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The Original Intent of UN Security Council Resolution 242

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donsutherland1

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The following explanations are taken from the interview he granted the Journal of Palestine Studies in 1976. The excerpts are limited solely to his actual explanations concerning UN Security Council Resolution 242. His personal ideas, and he took pains to emphasize, in cases, that he was expressing personal opinions as a private citizen, are excluded.

In his interview, Lord Caradon made clear that the final boundaries and the status of Jerusalem could only be determined in negotiations. Thus, contemporary arguments that UNSC Res. 242 entitles the Palestinians to all of the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and East Jerusalem are inconsistent with the original intent of the Resolution. Any resolutions adopted by the UN or European Union that seek to "ratify" a Palestinian state "comprising the West Bank and Gaza and with East Jerusalem as its capital" in the absence of agreement from both Israel and the Palestinians are inconsistent with UNSC Res. 242.

The italicized text is Lord Caradon's commentary.

Pre-1967 War Boundaries:

We could have said; well, you go back to the 1967 line. But I know the 1967 line, and it’s a rotten line. You couldn’t have a worse line for a permanent international boundary. It’s where the troops happened to be on a certain night in 1948. It’s got no relation to the needs of the situation.

Had we said that you must go back to the 1967 line, which would have resulted if we had specified a retreat from all the occupied territories, we would have been wrong… So what we stated was the principle that you couldn’t hold territory because you conquered it, therefore there must be a withdrawal to—let’s read the words carefully—“secure and recognized boundaries.” They can only be secure if they are recognized. The boundaries have to be agreed; it’s only when you get agreement that you get security…

We meant that the occupied territories could not be held merely because they were occupied, but we deliberately did not say that the old line, where the troops happened to be on that particular night many years ago, was an ideal demarcation line.

Arriving at “Secure and Recognized Boundaries:”

…when the representatives of the four principal powers [Britain, France, U.S., and U.S.S.R.] met together at that time in the United Nations after the 1967 resolution, we all agreed that what we had to do was to readjust the line to make it a reasonable line, instead of an unreasonable line, and that this could be done one way or the other… We thought that they should be rectified.

Issues Concerning Jerusalem, among others:

These matters have got to be dealt with in negotiations… They’re all difficult. They’re all negotiable.

Source: Lord Caradon, “An Interview with Lord Caradon,” Journal of Palestine Studies, Spring-Summer 1976.
 
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Caradon AND other members of his delegation including perhaps the actual/"I formulated the resolution" author, George Brown.
(links/sources in my 242 string or elsewhere. Since we started a new one here, and since Every I-P string comes down to 242)


Lord Caradon.. U.K. Ambassador to the United Nations (1964-1970):

"We didn't say there should be a withdrawal to the '67 line; we did not put the 'the' in, we did not say all the territories, deliberately..
We all knew - that the boundaries of '67 were not drawn as permanent frontiers, they were a cease-fire line of a couple of decades earlier... We did Not say that the '67 boundaries must be forever."

MacNeil/Lehrer Report - March 30, 1978


Lord Caradon, interviewed on Kol Israel in February 1973:

Question: "This matter of the (definite) article which is there in French and is missing in English, is that really significant?"

Answer: "The purposes are perfectly clear, the principle is stated in the preamble, the necessity for withdrawal is stated in the operative section. And then the essential phrase which is not sufficiently recognized is that withdrawal should take place TO secure and recognized boundaries, and these words were very carefully chosen: they have to be secure and they have to be recognized. They will not be secure unless they are recognized. And that is why one has to work for agreement. This is essential. I would defend absolutely what we did.
It was NOT for us to lay down exactly where the border should be. I know the 1967 border very well. It is NOT a satisfactory border, it is where troops had to stop in 1947, just where they happened to be that night, that is Not a permanent boundary...



Mr. Michael Stewart, Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, in reply to a question in Parliament, 17 November 1969:

Question: "What is the British Interpretation of the wording of the 1967 Resolution? Does the Right Honourable Gentleman understand it to mean that the Israelis should withdraw from ALL territories taken in the late war?"

Mr. Stewart: "NO, Sir. That is NOT the phrase used in the Resolution. The Resolution speaks of secure and recognized boundaries. These words must be read Concurrently with the statement on withdrawal."



Mr. George Brown, British Foreign Secretary in 1967, on 19 January 1970:

"I have been asked over and over again to clarify, modify or improve the wording, but I do not intend to do that. The phrasing of the Resolution was very carefully worked out, and it was a difficult and complicated exercise to get it accepted by the UN Security Council.
"I formulated the Security Council Resolution. Before we submitted it to the Council, we showed it to Arab leaders.
The proposal said 'Israel will withdraw from territories that were occupied', and NOT from 'the' territories, which means that Israel will NOT Withdraw from all the territories."


"...Eban met Harold Wilson and GORGE BROWN who told him Britain was in "General Agreement" with the United States, but that as Britain now had "tolerable" relations with Egypt, it was sometimes possible to pursue a somewhat independent line.
BROWN told Eban that Britain would advocate Israeli withdrawal, BUT ONLY in the context of permanent peace and TO SUCH SECURE and agreed upon boundaries as would provide Satisfactorily for Israel's security."
-

The the Gist of this Whole delegation (and the USA one) makes clear that 'withdrawal' will only be to NEW/Negotiated 'secure and recognized' boundaries, recognizing, after the WarS to eliminate Israel, 'secure' included a new buffer/Incomplete withdrawal/Withdrawal Only as far as secure and make another Arab attack less likely.
ERGO, the words 'all' and even 'the' 'territories' (to 'withdraw' from) were Specifcally Rejected in many previous Failed drafts.
And that these borders would be NEW negotiated ones. (and history shows the arabs would NOT negotiate, leaving Israel with these territories that did get settled in small degree for lack of arab recognition to even talk)
Again, this is in the 242 string.
-
 
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Adding to the material on the meaning of UNSC Res. 242, here's how Eugene Rostow, who was U.S. Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs and played a role in drafting the Resolution, explained it:

Resolution 242, which as undersecretary of state for political affairs between 1966 and 1969 I helped produce, calls on the parties to make peace and allows Israel to administer the territories it occupied in 1967 until "a just and lasting peace in the Middle East" is achieved. When such a peace is made, Israel is required to withdraw its armed forces "from territories" it occupied during the Six-Day War--not from "the" territories, nor from "all" the territories, but from some of the territories which included the Sinai Desert, the West Bank, the Golan Heights, East Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip.

Five-and-a-half months of vehement public diplomacy in 1967 made it perfectly clear what the missing definite article in Resolution 242 means. Ingeniously drafted resolutions calling for withdrwal from "all" the territories were defeated in the Security Council and the General Assembly. Speaker after speaker made it explicit that Israel was not to be forced back to the "fragile" and "vulnerable" Armistice Demarcation Lines, but should retire once peace was made to what Resolution 242 called "secure and recognized" boundaries, agreed to by the parties...

Resolution 242 leaves the issue of dividing the occupied areas between Israel and its neighbors entirely to the agreement of the parties in accordance with the principles it sets out.

Source: Eugene V. Rostow, "Resolved," The New Republic, October 21, 1991.

The above explanation is wholly consistent with Lord Caradon's. The consistency demonstrates the original intent behind UNSC Res. 242.
 
Coup de Grace

And you'll note the recent arab call for the 1967 borders.

They DIDNT just say let's implement 242, which they know, at the very least is controversial or in reality/at worst against them.

Just as they knew 10 years ago!

 
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Many thanks

This is really quite a misleading interpretation of Caradon. But lets examine how you can justify your position given his comments at a symposium in the 70s;

United Nations Security Council Resolution 242 at AllExperts

To wit, Aban Ebbas, his Israeli counterpart seems to have entered that Caradons perception must have been dimmed by the passage of time, to which Caradon replied 'No not at all'.
Image and reality of the Israel ... - Google Books

I can concede that Caradon in saying that the 67 borders were unsatifactory intended the resolution to mean peace with withdrawal, that final status would be decided in negotiations, the negotiations would mean mutual land swaps. However, there is no green light to annexation or settlement ahead of negotiation.

Further to this;

We can add that Caradon emphasied the inadmissibility preamble.

or the US opposition to Israel holding large chunks of territory.

Or the comments of international delegations such as France and India.

or that in 67 10 of the 15 UNSC members empahised the inadmissibility principle, to which none voiced an objection on that point.

Of course, we should also include the actual grammatical english in the text, but that is for another time.

We should also include the ICJ 2004 advisory opinion.
 
