness of the value.

So to attempt to pull reason, which concerns all of reality, distinct from emtions, which are certainly within reality, is fallacy.

Hume says that reason is a "slave to the passions". We use reason to achieve our goals and desires, which cannot be formed by reason alone.

1. Are these values that you claim to know about = facts.

It's a fact that I have values. Values are not the same as facts, however.

Did Hume believe values were facts? You say no earlier, just confirming.

Uh, no. That's the entire point of the is/ought distinction.

Can values be derived at all? You imply yes, then claim maybe no, so which is it?

It is possible, within a presupposed framework, to logically derive values. Science has similar irreducible starting points and assumptions. The main point is that values cannot be derived purely from facts.

What is the origin of a value, relative to the universe? Is it matter, energy, is it a product of the brain, or just magical? How do we arrive at them, as humans?

A complicated question, and one which would require a very long and thoughtful response.

 

[Mach]

We can know for a fact that someone is experiencing the event we call "sentiment, emotion, feeling" and so forth. But it's folly to believe that we can "know" that the opinions derived from such things are "facts".

What are these "derived opinons" you've introduced? I can't seem to get you to go logically step by step. So I'll skip ahead with you, because I know where it all leads anyway (from practice, not from prescience).

Humans do have real likes/dislikes, factually. We use evidence, observation, logic, (and then some), to differentiate true (is the case), vs. false (is not the case). Values, if based on reality, are no exception.

Example: Two facts of reality that we're going to call values:
Bob likes the taste of grapes.
Bob doesn't like people taking things he has purchased.

Nothing questionable here.

You want, I assume, to go on to "derive new rules" from those facts, into rules like:
Grapes are good (in principle)
Theft is bad (in principle)
Right? And then claim it's folly to assume they are facts. Well, that’s' true. It is folly, but that's because they are not values, by definition, nor was the "method of derivation" a reasoned one. They are not facts, and by extension, not values. (values are actually facts). You want to hold them as examples of "values", then go on to make claims about these values. You can't, this value is contradictory to what we already established as a value!!

"In principle" means, without being relative to the individual.
Well, no, values are specifically defined in this case as:
The like or dislike <X> relative to person <Y>.

When someone says "in principle", with respect to reality, it's not very useful, because what they mean is it's no longer falsifiable.
Grapes are good - relative to no one? (in principle) That is contradictory. And when someone doesn't make sense, they don't make sense.

For instance, it is simply a fact that a lunatic might experience an event—a feeling—that he is Napoleon. But it's not a fact that he is Napoleon. This seems to be the root of your confusion. In short, it's a "fact of reality" that people experience these events, but it's folly to confuse that with proving the correctness of the value.

Since when is "thinking you're Napolean", a value? Really?
Anyway, to short circuit this:
I believe I am Napolean.
I believe I like grapes.
It is either a fact, or not, that I am Napolean, and a fact, or not, that I like grapes. Both can be evaluated using reason (science) to determine if they are true, or false. Ironically you think the concept of "proof" is relevant here, but you reject it in the other thread. The other-you is correct.

1. Are these values that you claim to know about = facts.
It's a fact that I have values. Values are not the same as facts, however.

So, J.A. claims a value is NOT a fact.
But we know this is contradictory.
If I like grapes, it's a fact that I like grapes. How can you and Hume deny that? Really, you specifically claimed you deny it? Why? It's like denying the sun in the sky. Probably because in your mind you're doing that "derivation to an in-principle rule that grapes are good". Which is your mistake, not the fault of values.

It is possible, within a presupposed framework, to logically derive values. Science has similar irreducible starting points and assumptions. The main point is that values cannot be derived purely from facts.

Values ARE facts.
Bob dislikes theft?
Either it is, or is not, a fact. If it's a fact, then it's his value. It's trivial.

For you or anyone to claim "<X> is bad to all people, in all cases, despite any evidence to the contrary" is not a value at all. It's unreasoned dogma.

 

[J.Anderson]

I don't deny that it could be a fact that Bob likes grapes. I said that we cannot go purely from facts to values. For instance:

Bob likes grapes.
Therefore, grapes are good.

That presupposes that whatever Bob likes is good. So we are not actually moving directly from facts to values. The same goes for theft.

Bob doesn't like people taking things he has purchased.
Therefore, theft is bad.

This presupposes that whatever Bob doesn't like is bad. Again, we are not moving simply from facts to values, because we are presupposing a value.

