Start with the military
situation, because that’s the foundation of everything else. On the ground, Ukraine’s strategic position is deteriorating by the month. Mobilization efforts have stalled. Recruitment has collapsed. The average age of a frontline soldier is now nearing 45. Desertion and draft-dodging are spreading, and Western aid – though still flowing – is increasingly mismatched to Ukraine’s real needs. You can send as many artillery shells and drone kits as you like, but you cannot manufacture trained infantry out of nothing. And that’s what Ukraine is short of: not resolve, not hardware, but men.
Meanwhile, Russia’s army has
evolved. It’s no longer the chaotic, overstretched force that stumbled out into Ukraine in February 2022. It has absorbed its losses, adapted to the terrain, and reverted to what it does best: attritional warfare, backed by overwhelming firepower and deep reserves of manpower. Russia doesn’t need to stage flashy counter-offensives or overrun all of Ukraine. It only needs to advance slowly, dig in, and bleed Ukraine white – while maintaining pressure long enough to outlast Western political will. And that’s exactly what it’s doing.
Which brings us to the economic
front. There’s a persistent myth in Western capitals that Russia is teetering under the weight of sanctions –that the ruble is crumbling, the oligarchs are restless, and the economy is one shock away from implosion. This is wishful thinking. Sanctions have hurt, yes, but they have also catalyzed a strategic decoupling from the West that was probably inevitable anyway.
Russia has reoriented its economy toward Asia. It’s selling oil to India, natural gas to China, and arms to anyone willing to pay in non-Western currencies. The parallel financial system is crude but functional. And the state is compensating for consumer losses with heavy military-industrial spending – spending that, unlike in the West, is tied directly to battlefield outcomes and regime survival.
The IMF projects modest
growth for Russia in 2025. Inflation is high, but not catastrophic. Unemployment is low. And industrial output – especially in arms production – is booming. Yes, living standards have declined. But the state has managed the pain selectively, shielding key groups – soldiers, pensioners, the security apparatus – while letting the rest of society absorb the shock. It’s crude economic triage. But it works. And it buys time.