I'm taking a step back. Not that there is any more merit to this panel's approach, but that I shouldn't blame casual readers for falling for it, because it "
sounds" plausible. What the Court assiduously avoids, and why the deception
seems logical, are
the myriad legal precepts and precedents it ignores or violates. It doesn't read like the nonsense that it is. I reacted as a lawyer, not as an uninformed reader. I'll try to make up for that.
The first rule of statutory interpretation is actually to "not make an ass of the law"; or, put more academically, that the law should be interpreted
to make sense. To do so, one looks first to the structure, language and purpose of the law. Sometimes that purpose is obvious on its face, sometimes one has to look to legislative history. In this instance, the panel's deception begins in the very first paragraph: "Text, precedent, and historical practice confirm this “day for the election” is the day by which ballots
must be both cast by voters and received by state officials." That is patently untrue. That has, in fact,
never been true, which is why no other court has ruled this way. They get away with this lie because there is no dissent to keep them
honest. As noted earlier, 20 jurisdictions have laws on the books that directly refute the claim.
https://www.ncsl.org/elections-and-...-postmark-deadlines-for-absentee-mail-ballots Others have case law to the same effect.
Another rule of statutory construction is that courts should avoid constructions that conflict with other laws, and not reach a constitutional issue (such as preemption) if it can be avoided. The Court did not even pretend to do that, indeed
assuming federal preemption when that is inconsistent with longstanding precedent which
avoids preemption unless Congress affirmatively asserts it. Congress did not do so here. In fact, Congress has frequently taken steps to avoid interference with the voting franchise (rather than, as the court does here, disenfranchisement), and expand flexibility (such as HAVA). These efforts contradict this court's "interpretation" of Congress intent.
Finally (for now), the Court arbitrarily dismisses the longstanding "mailbox rule" of "constructive receipt" which
many jurisdictions, including the federal enclave of the District of Columbia, use: postmark by election day constitutes "constructive receipt". The panel simply dismisses this by asserting "voting is not a contract". It provides no other justification. That's absurd.
This opinion is not only sloppy, it is historically unsound, logically inconsistent and embarrassingly violative of even rudimentary legal construction.