 

[J.Anderson]

It should also be pointed out that the line of reasoning that you seem to believe is valid would lead to absurd conclusions and extreme moral relativism. For example:

Hitler dislikes Jews.
Therefore, Jews are bad.

But this is just as invalid as the idea that grapes are good because Bob likes them; it presupposes that whatever Hitler doesn't like is bad. The argument you have presented (and oddly insisted was a refutation) is simply begging the question: a logical fallacy.

 

[Mach]

I don't deny that it could be a fact that Bob likes grapes. I said that we cannot go purely from facts to values. For instance:
Bob likes grapes.
Therefore, grapes are good.

I covered all this.

Bob likes grapes - a fact you accept.
Grapes are good, to Bob - logically implied.
--> then onto the bad claim:
Grapes are good for all people, at all times --> that's absurd.

Anyone claiming that is "true" or "false" is just making an un-reasoned claim. It's not a value, it's complete B.S. It's like saying "red is actually the sun, and nothing anyone can say changes this fact". It's got nothing to do with reality.

That presupposes that whatever Bob likes is good.

No, it contradicts the definition of a value. Your mistake.
Values are likes/dislikes [X], relative to person [Y]
They are facts, based on reality.

The assertion: "Grapes are good"

Is relative to no one, it's not a value, don't let Hume fool you into thinking it is, clealry it's missing the required relative person [Y].

In common language if you told me "grapes are good", my interpretation would be that you implied:
J.A. likes grapes.
J.A. thinks it's LIKELY that I would like grapes too, if I tried them.
(but if I didn't, J.A. would say J.A thinks they are good, Mach does NOT)

That's fundamentally different than the absurd claim:

Grapes are necessarily good, for all entities, in principle.
Which makes no sense at all, it's just dogmatic jaw flapping.

See the difference?

 

[Mach]

It
Hitler dislikes Jews.

Therefore Hitler dislikes Jews.

That's all one takes away from this statement.

Therefore, Jews are bad.

Therefore? That's nonsense. Try it with any other fact of reality and you know it's pure bunk.

1. My apple is red.
Therefore all apples are red?
complete nonsense.

2. My chair has four legs.
Therefore all chairs have four legs?
Stupid.

3. I like danger.
Therefore everyone likes danger?
Just stop!

 

[J.Anderson]

Bob likes grapes - a fact you accept.
Grapes are good, to Bob - logically implied.

There are several ways to interpret this, neither of which shows that values can be derived from facts. The first way would be redundant; you would simply be saying "Bob likes grapes; Therefore, Bob likes grapes." The other way would to say that whatever Bob likes is actually good for him absolutely which would be invalid, because you are still presupposing that whatever Bob likes is actually "good" for him, which is begging the question.

Your current position is extreme moral relativism, saying that values can only be whatever the individual likes or dislikes—not an actual property of an external object, action, or statement—which is a different discussion.

You have failed to solve Hume's Law, and I believe that you still don't even understand it. You're getting caught up in your own definitions of fact and value, and thus you are confusing yourself with semantics. Think of it this way:

It is not possible to derive prescriptive statements purely from descriptive statements. That is to say, it is impossible to derive what one ought to do purely from statements about what is the case.

Another way of putting it is that it is not possible to derive moral statements from non-moral statements.

I sincerely hope that consideration of these clarifications will lead to some level of understanding on your part.

 

[nkgupta80]

you mention semantics, and reading this discussion, a lot of it does boil does down to semantics. The thing about language is that in many cases it is hard and vague to extract the actual meaning from the words being used.

In the case of Bob likes grapes. To Bob, grapes are good. You pointed out this problem exactly. What kind of good are you referring to?


One general thing I never understand is the use of the term rational and "being rational". Being rational ultimately means you relegate yourself to a certain set of axioms from which you follow logically. Therefore, any problem a rational being faces, he/she would solve through logic based on these axioms.

My problem is that these axioms are not well-defined and often differ from person to person. Objectivism, for example, says to have found a core set of axioms. I claim that those axioms cannot produce an all-inclusive framework that can rationally explain everything. (I don't think any set could do that without some contradiction).

In classical economics, a key assumption made for all models are that individuals are rational. Of course rationality has to be defined, and in this case it could be utility maximization. Of course utility has to be defined, so in many basic models, utility maximization is equated to profit maximization.
Does that mean that in reality, someone who does not maximize profit is not rational? Based on this definition yes, but based on any other definition, no. A Buddhist monk could claim that these profit-maximizers are ultimately going to lead themselves to an endless cycle of suffering -- true happiness is attained by balance. An artist could say that I will pursue my art for the sake of art itself (by basic economic rationality he/she would be considered irrational).