Fisk demonstrates the problem quite clearly

That great American statesman George Ball was to recount how, when the Arabs negotiated over 242 in early November of 1967 – at the Waldorf Astoria (these guys knew how to pick the swankiest hotels for political betrayal) – the US ambassador to the UN, Arthur Goldberg, told King Hussein that America "could not guarantee that everything would be returned by Israel". The Arabs distrusted Goldberg because he was known to be pro-Zionist, but Hussein was much comforted when US Secretary of State Dean Rusk assured him in Washington that the US "did not approve of Israeli retention of the West Bank". Hussein was further encouraged when he met President Johnson who told him that Israeli withdrawal might take place in "six months". Goldberg further boosted his confidence. "Don't worry. They're on board," he said of the Israelis. Ho ho.

It's intriguing to note that several other nations at the UN were troubled by the absence of "the". The Indian delegate, for example, pointed out that the resolution referred to "all the territories – I repeat all the territories – occupied by Israel..." while the Soviet Union (which knew all about occupying other people's countries) stated that "we understand the decision to mean the withdrawal of Israeli forces from all, and we repeat, all territories belonging to Arab states and seized by Israel...". President Johnson rebuffed the Soviets and bluntly refused to put the word "all" in the resolution. Bulgaria, not surprisingly, said much the same as the Soviets. Brazil expressed reservations – rightly so – about "the clarity of the wording". The Argentinians "would have preferred a clearer text". In other words, the future tragedy was spotted at the time. But we did nothing. The Americans had stitched it up and the Brits went along with it. The Arabs were not happy but foolishly – and typically – relied on Caradon's assurances that "all" the territories was what 242 meant, even if it didn't say so. Israel still fought hard to get rid of the "inadmissability" bit, even when it had got "the" out.

Robert Fisk’s World: One missing word sowed the seeds of catastrophe - Robert Fisk, Commentators - The Independent

and the saddest part of the article

McHugo mischievously adds that a mandatory warning in a city that says "dogs must be kept on the lead near ponds in the park" clearly means that "all" dogs and "all" ponds are intended. These days, of course, we use walls to keep dogs out. Palestinians, too.



Yalla, big fish always eats small fish
 
The withdrawal and inadmissability section must be read IN CONTEXT. (not in Finkelstein)

As Caradon Reminds us:

Question: "This matter of the (definite) article which is there in French and is missing in English, is that really significant?"

Answer: "The purposes are perfectly clear, the principle is stated in the preamble, the necessity for withdrawal is stated in the operative section. And THEN the ESSENTIAL phrase which is Not Sufficiently recognized is that withdrawal should take place TO secure and recognized boundaries, and these words were very carefully chosen: they have to be secure and they have to be recognized. They will not be secure unless they are recognized. And that is why one has to work for agreement. This is essential. I would defend absolutely what we did.
It was NOT for us to lay down exactly where the border should be. I know the 1967 border very well. It is NOT a satisfactory border, it is where troops had to stop in 1947, just where they happened to be that night, that is Not a permanent boundary...

and Stewart Echoes this:

""Does the Right Honourable Gentleman understand it to mean that the Israelis should withdraw from ALL territories taken in the late war?"

Mr. Stewart: "NO, Sir. That is NOT the phrase used in the Resolution. The Resolution speaks of secure and recognized boundaries. These words must be read Concurrently with the statement on withdrawal."

AGAIN and completely consistent.. what kind of 'withdrawal'?
British Foreign secretary who Wrote it.

Mr. George Brown, British Foreign Secretary in 1967, on 19 January 1970:

"I have been asked over and over again to clarify, modify or improve the wording, but I do not intend to do that. The phrasing of the Resolution was very carefully worked out, and it was a difficult and complicated exercise to get it accepted by the UN Security Council.
">I< formulated the Security Council Resolution. Before we submitted it to the Council, we showed it to Arab leaders.
The proposal said 'Israel will withdraw from territories that were occupied', and NOT from 'the' territories, which means that Israel will NOT Withdraw from all the territories."

Brown again. what degree of withdrawal?


"...Eban met Harold Wilson and GORGE BROWN who told him Britain was in "General Agreement" with the United States, but that as Britain now had "tolerable" relations with Egypt, it was sometimes possible to pursue a somewhat independent line.
BROWN told Eban that Britain would advocate Israeli withdrawal, BUT ONLY in the context of permanent peace and TO SUCH SECURE and agreed upon boundaries as would provide Satisfactorily for Israel's security."
 
creation said:
This is really quite a misleading interpretation of Caradon. But lets examine how you can justify your position given his comments at a symposium in the 70s
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The italicized text is Lord Caradon's own explanation. To suggest that Lord Caradon's own commentary on UNSC Res. 242 is a "misleading interpretation" of Lord Caradon's description of the Resolution's intent is quite a stretch.
 

That is more certainly not what Lord Caradon said in his own words:

And then reaffirmed here:

"Secure and recognized borders" would be any border that is not on territory occupied from the 1967 conflict.

Only the US and Israel hold the position that withdrawal is not on ALL the territories occupied. However, every other representative (that voiced an opinion on the matter [meaning any nation not in America's handhold]) to the UN Security Council affirmed, prior to the drafting, that withdrawal must be on ALL territories occupied in 1967:

Representative from India to UN Security Council:

Representative from Russia to UN Security Council:
 
Mira,

I'm sure you can well appreciate that diplomacy sometimes has to use language that papers over differences to reach agreement. There were very significant differences among the parties to the conflict and the world's great powers at the time. The Cold War rivalry was also superimposed on the conflict.

Imperfect as the Resolution might be, it is consistent with the reality that the 1949 armistice lines were temporary demarcation lines, not permanent boundaries. Even if there had been no 1967 War, negotiations were required to develop, among other things, permanent boundaries. UNSC Res. 242 did not stray from that fact. It also provides sufficient basis on which a peace agreement can be developed.
 
donsutherland1 said:
The italicized text is Lord Caradon's own explanation. To suggest that Lord Caradon's own commentary on UNSC Res. 242 is a "misleading interpretation" of Lord Caradon's description of the Resolution's intent is quite a stretch.
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Don

If im stretching and it is your meaning of his intent and words that is correct then it should be a trifle for you to explain that comments from Lord Caradon that I have provided you with.

Is there a problem in doing this?
 

Thank you for this interjection.

Surely the OP and his supporters should be able to actually address the meaning of comments you have cited in quotation and bold form if they want to be taken seriously as presenting a rounded and well informed case.
 
Degreez said:
"Secure and recognized borders" would be any border that is not on territory occupied from the 1967 conflict.
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That was not Lord Caradon's position. Lord Caradon was highlighting the areas that were captured, and I have no dispute whatsoever, with the areas that were captured. He did not intend that the pre-1967 boundaries be imposed, and I quoted from an extensive interview he gave on the subject.

Why the seeming contradiction? Did Lord Caradon tell different audiences different things? Did he change his mind?

No. The quote you provided does not provide the entire context of his position. Hence, it does not, and I repeat not, address his view on how UNSC Res. 242 seeks to remedy the situation. Leaving out those vital details creates an inaccurate representation.

His position, based on numerous interviews and comments he made was:

1. The principle of non-acquisition of territory should guide policy making (and again, I have no dispute with the principle).

2. The circumstances need to be considered. The historic context is vital. In the case of the pre-1967 war boundaries, those boundaries were demarcation lines, only. They were not recognized boundaries. And, in Lord Caradon's words, they were "rotten" boundaries. The 1967 war only shifted lines but did not in any way shatter a settled issue. The issue of boundaries needed to be resolved prior to the war. It needs to be resolved now. UNSC. Res. 242 allows ample latitude to do so.

Indeed, when Indian Amb. Parthasarathi stated that the Resolution required total withdrawal, Lord Caradon clarified the matter stating that such an interpretation was India's view. Relevant excerpts from that exchange:

Amb. Parthasarathi: It is our understanding that the draft resolution, if approved by the Council, will commit it to the application of the principle of total withdrawal of Israel forces from all the territories--I repeat, all the territories occupied by Israel as a result of the conflict which began on 5 June 1967.

In other words, the draft commits the Council to the withdrawal of Israel forces from the whole of Sinai, Gaza, the Old City of Jerusalem, Jordanian territory west of the Jordan River and the Syrian territory...

Lord Caradon: I would say that the draft resolution is a balanced whole. To add to it or to detract from it would destroy the balance and also destroy the wide measure of agreement we have achieved together. It must be considered as a whole and as it stands. I suggest that we have reached the stage when most, if not all, of us want the resolution, the whole resolution and nothing but the resolution...

I would say that every delegation has a right, of course, and a duty to state its own views. As I said on Monday: "Every delegation is entitled, indeed is expected, to state the separate and distinct policy of the Government it represents."

3. The disputed areas ranging from boundaries to Jerusalem's status needed to be resolved through negotiations.

Those were Lord Caradon's positions. They were entirely reasonable and fair-minded. I have no objections to any of those three points.

His personal view, and he was quite explicit in making the point that he was offering a personal insight, was that Jordan have a "role" in East Jerusalem.

With respect to Lord Caradon's personal view on Jerusalem, under the contemporary situation, "Palestinians" would be substituted for Jordan. "Role" does not preclude arrangements short of giving the Palestinians all of East Jerusalem e.g., it does not preclude joint sovereignty in East Jerusalem, among other possible formulas for accommodating the two sides' needs with respect to East Jerusalem.
 
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creation said:
Thank you for this interjection.

Surely the OP and his supporters should be able to actually address the meaning of comments you have cited in quotation and bold form if they want to be taken seriously as presenting a rounded and well informed case.
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The bolded portion is merely a fragment of his comments. One needs the whole context to get his meaning. Once one reads the context, and he has made it available in numerous interviews and comments, one finds that Lord Caradon did not interpret UNSC. Res. 242 as requiring withdrawal from "all" the territories captured. UNSC. Res. 242 required withdrawal to "secure and recognized boundaries" and those boundaries, along with other elements of the dispute, would be resolved in negotiations.
 
donsutherland1 said:
The italicized text is Lord Caradon's own explanation. To suggest that Lord Caradon's own commentary on UNSC Res. 242 is a "misleading interpretation" of Lord Caradon's description of the Resolution's intent is quite a stretch.
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I saw that and couldn't help but laugh. "Misleading translation"? What was translated, the Lord wrote it himself. :lol:
 
rogerredy said:
I saw that and couldn't help but laugh. "Misleading translation"? What was translated, the Lord wrote it himself. :lol:
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Ok rogue, so what did he mean by it?
 
Mr. Arthur Goldberg, US representative, in the Security Council in the course of the discussions which preceded the adoption of Resolution 242:


"To seek withdrawal without secure and recognized boundaries ... would be just as fruitless as to seek secure and recognized boundaries without withdrawal. Historically, there have never been secure or recognized boundaries in the area. Neither the armistice lines of 1949 nor the cease-fire lines of 1967 have answered that description... such boundaries have yet to be agreed upon. An agreement on that point is an absolute essential to a just and lasting peace just as withdrawal is... " (S/PV. 1377, p. 37, of 15. 11.67)


Mr. Joseph Sisco, Assistant Secretary of State, 12 July 1970 (NBC "Meet the Press"):


"That Resolution did not say 'withdrawal to the pre-June 5 lines'. The Resolution said that the parties must negotiate to achieve agreement on the so-called final secure and recognized borders. In other words, the question of the final borders is a matter of negotiations between the parties."


Eugene V. Rostow, Professor of Law and Public Affairs, Yale University, who, in 1967, was US Under-Secretary of State for Political Affairs:


"... Paragraph 1 (i) of the Resolution calls for the withdrawal of Israeli armed forces 'from territories occupied in the recent conflict', and not 'from the territories occupied in the recent conflict'. Repeated attempts to amend this sentence by inserting the word 'the' failed in the Security Council. It is, therefore, not legally possible to assert that the provision requires Israeli withdrawal from all the territories now occupied under the cease-fire resolutions to the Armistice Demarcation lines." (American Journal of International Law, Volume 64, September 1970, p. 69)

"The agreement required by paragraph 3. of the Resolution, the Security Council said, should establish 'secure and recognized boundaries' between Israel and its neighbors 'free from threats or acts of force', to replace the Armistice Demarcation lines established in 1949, and the cease-fire lines of June 1967. The Israeli armed forces should withdraw to such lines as part of a comprehensive agreement, settling all the issues mentioned in the Resolution, and in a condition of peace." (American Journal of International Law, Volume 64, September 1970, p. 68)

From now on when you hear a diplomat, politician, terrorist, newsman, or clueless poster say that 242 calls for Israel to withdraw from the territories please tell them to shove it.
 
The Birth of Resolution 242


On November 7, 1967, the United Arab Republic (Egypt) turned to the president of the UN Security Council and requested an urgent meeting of the Council, considering that Israel refused to pull its forces out of the territories it occupied in the Six-Day War of June 1967. The Security Council met for several sessions from November 9, 1967, through November 22.

Two draft resolutions were presented to the council: First, there was a draft resolution introduced by India, Mali, and Nigeria; and second, the U.S. prepared a draft resolution, as well. During the meetings, two other draft resolutions were preparedne by the British of November 16, 1967, and a second resolution by the Soviets on November 20.

After a number of Security Council debates, there was only a vote on the British draft resolution, which was finally adopted unanimously. In practice, the proposed British text was a compromise between the various drafts that had been considered. Once adopted, the British draft resolution was formally numbered Resolution 242.

