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The Ostpolitik was a term Willy Brandt coined during his Chancellorship for a new policy towards the USSR and the Eastern Block, a policy less confrontational and more open for cooperation. It was under Brandt's Chancellorship that energy cooperation between West Germany and the USSR begun, and the FRG started to import Russian energy. While not all things from Brandt's Chancellorship were considered popular, the Ostpolitk was, and survived the test of time. The Chancellors following Brandt all continued it, whether it was Schmidt (SPD), Kohl (CDU), Schröder (SPD), Merkel (CDU) and even Scholz (SPD) until the invasion of Ukraine. Of course details have changed, USSR has disappeared, and the ideological Communist threat is gone and Germany is reunified. However for many Germans this was just proof of the success of the Ostpolitik. Germany's reunification was tied to the relationship with the USSR, surely if the German state now was unified and the Communists were gone, the foreign policy decisions was an astounding success. Then we throw the Nordstream project into the mix, and while discussion to deepen energy ties was discussed throughout the 90s, it was under Schröder's chancellorship it became more concrete with Nordstream 1 being approved, built and put into action, which of course was continued with the approval of Nordstream 2 under Merkel's watch.
While Germany now tries to wriggle itself away from the Ostpolitik, the shadow of still looms over German foreign policy. The hesitation to approve Leopard tanks being delivered to Ukraine even from third countries can be seen under this lens. It's not easy to change Foreign Policy doctrine, a good relationship with Moscow has for decades been a cornerstone in German foreign policy. I live in a country with a similar dilemma, in Finland politicians often bragged about how they understood Russia better than those from other European countries due to the "special relationship" between Helsinki and Moscow that goes all the way back to Paasikivi and Kekkonen (and probably only existed in the fantasies of older politicians at least since around the year 2000). The problem Berlin is facing is similar, they thought they understood Putin, that they knew him, and he understood them. That he would never go so far as to start a war (despite doing it twice before) because he wouldn't want his partners in Europe to be disappointed. But the reality is that the Ostpolitik is dead, and it can't be salvaged anymore.
While Germany now tries to wriggle itself away from the Ostpolitik, the shadow of still looms over German foreign policy. The hesitation to approve Leopard tanks being delivered to Ukraine even from third countries can be seen under this lens. It's not easy to change Foreign Policy doctrine, a good relationship with Moscow has for decades been a cornerstone in German foreign policy. I live in a country with a similar dilemma, in Finland politicians often bragged about how they understood Russia better than those from other European countries due to the "special relationship" between Helsinki and Moscow that goes all the way back to Paasikivi and Kekkonen (and probably only existed in the fantasies of older politicians at least since around the year 2000). The problem Berlin is facing is similar, they thought they understood Putin, that they knew him, and he understood them. That he would never go so far as to start a war (despite doing it twice before) because he wouldn't want his partners in Europe to be disappointed. But the reality is that the Ostpolitik is dead, and it can't be salvaged anymore.