Point is that all these words have a certain vagueness that becomes extremely important when discussing basic philosophical issues. In finding absolute moral truths, this problem of accuracy arises again and again.

 

[Mach]

There are several ways to interpret this, neither of which shows that values can be derived from facts.

Values ARE facts, you have missed this?
"I do not like theft."
1. Is this a fact?
2. Is this a value?

The first way would be redundant; you would simply be saying "Bob likes grapes; Therefore, Bob likes grapes."

Why be redundant? Just make the claim:
Bob likes grapes.
End of discussion. Only fools try to turn it into something it is not.

The other way would to say that whatever Bob likes is actually good for him absolutely which would be invalid, because you are still presupposing that whatever Bob likes is actually "good" for him, which is begging the question.

I'm not presupposing anything, we're simply stating:
Bob likes grapes.
The value IS A FACT OF REALITY.
Are you saying once you move to the term "good" you don't know what's invovled? Then let's define good, to make some sense. But if we can't get past the fact that Bob likes grapes, is a fact, we can't proceed.

You have failed to solve Hume's Law, and I believe that you still don't even understand it. You're getting caught up in your own definitions of fact and value, and thus you are confusing yourself with semantics. Think of it this way:

The law is nonsense, but that's irrelevant. We're debating, and are entirely capable of identifying truth and falsity.

It is not possible to derive prescriptive statements purely from descriptive statements. That is to say, it is impossible to derive what one ought to do purely from statements about what is the case.

Where did this "ought" come from? Magic?

Another way of putting it is that it is not possible to derive moral statements from non-moral statements.

What's a moral statement? Oh I know what you think one is, and what I know one to be, but I'd certainly like to see you write it so we can you know...analyze it.

I sincerely hope that consideration of these clarifications will lead to some level of understanding on your part.

Likewise, ad infinitum.

 

[J.Anderson]

Values ARE facts, you have missed this?
"I do not like theft."
1. Is this a fact?
2. Is this a value?

You may call it a value if you wish, but it's not the way I was using the term. I attempted to clarify what I mean when I use the term "values" but you appear not to have understood. You are still confusing the fact that people have values with the idea that values cannot logically be derived purely from facts.

Why be redundant? Just make the claim:
Bob likes grapes.
End of discussion. Only fools try to turn it into something it is not.

You made the redundancy, and I was merely calling you on it. You said "Bob likes grapes, therefore grapes are good to Bob." I agree that only a fool would try to turn this into something it is not.

I'm not presupposing anything, we're simply stating:
Bob likes grapes.
The value IS A FACT OF REALITY.
Are you saying once you move to the term "good" you don't know what's invovled? Then let's define good, to make some sense. But if we can't get past the fact that Bob likes grapes, is a fact, we can't proceed.

You are calling that a value, but that's not the sense in which I am using the term. I am using the term value in the sense of a goal, end, prescription, or an ought-statement. Thus, your argument is simply a strawman as it does not address my point.

The law is nonsense, but that's irrelevant.

It seems like nonsense to you because you still don't understand it. This is entirely your fault, because you continue to confuse yourself.

Where did this "ought" come from? Magic?

Facts alone cannot logically give us an ought-based statement. It requires input from our sentiments, desires, feelings, and emotions.

What's a moral statement? Oh I know what you think one is, and what I know one to be, but I'd certainly like to see you write it so we can you know...analyze it.

You have consistently failed to present a logical series to prove your points, even when I have urged you to do so. Your only attempt so far was "Bob likes grapes; therefore grapes are good to Bob", which is either invalid by itself, or redundant. However, examine:

It is illegal in the U.S. to murder human beings;
You live in the United States;
Therefore, you ought not to murder human beings in the United States.

This doesn't follow unless we presuppose another ought: that one ought to follow the law.

 

[nkgupta80]

Why be redundant? Just make the claim:
Bob likes grapes.
End of discussion. Only fools try to turn it into something it is not.



I'm not presupposing anything, we're simply stating:
Bob likes grapes.
The value IS A FACT OF REALITY.
Are you saying once you move to the term "good" you don't know what's invovled? Then let's define good, to make some sense. But if we can't get past the fact that Bob likes grapes, is a fact, we can't proceed.

The law is nonsense, but that's irrelevant. We're debating, and are entirely capable of identifying truth and falsity.

Where did this "ought" come from? Magic?

What's a moral statement? Oh I know what you think one is, and what I know one to be, but I'd certainly like to see you write it so we can you know...analyze it.

Likewise, ad infinitum.

Well the argument should not be about whether a value statement is a fact or not (it obviously is because Bob made the statement, so its existence is a fact), but the point is to extract the right meaning from this value statement. And whatever meaning is extracted is often subject to debate and clarification.

Bob could mean that he likes how grapes look but not how they taste, or he likes only sour grapes, or he likes only green grapes (having never seen purple grapes).

Although in the case of grapes it may seem a little bogus, In assessing value statements that form the basis of morality, this extraction of meaning becomes quite complicated...hence the endless discussions and arguments.

For example, I could say that I don't like killing, but then acting on this value statement would require me to clarify the meaning behind it. Does that mean I would not like killing animals or just humans? Maybe I just don't like seeing the act of killing, but don't mind it as long as I don't witness it.

My question is that if objective moral statements exist, tell me how they are found, and what makes them rational.

I believe anything rational should be labeled as such as relation to some basic assumption. Thou shall not kill is rational based upon the assumption of God, or on the assumption of natural rights to life, or a human's natural emotional aversion to the act of killing, or something.

If someone does not agree with one of those assumptions, and thus breaks the "Thou shall not kill" rule, then that person is not necessarily irrational.

 

[Mach]

Well the argument should not be about whether a value statement is a fact or not (it obviously is because Bob made the statement, so its existence is a fact), but the point is to extract the right meaning from this value statement.

To J.A.? You're incorrect. At the core of J.A./Hume's claim was that values were NOT facts.
Showing that clearly they are facts, demonstrates his claim as False.
You apparently don't have the same claim however, so for you, maybe it's irrelevant. I'm more than happy to address both simultaneously. See my point?

And whatever meaning is extracted is often subject to debate and clarification.

One can start from the bottom and work up, or start at the end and work backwards.
In my experience starting at the bottom holds the most likely success, it's clear and gets to the root cause first.
Starting at the end, often just grows larger, and ends up running in circles. If I think the person is up to speed, I may start at the end, because it may save time.
Really, it entirely depends on the person, and what we deem will be most successful, or efficient, approach. in most cases, nothing works...you don't perseuade people to be reasonable every time, or even most of the time.

Bob could mean that he likes how grapes look but not how they taste, or he likes only sour grapes, or he likes only green grapes (having never seen purple grapes).

Irrelevant, because each of these has the same logical form.
Bob likes grapes [appearance] (proper english ignored for clarity)
Bob likes [sour] grapes [taste]
Bob likes [green] grapes.
All the same form, none of this changes the root discussion. All facts of reality still. You can use logical substitution to repace these with any of the infinite variations one can imagine.
Point being, if we want to know what Bob likes, we consult....Bob, or observe him. And, if they correspond with reality, they are facts (contradicts Hume, which J.A. argued, so relevant to him...most certainly).

Although in the case of grapes it may seem a little bogus, In assessing value statements that form the basis of morality, this extraction of meaning becomes quite complicated...hence the endless discussions and arguments.

Have you debated philosphy much? Because the people that are typically capable of being honest and clear, already know the answer, and don't disagree, and dont' get tripped up with semantics, or underlying premises, or ego/denial of having made a mistake. Those that do have some false beliefs, are the ones that you end up debating with (if your'e one of the former). So, more often than not it ends it forfeit, or circles (i.e. denial).

I submit that nothing being disucussed is all that complicated, if one is clear. Logic is simply A, not A, and some really basic rules of how to operate. Step by step, it's easier than putting butter on toast.

And notice that the word "taste", comes verbatim from one of J.A.s posts about what a value is. Now, do you think I was wise to take something so obviously factual and simple as "taste" as opposed to trying to jump into the semantic mess of the concept "good"?
I think it was the correct choice to use the simple "taste", because that's obviously the clearest, and sufficies to show his claim is false. now you know why "taste" was used.
You, instead, may reject his claim, and want to go and discuss the concept of "good.". Then OK, start wherever you like, I'm ready.

For example, I could say that I don't like killing, but then acting on this value statement would require me to clarify the meaning behind it. Does that mean I would not like killing animals or just humans? Maybe I just don't like seeing the act of killing, but don't mind it as long as I don't witness it.

You're just proving my point. What specifically you like or dislike is irrevalnt. That you have likes and dislikes, and can discover them, and relay them via language, is all we're discussing.
In other words, if you saud you don't like killing, only a fool would assume that means in principle, "killing is bad". As you write, correctly we would consult the person the value is relative to, to attempt to discover what exactly it is they mean (i.e. identify the fact).

If Hume had 3 logical errors in his claim, and I demonstarted any one to be the case, the claim is false. You may want to dig into all thre at the same time, but I'd like to choose the most efficient route, the lowest hanging fruit, as false. See the reasoning behind it?

My question is that if objective moral statements exist, tell me how they are found, and what makes them rational.

In the same way most of reality is discovered. You observe/experience them.
Have you had a loved one die? Praytell how you found out about your feelings on the issue of death of someone you cared about.
Did you go research it? Consult a diety? You FREAKING EXPERIENCED IT. It HURT, it consumed your thoughts, it stayed with you for weeks, months, perhaps years.
How is this mysterious? did you do some axiomatic math to find it? No, you observed it first hand (experience). Did you ask Hume? You get the point....

If you accept new evidence/observation, it's reasoned (and can be false or true). If you don't accept new evidence/observation, the position that it's "true", is not reasonable.

I believe anything rational should be labeled as such as relation to some basic assumption. Thou shall not kill is rational based upon the assumption of God, or on the assumption of natural rights to life, or a human's natural emotional aversion to the act of killing, or something.

See, the first part is correct. Values are relative to the indivudal that holds the value, by definition.
Then to go on and say god an be one such example of an individual that holds likes/dislikes, is entirely, demonstrably, illogical/unreasonable.
it would be like me saying:
Grapes are good. Based on the assumption that the doorknob declared it. !?! What?
No, you say, Bob believes grapes are good. It's relative not to a human. Kind of like you and I. Introducing God, to a simple discussion of morals/values, opens up a lot of other problems. If you intended to do that...odd. Ideally you can address god as illogical, in another thread, or at least distinct from this issue.

If someone does not agree with one of those assumptions, and thus breaks the "Thou shall not kill" rule, then that person is not necessarily irrational.

Irrational is being used as either/or "illogical", or "unreasonable". Both of which are easily defineable.
Breaking a rule is breaking a rule, it has nothing to do with logic or reason per se. Why they broke it, can be analyed as rational or irrational...based on their premises/beliefs.

I can reduce future posts to be a lot more brief.

 

[Mach]

You may call it a value if you wish, but it's not the way I was using the term.

WRONG.

Hume contends that values are not derived from reason, but are merely feelings, tastes, and desires.

If you can't be honest here, given the black and white, what do you expect me to do? I can't debate with you if you can't remember what it is you claimed. I'm showing you, here it is, read it.

I attempted to clarify what I mean when I use the term "values" but you appear not to have understood. You are still confusing the fact that people have values with the idea that values cannot logically be derived purely from facts.

You don't get it.

You were defending Hume as correct.
Now, to think values are something other than "merely taste.." (as you are trying to do above), means you reject Hume, based on your declaration to us what Hume stated.

Which means, we're done debating, because you ALREADY disagree with Hume. You think I'm confused, but clearly I'm showing you precisely how you're wrong. Of course I know it's you who is confused, but I don't care to keep tellin you that, instead I'm showing you YOUR ERROR.

Hume: Taste is an example of a value (paraphrased from your quote)

here is what I'm gettign in return:
"Mach..you're confused...you dont' know what I mean, I disagree with what Hume wrote, even though i am defending Hume's position."!!?!

That's checkmate long ago, I can't make you see it, I can only show it you, and ask you to fix your error, or accept it and move on.

You are calling that a value, but that's not the sense in which I am using the term. I am using the term value in the sense of a goal, end, prescription, or an ought-statement. Thus, your argument is simply a strawman as it does not address my point.

Sure, sure. You're using it in a sense that contradicts your position that Hume was correct. Until you resolve that, I can't move on to J.A.s new claims about values. First you need to accept you reject Hume, that you believe Hume was incorrect, then we close the book on that.

Then, we move on to your new claims. Jesus man, I am patient, please work this out.

It is illegal in the U.S. to murder human beings;
You live in the United States;
Therefore, you ought not to murder human beings in the United States.
This doesn't follow unless we presuppose another ought: that one ought to follow the law.

Who precisely made this claim?
"Therefore, you ought not to murder human beings in the United States."

-Mach