It should be emphasized that in the various debates that had been held previously in the UN General Assembly, where the Arab bloc enjoyed an automatic (57-1) majority against Israel, many anti-Israel resolutions had been adopted regarding the Arab-Israeli conflict. However, General Assembly resolutions are only recommendations and, therefore, do not create international legal obligations. In contrast to the resolutions of the UN General Assembly, UN Security Council resolutions are legally binding, to the extent to which they are adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. A Chapter VII resolution, according to the Charter, is an "action with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace and acts of aggression."

But Resolution 242 did not fit into the category of a Chapter VII resolution (for Israel's action in the Six-Day War did not merit that characterization). Instead, Resolution 242 was adopted under Chapter VI of the UN Charter that deals with "pacific resolution of disputes." Thus, all the efforts of the Arab bloc to have Israel branded at the UN as the aggressor in the Six-Day War completely failed. Therefore, according to Resolution 242, Israel was assigned rights and obligations with respect to the territories its forces had captured.
 

Thank you

Yes, this was/ is a good thread youve pointed us to.

I direct members here to post no.238

 
The above, CJPME is a Pathetic piece of crap And seemingly mostly Arab/Pro-Palestinian Arabic 'Peace group' and completely and Goofily anti-Israel.
and hardly scholarly Brief piece,
(citing Finkelstein among others like Hamas Leader! Abdel Aziz al-Ranhtissi!! in it's notes 8/9!)
The group being a stop on Twinkelstein's Crackpot tour! Norman G. Finkelstein CJPME 2008 Speaker Series: Norman FinkelsteinSrie de confrences 2008 de CJPMO: Norman Finkelstein
and Ironically cites Lord Caradons' UNSC Resolution 24, Case Study in Ambiguity.
NO author Named, but probably by the sites Registrant, Loauy Jabry.

To see their Completely Biased agenda just see their Home page CJPME - Canadians for Justice and Peace in the Middle East: Home

And regularly has speakers on "israeli Apartheid", "the Israelli Lobby",
Completely Biased ****-on-a-stick:

'Who Is"


The 4 listed Blog entries on CJPME's site.

CJPME Blog
December 09, 2009, 12:00 AM
Nadine Dajani, Montreal, QC

November 12, 2009, 12:00 AM
Sami Elkhayri, London, ON

November 06, 2009, 12:00 AM
Muhammed Hamou, London, ON

September 12, 2009, 12:00 AM
Nadine Dajani,

For info on any of their ALL pro-Arab/anti-Israel press releases? (like their support of al-Jazeera and a score more Biased utterances) "Contact Grace Batchoun".
Or just don't bother.
Just another electronicacca. So many using this Deceptive 'peace' routine.
And just more creation-ism.
 
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Yes, thank you.

Im pretty happy with CJPME, and Norman Finkelstein. They both make good argument.
People who quote things like the ADL and Christian Action for Israel should watch out for the glass coming down on their heads as they throw their stones.

And theres little wrong with Al-jezeera. I watch it all the time - its even carried by the News Corp, i.e. Rupert Murdoch!

As for 'Lord Caradons' UNSC Resolution 24, Case Study in Ambiguity' it was apparently a symposium including Mr Foot, A. Ebban and a few others and its introduced by J Sissco.

Anyway, if anyone has a problem with the actual arguments presented by CJPME or Norman Finkelstein then lets discuss it.
 
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You have a nice little circle jerk going.
Your routine here.
Back up crackpot Finkelfuhrer with his [fellow anti-semite] Hangout crackpot 'counterpunch! who he oft writes for, and his own opinion of himself-- throw in a few more fringe leftists and anti-Israel arab sites and you are perfect example of how any opinion (no matter how bigoted) can be backed by a circle of other radicals.

$15 a year and you've got your own anti-Israel Stormfront/RadioIslam/Rense/Finkelstein/Counterpunch/CJPME/etc, etc.
 
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Why havent you addressed any of the arguments presented?

Why this nonsense about the people I quote? Its childsplay for me to add a similar line right back at you. Where does that get us?

Surely given your wealth of expertise it be a trifle for you to address anything I present clearly, without bolding every third sentence or telling me Im using crackpots, stormfront, radioislam or paying money for the priveledge.

Why waste our time with telling me about some circlejerk? Dont you realise how insulting that is? Please, I implore you to avoid such inflammatory language, as well as wasting everyone's time it just makes it easier for me to reply and even worse it makes me look more reasonable than you to the average reader.
 
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