- Joined
- Sep 28, 2011
- Messages
- 17,200
- Reaction score
- 13,727
- Location
- SF Bay Area
- Gender
- Male
- Political Leaning
- Conservative
It's education time.
I requested Grok 3, in its lengthily deep search mode, to estimate TWO hypotheticals using its economic tools, economic studies on China trade, and their elasticities: First
First hypothetical, if in Trump's first term he had accepted China's long-standing WTO approved tariff average (8%) and kept the US tariff average of 3.4 percent (also WTO approved). What would be the 2024 import/export estimated for both nations?
Second, what if in Trumps first term China had immediately capitulated and lowered its average tariffs to 3.4 percent, while US also left it tariffs on China at the same preexisting rate of 3.4 percent. What would be the 2024 import/exports estimated for both nations?
By comparing these numbers one can estimate the impact of "unequal" tariffs on US exports to China.
Results were:

Key finding
- US exporters were not be significantly limited by China's "unfair and unequal" tariffs against US products before Trump's first crusade. If China lowered its average tariff to the US average, and thus equalizing rates in the first term it would have only increased US exports to China by 7 billion dollars, from 154 billion to 161 billion. Ergo, the Chinese businesses and consumers still would not find US products much more attractive than before - meaning average Chinese tariffs were not responsible for the trade deficit nor "ripping us off".
So the next question is, what were actual results of Trump's anti-China tarrif crusade during his first term?
Trump's aggressive meddling resulted in a tariff war of reprocity and it caused China to increase its average tariffs on US exporters to 21 percent (later lowered to 15 percent) while the US imposed an average tariff of 20.8 percent, continuing through the Biden administration.

So, it's fair to ask how did that change both countries imports and exports:

Key findings-
- Trumps "deal" with China cost both nations. It reduced US exports to China about 9 billion from what it otherwise would have been under the 2016 orginal tariffs. More significantly, it reduced US imports of Chinese goods by 65 billion, nudging the trade deficit downward to 295 billion rather than what would have been 360 billion.
- Most of the added tariff costs were passed through to US importers, US businesses, and US consumers.
- Chinese companies mitigated their lost sales by finding new customers, or relocating to other countries to sell to the US from a less tariffed location, but not in relocating to the United States.
Conclusion -
It appears that after analyzing the economic findings of tariff effects by other expert sources, Trumps first term Tariffs war was severe failure and unforced error. He got his "agreement" which, due to his own false premises, only denied Americans the purchase of 65 billion dollars of Chinese goods while imposing the major costs of added tariffs on the US population. Supporting studies show companies did not "reshore" to the US but elsewhere, and that the US did not develop new manufacturing to replace these lost product trade.
That isn't winning, that is losing.
-
I requested Grok 3, in its lengthily deep search mode, to estimate TWO hypotheticals using its economic tools, economic studies on China trade, and their elasticities: First
First hypothetical, if in Trump's first term he had accepted China's long-standing WTO approved tariff average (8%) and kept the US tariff average of 3.4 percent (also WTO approved). What would be the 2024 import/export estimated for both nations?
Second, what if in Trumps first term China had immediately capitulated and lowered its average tariffs to 3.4 percent, while US also left it tariffs on China at the same preexisting rate of 3.4 percent. What would be the 2024 import/exports estimated for both nations?
By comparing these numbers one can estimate the impact of "unequal" tariffs on US exports to China.
Results were:

Key finding
- US exporters were not be significantly limited by China's "unfair and unequal" tariffs against US products before Trump's first crusade. If China lowered its average tariff to the US average, and thus equalizing rates in the first term it would have only increased US exports to China by 7 billion dollars, from 154 billion to 161 billion. Ergo, the Chinese businesses and consumers still would not find US products much more attractive than before - meaning average Chinese tariffs were not responsible for the trade deficit nor "ripping us off".
So the next question is, what were actual results of Trump's anti-China tarrif crusade during his first term?
Trump's aggressive meddling resulted in a tariff war of reprocity and it caused China to increase its average tariffs on US exporters to 21 percent (later lowered to 15 percent) while the US imposed an average tariff of 20.8 percent, continuing through the Biden administration.

So, it's fair to ask how did that change both countries imports and exports:

Key findings-
- Trumps "deal" with China cost both nations. It reduced US exports to China about 9 billion from what it otherwise would have been under the 2016 orginal tariffs. More significantly, it reduced US imports of Chinese goods by 65 billion, nudging the trade deficit downward to 295 billion rather than what would have been 360 billion.
- Most of the added tariff costs were passed through to US importers, US businesses, and US consumers.
- Chinese companies mitigated their lost sales by finding new customers, or relocating to other countries to sell to the US from a less tariffed location, but not in relocating to the United States.
Conclusion -
It appears that after analyzing the economic findings of tariff effects by other expert sources, Trumps first term Tariffs war was severe failure and unforced error. He got his "agreement" which, due to his own false premises, only denied Americans the purchase of 65 billion dollars of Chinese goods while imposing the major costs of added tariffs on the US population. Supporting studies show companies did not "reshore" to the US but elsewhere, and that the US did not develop new manufacturing to replace these lost product trade.
That isn't winning, that is losing.
-
Last edited: